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Academic freedom is an issue dating back to the time of Plato. 
Tenure has been linked with academic freedom for at least a century. The 
relationship between academic freedom and tenure is still debated as is 
the issue of academic freedom for nontenured faculty members. 
While states have tenure laws for public school teachers, only 
seventeen states have legislative enactments concerning tenure for 
community college faculty. Faced with a lack of pertinent legislation, 
some community colleges have developed their own tenure systems. In the 
many community colleges that have no tenure systems, administrators face 
the problem of safeguarding faculty rights while effectively 
administering their institutions. 
It is the purpose of this study to provide community college 
administrators with guidelines to help them recognize teacher rights so 
they may avoid wrongful dismissals with the accompanying damage to 
academic freedom. Damage to the community college may occur as a result 
of litigation resulting from dismissals and nonrenewals. This study, 
through analysis of state statutes and judicial decisions also provides a 
set of guidelines that community college administrators will find helpful 
in making dismissal and nonrenewal decisions. 
Based on analysis of judicial decisions, the following conclusions 
are made. (1) Courts will intervene when a teacher's right to free 
speech is infringed. (2) Courts will intervene when a dismissal has 
infringed upon a property interest, an interest that exists for teachers 
with tenure or de facto tenure. (3) Courts will intervene when colleges 
fail to follow established policies and rules. (4) Most dismissal cases 
will involve both liberty and property claims. (5) Liberty and property 
claims and procedural grounds will continue to be the basis for judicial 
decisions. (6) Where constitutionally protected activity is involved, 
courts will seek to determine if the protected activity is the principal 
reason for dismissal. (7) Tenure systems will continue to be threatened 
by declining enrollment. (8) Trends toward political conservatism will 
increase the threats to academic freedom. (9) The right of boards of 
trustees to establish and enforce curriculum standards will continue to 
be sustained by the courts. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Academic freedom is a philosophy of intellectual freedom that arose 
among the Greeks and again in European universities in the Middle Ages. 1 
At that time the principal concern was the effect of the medieval church 
on the freedom of scholars. 2 A more modern conception of academic 
freedom came from nineteenth-century Germany. At that point the state, 
not the church, provided sponsorship for the majority of universities. 3 
The German professors called for lehrfreiheit and lernfreiheit, freedom 
of teaching and learning, respectively. Together with many other ideas 
borrowed from the German universities, that view of academic freedom was 
4 incorporated into the American conception of intellectual freedom. 
In the United States as elsewhere, academic freedom is associated 
closely with the policy of tenure, a policy that was also followed to 
some extent in the Middle Ages where those in power, notably the popes, 
looked out for the physical security and material comfort of scholars, 
5 though this protection by no means assured academic freedom. Indeed, 
1Ralph Fuchs, "Academic Freedom--Its Basic Philosophy, Function and 
History," in Academic Freedom--The Scholar's Place in Modern Society, ed. 
Hans W. Baade (New York: Oceana Publications, 1964), p. 1. 
2Ibid. 
3Academic American Encyclopedia, s.v. "Academic Freedom", by 
Edward Pincoffs. 
4Ibid. 
5 Fuchs, p. 7. 
2 
the mere fact that the scholar's comfort and physical safety depended on 
those in authority tended to result in an aversion to the expression of 
ideas that might offend. 6 Even then, however, scholars sought a degree 
of autonomy, an immunity even from those who sponsored them. When 
conflicts did arise, some of the old universities such as Oxford were 
using forms of due process, where scholars could be dismissed for just 
7 cause. 
The Protestant Reformation marked a turning point in the academic 
freedom and tenure issue. Many universities fell at this time under more 
8 control by the state as opposed to the church. This was especially true 
in England. In conjunction with its new state-created religion the non-
9 religious element became increasingly important. 
American schools, just beginning at a time when these effects were 
still being felt, were subject to strict regulations ~y boards of state 
or church officials, notably at Harvard University and the College of 
William and Mary. From the beginning those colleges had adopted another 
European idea, the fellow, who usually enjoyed unlimited tenure. 10 
6walter Metzger, "Academic Tenure in America: A Historical Essay," 
in Faculty Tenure: A Report and Recommendations, ed, William Keast 
(San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1978), p. 94. 
7 Ibid., p. 102. 
8 Fuchs, p. 4. 
9Lord Chorley, "Academic Freedom in the United Kingdom," in Academic 
Freedom--The Scholar's Place in Modern Society, ed, Hans W. Baade 
(New York: Oceana Publications, 1964), p. 221. 
10 Metzger, p. 109. 
However, in the late seventeenth century there were proposals to limit 
tenure, and in 1716 the officials at Harvard ruled that all new tutors 
would be limited to three-year terms, though they could be reappointed 
11 for additional three-year periods. 
3 
As mentioned earlier, the trend against tenure diminished greatly in 
the nineteenth century. Formal hearings, employed in the colonial 
period, made a comeback, and appeals of tenure matters could be made to 
12 the courts, though few were. 
Struggles over these issues helped spur the development of the 
American Association of University Professors (AAUP) in 1915. In that 
year the AAUP issued a declaration from its Committee on Academic Freedom 
13 and Tenure, and has since updated is position. 
In the twentieJ:h century the tenure debate has heated up and abated 
with changing conditions. Serious threats to academic freedom came as a 
result of World War I and the accompanying distrust of foreign 
influences. 14 This often placed faculties in defensive positions. The 
Great Depression increased faculty desire for security while the infusion 
of money into the educational system after World War II resulted in a 
prosperity that educators desired to keep even as that prosperity 
diminished. 15 New and serious threats to academic freedom and tenure 
11
Ibid.' p. 117. 
12Ibid., p. 129. 
13 8. Fuchs, p. 
14 Bulletin, February-March, 1918, 29' 41. A.A.U.P. P• 
15 156. Metzger, p. 
4 
came during the McCarthy era and a great deal was written in defense of 
16 tenure as a result. The most recent threat to tenure is that posed by 
declining enrollment and the oversupply of educators. Many colleges are 
at the point of having large percentages of their faculties possessing 
tenure and face the problem of what to do about younger faculty 
17 
members.· 
Community colleges, having come into their own only in the past two 
decades, have had to face the above mentioned dilemmas from the time the 
institutions were founded, a situation that could help explain the 
problems those colleges have with the tenure issue. 18 
Notably in more recent years, numerous cases concerning academic 
freedom and tenure have found their way into the courts. Some of the 
cases involve community colleges or other two-year colleges. This study 
will review the major court cases concerning academic freedom and tenure 
in community colleges. 
Much has been written concerning academic freedom and tenure from 
the public school and the collegiate perspectives; however, there is a 
scarcity of material dealing specifically with community colleges. 
16Arval A. Morris, "Academic Freedom and Loyalty Oaths," in Academic 
Freedom--The Scholar's Place in Modern Society, ed. Hans W. Baade 
(New York: Oceana Publications, 1964), p. 67. 
17 Bardwell L. Smith and Associates, The Tenure Debate 
(San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers), p. 270. 
18 Charles R. Monroe, Profile of the Community 
College (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers), p. 270. 
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Selected key studies, only some of which deal exclusively with community 
colleges, will be reviewed.in order that the judicial issues may become 
more apparent. 
The purpose of this study is to provi.de community college 
administrators with a review of the tenure issue together with an 
examination of the larger issue of academic freedom. It presents 
arguments for and against tenure as a means of protecting academic 
freedom and reviews the legal issues involved, 
Statement of the Problem 
In making decisions concerning tenure as a means of safeguarding 
academic freedom, administrators face pressures. One of these is a 
pressure internal to the institution. Opposition to tenure may come from 
some administrators who dislike the complex due-process procedures that 
must be followed in dismissal cases. The procedural process may include 
documentation, written charges, and time limitations. Tenure may also 
prove a problem to administrators when a reduction in force becomes 
necessary. 
Another group that may have strong opinions on tenure in community 
colleges is the people in the local community. As the name implies, 
those schools often have closer ties with the community than do large 
universities. Some citizens may question why faculty should have jobs 
guaranteed while those in other occupations do not. 
In order to respond to these pressures, decision-makers need 
appropriate information. They need an awareness of the arguments for and 
against tenure and the relationship between tenure and academic freedom. 
Also, they need a knowledge of the legal ramifications of their 
decisions. 
Questions to be Answered 
In order to provide administrators with guidelines for making 
decisions regarding academic freedom and tenure, several key questions 
need to be answered. Those questions are listed below. 
6 
1. Under what circumstances, if any, are constitutional rights of 
faculty involved when administrators of community colleges and technical 
institutes are faced with academic freedom and tenure problems? 
2. What are the major educational issues regarding academic 
freedom and tenure in community colleges and technical institutes? 
3. Which of these educational issues involve legal questions as 
reflected in court cases concerning community colleges and technical 
institutes? 
4. Based on recent court cases, what issues related to academic 
freedom and tenure are under litigation at this time? 
5. What trends, if any, can be seen from the court cases? 
6. Based on precedents established by "landmark" cases, what are 
legally acceptable criteria which are most likely to assist 
administrators of community colleges and technical institutes in 
preventing legal action in academic freedom and tenure cases? 
Scope of the Study 
This study examines the legal issues of academic freedom and tenure 
related to community colleges especially as those issues are influenced 
by litigation. The research describes the litigation, its causes and 
outcomes, and the possible effects that judicial decisions may have on 
community college administrators. 
This study does not attempt to debate conclusively the argument 
either for or against tenure in two-year colleges, although advantages 
and disadvantages of tenure will be presented. 
7 
This study includes a review of the literature related directly or 
indirectly to academic freedom and tenure in ~ommunity colleges. Major 
court cases related to those issues from 1952 to the present are included 
in the review. 
Methods, Procedures, and Sources of Information 
This study is historical in nature and examines available references 
concerning academic freedom and tenure, especially as those issues affect 
community colleges. 
Dissertation Abstracts were searched to determine the need for this 
study. Relevant journal articles were located with the help of the 
Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature, Education Index, and the Index 
to Legal Periodicals. 
Summaries of pertinent research were found in a review of literature 
assisted by a computer search from the Educational Resources Information 
Center (ERIC). 
Court cases cited were located through use of the Corpus Juris 
Secundum, American Jurisprudence, and the National Reporter System. The 
more recent court cases cited were found through the NOLPE School Law 
Reporter. 
8 
Definition of Terms 
Selected terms used frequently in this study are defined as follows: 
Academic Freedom. While a large number of definitions of the term 
have been formulated, most have certain elements in common in that they 
speak of freedom in all of the following scholarly activities: study, 
research, opinion, discussion, expression, publication, speech, teaching, 
writing, and communication. 19 One view of academic freedom that seems to 
be inclusive would give the meaning as: 
••• a security against hazards to the pursuit of truth by those 
persons whose lives are dedicated to conserving the intellectual 
heritage of the ages and to extending the realm of knowledge. It 
is the right or group of rights, intended to make it possible for 
certain persons (always few in number in any society when compared 
with the bulk of the population) to reach truthfully and to e'8loy 
their reason to the full extent of their intellectual powers. 
In spite of the large number of court cases involving the rights of 
educators, the term academic freedom is not often mentioned. In part it 
is due to a lack of understanding of the concept on the part of the 
general public. The misunderstanding has been heightened by the fact 
that academic freedom is an alien concept to many people outside of the 
educational system. In 1952 in a dissenting opinion in Alder v. Board of 
Education of City of New York, Justice Douglas became the first member of 
the Supreme Court to recognize academic freedom as a constitutional 
. h 21 
r~g t. 
19 William P. Murphy, "Academic Freedom, An Emerging Constitutional 
Right", Academic Freedom--The Scholar's Place in Modern Society, ed. 
Hans W. Baade (New York: Oceana Publications, 1964), p. 21. 
20Russell Kirk, Academic Freedom--An Essay in Definition (Chicago: 
Henry Regnery Company, 1955), p. 3. 
21william P. Murphy, op. cit. p. 18; see also Adler v. Board of 
Education of City of New York, 342 US 485, 96 LEd 517, 72 SCt 380 (1952). 
9 
Tenure. The right of a teacher to continuing employment is referred 
to as tenure. The purpose is to protect capable teachers from unjust 
dismissals and political interference. Tenure systems normally provide 
grounds for teacher dismissal and procedures by which such removal may be 
accomplished. 
22 freedom. 
Thus, tenure serves as a safeguard for academic 
Due Process. In order to make the best possible decisions in 
teacher dismissal matters a system of procedures referred to as due 
process has been developed. Among those procedures are a preliminary 
hearing, the right to counsel, the right to hear charges, presentation of 
evidence and witnesses, the right to cross-examination of witnesses, a 
record of the proceedings that is made available to all parties involved, 
adequate time to prepare for the hearing, and a set of standards 
23 governing the entire process. 
When both parties understand there to be an expectancy of continued 
employment, a property interest is said to exist. If a party's good name 
and reputation have been stigmatized so as to hinder future employment 
opportunities or community standing, a liberty interest is involved. 
When either liberty or property interests are involved, due process is 
required by the Constitution of the United States. 24 
22Edward C. Bolmeier, The School in the Legal Structure (Cincinnati: 
The W. H. Anderson Company, 1973) p. 192. 
23 Louis Joughin, "Academic Due Process, 11 Academic Freedom--The 
Scholar's Place in ~1odern Society, ed. Hans W. Baade (New York: Oceana 
Publications, 1964), p. 146. 
24Patricia A. Hollander, Legal Handbook for Educators (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1978), p. 161. 
10 
Employment Contract. A contract is a binding agreement between two 
or more parties. It may be written ·or in the form of an informal 
statement. Courts may enforce the agreement or assess damages for its 
breach. As applied to education, contracts may be made with instructors 
individually or on a collective basis. The agreements are most often 
term contracts, having specific beginning and ending dates. 25 
Community College. Though many variations exist, the majority of 
educational institutions known as community colleges have some 
characteristics in common. Normally they are two-year, coeducational 
schools. They rarely have dormitories, being intended to serve commuting 
students. Two different groups of students are served: those wishing to 
transfer into a four-year college upon completion of the community 
college degree, and those who are interested in terminal programs, often 
referred to as career or occupational programs where no schooling beyond 
the two-year degree is contemplated. 
Community colleges are generally inexpensive to attend, and 
admittance is easier than would be the case at most four-year schools. 
Indeed, many community colleges have open door policies where the only 
qualification for admission is graduation from high school. The result 
is a student populatio.n with a wide range of academic ability. However, 
the students are a rather homogenous group as far as geographic area and 
socioeconomic status are concerned. Faculty effort is concentrated on 
teaching as opposed to research. 
25 Ibid., p. 8. 
11 
As the name implies, the colleges maintain close ties with the local 
community, having programs such as.adult education, noncredit courses for 
special groups, plays, and other entertainments. In addition, these 
colleges provide the local community needed personnel to fill technical 
and subprofessional positions. 26 
Technical Institute. In many respects the technical institutes are 
identical to the community colleges and many community colleges have 
included within their organizational structure a technical institute 
component. However, the technical institute as the name implies places 
more emphasis on training students for technical and subprofessional 
27 positions. Typically they do not offer the programs that transfer to 
four-year colleges and this is the major difference between community 
colleges and technical institutes. 28 
Many of the technical institutes began as extensions of the public 
29 school systems in the form of vocational and technical high schools. 
Over the years many technical institutes have become community 
30 colleges. 
26 Thomas E. 0 1 Connell, Community Colleges--A President 1 s View 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1968), p. 6. 
27 Charles R. Monroe, Profile of the Community College 
(San Francisco: Jessey-Bass Publishers, 1980), p. 12. 
28Ibid. 
29Ibid. 
30Ibid. 
12 
Signifiance of This Study 
The academic freedom debate is not a new one, and over the years 
many cases have come to the courts for settlement. Before the last 
decade few cases directly involved community colleges. Where litigation 
did occur concerning academic freedom, decisions were based on the First 
Amendment rather than specifically on academic freedom. 31 
In many cases the issues of tenure and due process are involved in 
the litigation. That is explained by the perception on the part of 
educators that tenure and due process are the chief protectors of 
academic freedom through the requirement of a hearing and legitimate 
32 reasons for discharge. 
In the cases, the courts have upheld the right of educators to 
exercise their constitutional rights within the performance of their 
duties, while upholding the state's right to judge the competency of 
instructors. 33 
The fact that many community colleges and technical institutes do 
not have tenure has resulted in much of the recent litigation. Among the 
questions raised in those cases are breach of contract and property 
interest under the Fifth Amendment. The courts have held that the 
contract defines the property interest and that nontenured faculty 
31 William P. Murphy, p. 22. 
32Ibid., p. 54. 
33Ibid., p. 35. 
13 
members have no property interest. Therefore, they have no right to due 
process when contracts are not renewed unless other issues are involved. 
Nontenured faculty cannot be dismissed for exercising their 
constitutional rights. 34 
On the other hand, policies and circumstances at a particular 
educational institution may alter the situation. A school without a 
written tenure policy can by administrative action create an expectation 
of continued employment. In effect de facto tenure can provide the 
f lt b . t t 35 acu y mem er a property ~n eres • De facto tenure cannot exist in 
36 colleges having formal tenure systems. 
In similar manner, a college's own rules and procedures, if not 
followed, may invalidate the nonrenewal of a faculty member who does not 
possess tenure. The key here is the failure to abide by established 
rules for due process. Those regulations are not required but if they 
37 are in effect they must be followed. 
34 Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 
S. Ct. 2701 USCT, 1972. 
35 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S. Ct. 2694, USCT 1972. 
36H i . a mow~tz 
1978); see also 
Maryland, 1979). 
v. University of Nevada, 579 F 2nd 526, (Ninth Circuit, 
Steinberg v. Elkins, 470 F. Supp. 1024 (District of 
37Nzomo v. Vermont State Colleges, 385 A 2nd 1099, Supreme Court of 
Vermont. 
14 
While state laws provide for the tenure of public school teachers 
and often state university faculty as well, seventeen states have tenure 
laws affecting two-year college faculty. Among states having tenure for 
community colleges are California, Colorado, Washington, Florida, and 
Illinois. The typical state statute regarding tenure in two-year 
colleges will include two categories of instructor, probationary and 
tenured. Generally, a probationary teacher may be dismissed at the end 
of the contract and lacks the right to judicial review enjoyed by tenured 
teachers. 
Community college administrators should become aware of the legal 
issues involved as they consider whether to use a contractual arrangement 
regarding faculty employment or to implement a tenure policy. They must 
also consider the impact of the establishment of due process procedures. 
Finally, in making these decisions, educators should realize how academic 
freedom will be affected. 
This study is significant in that it provides community college and 
technical institute administrators with an analysis of the legal aspects 
of tenure and academic freedom. This analysis, together with a summary 
of the critical issues and arguments, may aid these administrators in 
their efforts to safeguard academic freedom in community colleges. 
Design of the Study 
The remainder of this study is divided into three major sections. 
Chapter II contains a review of the related literature. In addition to 
literature concerned specifically with the legal aspects of academic 
freedom and tenure in community colleges, this chapter reviews writings 
on tenure and its relationship with academic freedom, especially as they 
15 
pertain to community colleges. These reviews are included so that the 
background of the legal issues may be more readily perceived. 
Chapter III consists of a discussion of the legal issues involved in 
academic freedom and tenure matters. This section also examines the 
existing state statutes concerning academic freedom and tenure in 
community colleges. 
The fourth chapter contains a listing and analysis of selected court 
cases. Cases dealing specifically with community colleges will be 
emphasized, though other cases originating in four-year colleges and 
universities will also be included as the decisions in these cases have 
had an impact on the two-year schools. 
The final chapter is a review and summary of the information 
contained in the literature and in the analysis of court cases. The 
questions asked in the introduction are answered in this chapter. 
16 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
In order that the current issues concerning academic freedom and 
tenure may be fully comprehended, it is necessary that the historical 
roots be examined. The historical overview presented in this chapter is 
intended to help the reader gain an historical perspective. 
Academic freedom, though not known _until fairly recently by that 
1 name, goes back at least to the days of Plato. The concept found 
support in the Judaic-Christian philosophy of respecting the individual 
and later drew from the English heritage of civil liberties. 2 
In the United States, academic freedom in the modern sense of the 
word is about a century old, although the issue has been present since 
colonial times. 3 Very little of academic freedom existed in the colonial 
period because of pressures for orthodox religious beliefs that carried 
over into the classroom. However, with the American and French 
Revolutions came a spirit of freedom that carried over into the academic 
world. 4 
1 John S. Brubacher and Willie Rudy, Higher Education in Transition 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 307. 
2Algo D. Henderson, Policies and Practices in Higher Education 
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), p. 213. 
3sidney Hook, Academic Freedom and Academic Anarchy (New York: 
Cowles Book Company, Inc., 1970), p. 34. 
4 Brubacher and Rudy, p. 307. 
17 
In the nineteenth century, due largely to German influence, academic 
freedom became a major concern of academics in the United States. 5 
Today, virtually all colleges and universities recognize the principles 
of academic freedom, yet threats to academic freedom remain. 6 The 
twentieth century has seen threats to academic freedom from war, 
economic depression, cold war, declining enrollment, adverse public 
7 opinion, and even from the students and faculty themselves. 
From the nineteenth century onward, tenure has been closely 
associated with academic freedom, and tenure is generally considered to 
be necessary for the security of that freedom. 8 Tenure is security 
against being dismissed and results in the freedom to teach irrespective 
of the popularity of what is being taught. It is that job security that 
9 distinguishes between academic freedom and basic freedom of speech. The 
threats to tenure are the threats to academic freedom mentioned above. 10 
5Brubacher and Rudy, p. 307. 
6 Hook, p. 41. 
7Paul L. Dressel and William H. Fariey, Return to Responsibility 
(San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc. Publishers, 1972), p. 4. 
8 Walter P. Metzger, Academic Freedom in the Age of the University 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), p. 180. 
9 Henderson, p. 210. 
10nressel and Fariey, p. 4. 
18 
Tenure is not a human or a civil right. It has to be earned. 11 The 
process of earning it results in a thorough evaluation of the faculty 
member's association with the institution. Once tenure is achieved, the 
burden of proof shifts to the institution. 12 
Early History 
The history of academic freedom is closely tied to the history of 
the university, beginning in Greece and being highly developed by the 
13 fourth century. Beginning in the twelfth century, the histories are 
14 even more closely parallel. The Crusades of that era exposed many 
Europeans to ancient authors whose works were studied and discussed. 
Technological advances and some scientific investigation also 
characterized this period. 15 
It was during that century that universities were established in 
France and Italy and professors were given the privilege of self-
16 government, as well as freedom from taxation and military service. 
11 Hook, p. 35. 
12 Henderson, p. 211. 
13Alvin Quall, "The Solution to College Administration Problems," in 
Leaders, Teachers and Learners in Academe, ed. Stanley Lehrer (New York: 
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970), p. 215. 
14 Richard Hofstadter and Walter P. Metzger, The Development of 
Academic Freedom in the United States (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1955), p. 3. 
15 John E. Wise, The History of Education (New York: Sheed & Wood, 
1964)' p. 126. 
16 Quall, p. 216. 
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While those fairly self-contained universities did thus enjoy a measure 
of freedom from outside forces, there was considerable pressure on 
academic freedom from within due to pervasive religious influence of the 
17 time. The church did not seek freedom of thought, but the teaching of 
18 its one truth. While such a policy would seem tq eliminate academic 
freedom, in reality the policy was enforced with a great deal of 
inconsistency, and thus in certain instances, some degree of freedom was 
allowed. 19 
In the late fourteenth century and into the fifteenth century the 
20 universities experienced a loss of power. That loss paralleled the 
declining power of the church and opened the way for the state to step in 
and exert more control over the universities. 21 
The Reformation, while eventually leading to the growth of 
individual freedom, at first tended to do just the opposite, with 
suppression of most critical thought by both Catholic and Protestant 
22 groups. State control increased, with professors required to take 
23 confessional oaths of loyalty to the city and to the university. 
17 Hofstadter and Metzger, p. 6. 
18Ibid., P• 18. 
19Ibid. 
20Ibid., p. 40. 
21Ibid., p. 41. 
22Ibid., p. 62. 
23Ibid., p. 71. 
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An exception to this trend existed at the interdenominational university 
of Leiden. Founded in 1575, that university required only a simple oath 
without the usual doctrinal statements; however, that situation did not 
last beyond 1676. 24 
In England, after the conflicts between Catholics and Prostestants 
came the conflicts between Anglizans and Puritans. There were efforts to 
stamp out Puritanism at both Oxford and Cambridge. Confessional 
requirements were still required into the eighteenth century at European 
25 Universities as a result of that type of conflict. 
Colonial America and the Eighteenth Century United States 
The European religious struggles mentioned above were brought to 
America by the colonists. With those struggles came pressures for 
26 orthodoxy. Fearing that unless steps were taken their clergy would 
eventually be illiterate, the colonists in Massachusetts founded Harvard 
in 1636 to be an "orthodox instrument" of the Puritan community and its 
27 faith, and to produce "a learned and rational ministry". 
Teaching at Harvard was done mainly by tutors whose length of 
appointment was indefinite but usually of short duration, though through 
the years the average length of stay increased. Those tutors taught on 
the European model of liberal learning. 28 
24Ibid. , p. 72. 
25Ibid., p. 74. 
26Ibid., p. 63. 
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Yet the general opinion of the time held that there was but one 
religious truth and pressure existed to conform regarding religious 
29 matters. Resulting from that pressure, the first writings concerning 
academic freedom in the United States came from Harvard in 1692 during 
the presidency of Increase Mather, who assumed that since he nominated 
the tutors, they should teach what he wanted them to teacQ. However, for 
most of his presidency Mather did not even live near Harvard, and by the 
time he took action the liberal traditions of the college had been 
established. One of the liberal tutors ~1ho left at the time of Mather's 
crackdown and later returned as president was John Leverett, who 
administered the college for sixteen years early the eighteenth 
30 century. 
As the system of higher education grew in America, it began to 
differ from the European model. Colleges were numerous, and usually they 
were small and governed by lay boards. At Harvard and at William and 
Mary among others, faculties were subordinated to those lay boards. 31 
Since lay board members often had other occupations, a great deal of 
power was transferred to the college presidents. Indeed, many of the 
early academic freedom disputes were between presidents and their 
32 boards. 
29 Brubacher and Rudy, p. 308. 
30 Hofstadter and Metzger, p. 104. 
31Ibid., p. 134. 
32 Ibid., p. 114. 
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Conflicts did arise between boards and teachers as well, 
particularly with regard to faculty religious attitudes, with boards 
tending to view teachers as instruments used to convey the religious 
truth. Though th~ problem was eased by selective hiring practices with 
religious convictions used as a criterion for selection, tutors, 
professors, and presidents sometimes changed their minds on religious 
matters after being hired. Such circumstances led to a resolution by the 
overseers at Harvard in 1735 to the effect that the overseers had the 
right to dismiss any instructional employee of the college suspected of 
holding unacceptable religious beliefs. 33 
By the end of the colonial period, private colleges were well 
established in America. 34 After the Revolutionary War most of the 
financial support previously enjoyed by some American colleges ended 
abruptly. Yet during that same period many new colleges were founded. 
Thus, resources available to higher education were spread thin. 
Sectarian differences were heightened as we11. 35 
Those financial problems helped precipitate the most significant 
development in higher education in the eighteenth century: 
secularization, with an accompanying increase in academic freedom for 
faculty members, especi.ally in institutions administered by strong 
36 presidents. New colleges founded during this period were more open, 
33Ibid., p. 155. 
34Ibid., p. 144. 
35Ibid., p. 207. 
36Ibid., p. 185. 
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and there was more emphasis on scientific study~ though as yet science 
37 had not become very controversial. 
The trend toward secularization was not confined to the United 
States. Eighteenth century Germany was developing the modern concept of 
academic freedom. 38 The "enlightened despotism" existing in that country 
led to changes in the German universities with new emphasis being placed 
39 on free inquiry in the areas of science and philosophy. Freedom of 
inquiry had its origins at the University of Halle-founded in 1694-and 
led the break from strict Lutheran ties. 40 
That concept of academic freedom with the basic restriction being 
that of good scholarship became recognized by American educators. 
However, it was not until the nineteenth century that the German 
influence made a profound impact on higher education in the United 
States. 41 
37Ibid., p. 197. 
38 James Bowen, A History of Western Education (London: Methuen and 
Co., Ltd., 1981), p. 165. 
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The Nineteenth Century 
The large number of colleges that was established in the early 
nineteenth century had a negative impact on faculty and student freedom. 
In 1790, there were nine institutions of higher education. In 1861 there 
were 182, and those figures do not take into account the colleges that 
42 failed to survive. Sectarian competition accounted for much of that 
growth. 43 
The large number of colleges resulted in small enrollments and in 
many cases, in serious financial trouble. Princeton and Amherst are 
shining examples. 44 Faculty members were poorly paid and continued in 
their appointments by the grace of their governing boards with hearings 
rarely required for dismissa1. 45 Boards of trustees exerted their power, 
often making decisions involving classroom instruction, curriculum, 
student government regulations, and even the private lives of faculty 
members. 46 
However, trustees rarely met often enough to enforce the policies 
with the result that presidents and faculty, especially in the 
larger colleges and universities, gradually assumed more control at least 
47 over day-to-day operations. For example, faculties began to demand 
42 Hofstadter and Metzger, p. 211. 
43 Ibid., p. 209. 
44 Metzger, p. 29. 
45 Hofstadter and Metzger, p. 230. 
46 Metzger, p. 30. 
47 Hofstadter and Metzger, p. 233. 
more self-government in the area of student discipline, an area of 
concern in light of the students' widespread disobedience of strict 
trustee regulations. 48 Little faculty sentiment existed for seeking 
25 
power to deal with broader issues such as the selection of the president 
of the college. 49 
A major factor encouraging faculties to seek more freedom was the 
influence of the German universities. The rise of the Hohenzollerns saw 
a separation of church and state in Germany which profoundly affected 
its universities. 50 With decreased church control of the universities 
came increased state control. Nevertheless, faculties enjoyed a good 
measure of freedom, selecting new faculty members and choosing their own 
deans. 51 
The German definition of academic freedom involved two concepts, 
lernfreiheit, or freedom of learning, and lehrfreiheit, which meant that 
a professor was free to examine evidence and report his findings either 
through lecture or publication. Professors were free to lecture on any 
subject with no prescribed syllabus and few administrative rules. 52 
Such freedom was considered necessary for the functioning of a 
university, and it gave the German professors a unique position in an 
53 otherwise rigid society. 
48 Metzger, p. 33. 
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However, that freedom did not apply to situations outside the university 
where an atmosphere of political repression existed. 54 Professors, along 
55 with everyone else, were expected to be loyal to the state. 
The nineteenth-century United States was faced with pressures from 
science, industry, and the general public for a more utilitarian 
education than was being offered by the nation's colleges. 56 Faced with 
those problems with their nation's system of higher education, increasing 
57 numbers of American students went to Prussia for advanced study. Over 
nine thousand Americans studied at German universities in the nineteenth 
century, and many more studied German literature. 58 
Before that German influence had its effects, most of the push for 
intellectual freedom in the United States had come from France and 
England in the spirit of civil liberty. However, the protection afforded 
in those nations was simply the right to be protected against political 
interference, not against losing one's position within a university. The 
59 latter protection was a cornerstone of the German system. 
54 Brubacher and Rudy, p. 314. 
55 Metzger, p. 115. 
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American scholars tended to overlook the negative aspects of the 
German system such as the political repression, and tended to view the 
German universities idealistically. 60 Some of those students wrote of 
their experiences, praising the German system. German Universities: A 
61 Narrative of Personal Experience by James Hart was an example. 
Although American scholars read those works and admired the German 
62 system, they tended to implement only parts of that system. More 
emphasis was given to lehrfreiheit than to lernfreiheit because of 
conflicts with powerful boards of trustees that controlled American 
63 colleges and universities. This emphasis on instructional freedom 
carried into the twentieth century as evidenced by the 1915 American 
Association of University Professors (AAUP) report on Academic Freedom 
64 with its emphasis on teacher freedom. 
In contrast to the German system, American professors had more 
freedom outside of the university and less freedom in the classroom where 
65 they were supposed to remain neutral on controversial issues. 
60Burton, J. Bledstein, The Culture of Professionalism (New York: 
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American scholars •. influenced by the pragmatism of William James and 
John Dewey, went much farther than the Germans and came to view academic 
freedom as including the right to protection of their positions within 
the universities in spite of their taking political stands. 66 Thus, in 
America, free speech inside and outside of the university were linked 
67 with academic freedom. To protect that freedom increasing numbers of 
professors saw tenure as necessary in light of the power possessed by 
68 governing boards. 
Ideas concerning academic freedom caught on more read.ily in graduate 
69 programs than they did at the undergraduate level. 
Academic freedom conflicts arose on four fronts, the slavery issue, 
religion, science and business. After 1830, the first issue to threaten 
academic freedom, especially in the South, was slavery. 70 In spite of 
the American version of academic freedom, teachers were generally more 
willing to be controlled in the classroom than outside it. 71 That 
tendency was due in part to the belief carried over from the eighteenth 
century, that college students were too immature and irresponsible to be 
72 exposed to controversial opinions. Thus, in 1856, North Carolina 
66Brubacher and Rudy, p. 314. 
67 Metzger, p. 131. 
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professor Benjamin Sherwood Hedrick was dismissed for expressing 
pro-Republican sentiments. 73 Conformity was expected on that political 
issue just as it had always been on religious issues. 74 
Some of the first instances where the issue of academic freedom was 
raised were in defense of religious liberty for faculty members. Though 
American colleges and universities became more secular over the years of 
the nineteenth century, religion in the classroom remained a matter of 
concern. 75 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, college presidents were 
76 often ordained ministers of the sponsoring church. Even some state 
universities fell under the sway of a particular denomination as 
evidenced by required Bible classes and compulsory chapel. 77 State 
statutes offered little in the way of protection, opening the 
possibilities of religious tests for prospective faculty members. 78 
Nonetheless, tolerance grew in the state universities, particularly with 
regard to outstanding professors whom administrators wished to recruit or 
retain. Religious influence continued to decline and become less a point 
73Hofstadter and Metzger, p. 258. 
74 Brubacher and Rudy, p. 308. 
75 Hofstadter and Metzger, p. 263. 
76 Metzger, p. 23. 
77 Ibid., p. 24. 
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of controversy until religious doctrine came into conflict with 
science. 79 
An increase in pressure for conformity at the college level in 
30 
science and evolution in particular developed in the later half of the 
80 nineteenth century. Out of the controversy over evolution came an 
emphasis on a particular rationale for academic freedom which would carry 
81 over into the next century. 
Charles Darwin 1 s Origin of Species, published in 1859, drew a 
generally favorable response from the American scientific community and 
82 was no longer disputed by that group by the 1870's • There was 
however, vigorous opposition t.o Darwinism from religious groups, with 
trustees at many colleges instructing presidents to keep it out of their 
83 colleges. The degree of opposition to Darwinism at any one college 
depended upon the power and conviction of the college's leaders, how 
closely the college was tied to a church, the religious background of the 
trustees, and the importance of science to the institution. 84 Thus, the 
response to Darwinism was not uniform, and professors teaching 
evolutionary theory were hired at some institutions. 85 
79 Hofstadter and Metzger, p. 263. 
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Logically, the most extreme cases of anti-Darwinism took place at 
theological seminaries. 86 At the Presbyterian Theological Seminary in 
Columiba, South Carolina, for example, Dr. James Woodrow was dismissed 
after twenty-five years of service for stating that while he believed 
every word of the Bible was true, the Bible did not go into detail,as to 
how creation took place. Therefore he was unwilling to reject evolution 
87 outright. 
Another well-known incident occurred at Vanderbilt in 1878 after it 
became a multipurpose university. Alexander Winchell, an avowed 
evolutionist, was dismissed by Bishop Holland McTyere, the man who as 
president had originally hired him. Dismissal came after the former 
wrote a piece on the "pre Adamite" origin of man, even though in his 
writing Winchell stated that evolution was a reflection of God's wil1. 88 
Winchell explained his situation to the newspapers,. while other 
89 professors facing similar circumstances took their cases to court. 
Several notable trends came out of the controversy over evolution. 
At many institutions faculty members were looked upon as rebels by 
trustees who put pressure on college presidents to keep evolution out, or 
86Ibid., p. 53. 
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90 at the very least to teach it as an hypothesis only. However, since 
antievolution policies were not consistent between colleges, faculty 
91 members gathered the courage to go on. 
Faculty members claimed that sectarian trustees were impeding the 
advancement of science and called for free scientific inquiry and for 
more of a say regarding academic matters. 92 
Though trustees retained the power to judge the fitness of faculty 
members, it became more common for faculty committees to have input in 
hiring, tenure, and promotion decisions, and for faculty members to have 
more freedom in the classroom. 93 
However, that freedom was not without bounds: 
Academic freedom does not justify all kinds of intellectual 
nonconformity but only that kind of nonconformity that proceeds 
according to rules; not any private belief but the kind of 
private belief that allows itself to be publicly tested, not a 
perfect competition of ideas, but rather an imperfect competitio~4 to which certain opinions come enhanced with a special warranty. 
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As colleges became more secular they became more open to the concept 
of academic freedom. 95 However, the fact that more businessmen were 
serving on governing boards ~n the late nineteenth century was both a 
help and a hindrance to the cause of academic freedom. 96 Businessmen, 
and the public in general, were opposed to academic freedom. 97 In the 
1890's some cases drew national attention where, due to pressure from 
wealthy patrons, faculty members were dismissed for supporting the 
strategies of worker strikes and boycotts and for the expression of 
98 anti-monopoly views. 
Under the influence of business, colleges became more bureaucratic 
in the late nineteenth century. Bureaucratization in turn had a profound 
99 impact on academic freedom. Faculty members found in the bureaucratic 
form of organization a new safeguard for their academic freedom, and from 
that time forward, academic freedom and tenure were linked. 100 
Higher education entered a new period of growth and expansion in the 
101 late nineteenth century. Nevertheless, the supply of instructional 
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personnel exceeded the demand, and the oversupply heightened the demand 
for tenure. That demand for tenure was 
••• a demand for rules and regulations, for contractual 
definitions of function, for uniform procedures for dismissal, 
for definite standards for promotion based on seniority and 
service - in short for the definiteness, impersonatb~Y and 
objectivity that are the essence of bureaucratism. 
Thus, bureaucracy made professors more secure in their jobs and in 
their exercise of academic freedom. Tenure served to prevent academic 
freedom problems rather than to defend the faculty member after a 
dismissal had taken place. 103 
Before the Civil War, academics were not professionals as the term 
is understood today. They did little apart from teaching and had little 
104 relationship with the larger community. The concept of academic 
freedom was linked with civil and religious liberty; however, the link 
was a weak one at that time. 105 
By the close of the nineteenth century, a modified version of the 
German concept of lehrfreiheit had become influential in the American 
system of higher education, and the demand for tenure as a safeguard for 
106 academic freedom had become more common. 
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The Twentieth Century 
In the early twentieth century as in the late nineteenth century, 
the greatest threats to academic freedom came from business and 
107 government. Political and economic issues were the points of 
108 controversy. As mentioned above, higher education had developed a 
more bureaucratic form of government characterized by "entrenched" 
109 administrators. 
Faculty members were slow to organize due to the nature of their 
llO work and to their opposition to anything resembling a trade union. 
Yet there were pressures to organize, as faculty members had no legal 
protection, since the courts did not recognize academic freedom as a 
legal right and were reluctant to interfere in the internal affairs of 
1ll colleges. The term academic freedom was not widely known and was not 
even included in the most widely used American dictionary as late as 
1918. The term was not included in the legal dictionary of Words and 
Phrases as late as 1937. 112 
The American Association of University of Professors was formed in 
1915 as was Committee A on Academic Freedom Tenure. Among the factors 
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leading to the establishment_ of that organization were lack of support 
from the judicial system, conflicts with administrators, and lack of 
113 uniformity of academic freedom policies. 
The committee came up with a declaration of principles. Among those 
principles were statements to the effect that the public should view the 
university as a place where professors were investigating and discovering 
truth and that professors had the right to present the results of 
investigations both inside and outside of the university. The faculty 
member should act responsibly, and that responsibility should be to 
society, not to the governing board. 114 
Since academic freedom was necessary for the very existence of a 
university as the term is used above, the committee found that faculty 
members should be limited in pursuing truth only by their competence and 
by their objectivity. Tenure was to be the safeguard of academic 
freedom. 115 
The committee also developed specific proposals, in particular a due 
process procedure that placed limitations on trustees' authority to fire 
faculty members and called for a trial by other faculty members before 
dismissal. 116 
After principles and proposals were outlined, The American 
Association of University Professors spent a great deal of time 
113 Metzger, pp. 197-205. 
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investigating cases and placing institutions found to be in violation of 
the guidelines on a "non recommended" list, a tactic which eventually led 
to colleges' adopting the American Association of University Professors' 
117 declaration, though those adoptions came gradually. 
Academic freedom remained a misunderstood and largely unpopular 
concept as reflected in the media of the time. In 1916 the New York 
Times called academic freedom a 11 sham." 118 
Through the twentieth century, up to and including the present day, 
the cause of academic freedom has faced a series of crises. 119 During 
World War I, the principal threat came from the wave of patriotism that 
120 swept the country. Pro-German and pacifist ideas were not tolerated 
and faculty members were dismissed for expressing those views. Even the 
American Association of University Professors issued a statement 
recognizing limits on academic freedom in time of war. 121 
There was confusion regarding the old argument over when academic 
freedom applied. Was it whenever a faculty member spoke, on any issue, 
or only when he spoke within his field? The general view in the early 
twentieth century was that when a faculty member speaking outside of his 
117 Brubacher and Rudy, p. 321. 
118 Cullen Murphy, "In Darkest Academia," Harpers, October, 1978, 
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120 Ibid., p. 309. 
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field was protected by regular civil liberties only, though often the 
public failed to make the distinction. 122 
In spite of problems and limitations, academic freedom actually 
became more widely accepted on college campuses as did due process 
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procedures. Academic freedom came to be viewed as an essential part of 
higher education. 123 
Patriotism and intolerance generated by the war were not the only 
threats to academic freedom. The conflict between evolutionary science 
and fundamentalist religion raged anew, although not with as much impact 
124 as before on higher education. 
By the 1930's, academic freedom had become more widely respected 
within the nation's colleges and universities. 125 Gains were made in 
particular in the major private universities. Public esteem for the 
126 faculty member in higher education was growing. 
Nevertheless, two new threats to academic freedom appeared in the 
decade of 1930's, both of which were to reappear later in the century. 
The first of those threats, actually beginning in the late 1920's, was 
122Ibid., p. 315. 
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the "red scare" with the resultant fear of liberal ideas and the labeling 
of those ideas and the people who taught them as communist or 
i 1 . 127 soc a ~st. 
The other threat was the Great Depression, which left many 
universities in precarious financial positions. There was widespread 
fear that too much academic freedom might lead to a decline in monetary 
128 support, causing a college to go over the financial edge. 
Those two factors, the "red scare" and the Great Depression, led to 
the loyalty oaths at colleges and universities as a condition of 
employment, .oaths in which the faculty member was required to state his 
loyalty to the state and federal constitutions. 129 
Oaths became more common over the following two decades. Thirty 
states had passed loyalty oath statutes by 1952. 130 The American 
Association of University Professors issued a statement that competence 
should be the only criterion for hiring or dismissal. Still, many 
faculty members were afraid to discuss controversial subjects during the 
1930's. 131 
Less pressure was placed on faculty members during World War II than 
132 during World War I, though pressure did exist. 
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By 1939, only about seven boards of trustees had adopted the 
American Association of University Professors' standards, although there 
133 was much less opposition to those standards. A revision of the 
guidelines was begun in 1938. Changes were made in the due pro~ess and 
tenure procedures. The original standards required a three-month notice 
of dismissal for instructors, while those of higher rank were to be given 
a one-year notice. While faculty approval of dismissal was necessary in 
cases involving those below associate professorial rank, above that rank 
134 a judicial hearing was required. 
The revisions eliminated the double standard, requiring a one-year 
notice of dismissal for any tenured faculty member. The probationary 
period before tenure could be granted was lowered from ten years to six. 
(That was later amended to seven.) 135 Academic freedom was also to be 
granted to those on probation. 'Hhile colleges were still slow to 
formally adopt the AAUP rules, the revisions made those rules more to the 
liking of college administrators, and an increasing number of colleges 
used those rules as guidelines on academic freedom and tenure matters. 136 
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The cold war of the 1950's led to threats to academic freedom. 137 
There was widespread public support for conformity on the issue of 
138 communism. In general, faculty members' opinions tended to be to the 
left of the views of the general public. Faculty members were more 
likely to take part in campus protests against threats to academic 
139 freedom such as the imposition of loyalty oaths. In fact, faculty 
140 members were more likely to take part in protests than were students. 
There was no question about the right of a faculty member, as a 
citizen, to be a communist. However, such a faculty member's right to 
141 continue as a member of the faculty was challenged. At Berkeley, the 
loyalty oath required that one swear that one was not a communist and 
that he was swearing in good faith. Thirty-nine faculty members refused 
to sign the oath and were dismissed, although that oath was later 
142 declared illegal by the courts because it singled out the faculty. 
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During the 1950's there .were numerous dismissals of proven or 
admitted communists, along with some faculty members whose refusal to 
answer questions under the Fifth Amendment was taken as an admission of 
guilt. 143 As a result of the oaths and dismissals, many faculty members 
became cautious and timid. 144 The American Association of University 
Professors condemned the dismissals as the substitution of an economic 
punishment for a criminal one as the price for an individual exercising 
145 rights under the Fifth Amendment. 
Although the threats arising in the 1950's were among the most 
serious confronting academic freedom, the latter half of the decade saw 
new support for academic freedom and due process at all levels of 
education as the result of court decisions. 146 Since the 1950's, threats 
to academic freedom have become more subtle. 147 
Between 1952 and 1959, all nine justices of the United States 
Supreme Court went on record as recognizing academic freedom as a right. 
That recognition was largely responsible for college support of academic 
148 due process. 
143Ibid. 
144Ibid., p. 226. 
145Ibid. 
146smith, P• 212. 
147Ibid., p. 205 
148 Brubacher and Rudy, p. 326. 
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An example of judicial support is the case of Sweezy v. 
New Hampshire, where the professor had taught communism at a state 
university. At his trial he said he was not a communist, but refused to 
answer when asked whether he advocated Marxism. The New Hampshire court 
convicted him, but the Supreme Court reversed, stating that such an 
incident posed a threat to the right to free inquiry and as a result 
constituted a threat to the nation as a whole. 149 
New problems for academic freedom arose in the 1960's. That decade 
was characterized by growth and expansion of colleges and universities, 
150 and in particular by the rapid growth of community colleges. 
Shortages of Ph.D's tended to bolster faculty influence within the 
151 various institutions of higher learning. 
In light of that influence, it is interesting to note that some of 
the threats to academic freedom came from faculty members themselves. 
Faculty members were beginning to spend more time outside of their 
colleges with professional associations, businesses, publishers and 
politics. Combined with the trend for college governance 
149 Sweezy v. State of New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 77 S. Ct. 1203, 
IL. Ed. 2d 1311, 1957. 
150 Charles R. Monroe, Profile of the Community College 
(San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc., Publishers, 1972), p. 4. 
151Robert E. Roemer and James E. Schnitz, "Academic Employment as 
Day Labor," Journal of Higher Education, September/October 1982, p. 515. 
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to become more centralized, the result was a tendency for governance by 
faculty to also become more centralized through the formation of faculty 
senates, thus posing a threat to academic freedom which thrives on 
decentralization. 152 
The increasing size of many colleges and universities resulted in 
subject matter falling more under the control of committees. Often the 
faculty member teaching the subject was not included as a member of the 
committee regulating that subject area and in some cases no one from that 
153 particular discipline was included. 
The activism of both faculty and students of that decade also posed 
threats to academic freedom. Students at times responded to views 
154 different from their own with threats and disruptions. In some cases 
the threat to academic freedom took the form of the use of physical 
155 violence against faculty members by students. Many students of that 
decade were also critical of faculty tenure. 156 
152warrin Wallis, "Centripetal and Centrifugal Forces in University 
Organization" in The Contemporary University: U.S.A., ed. 
Roberts. Morrison (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966), p. 44. 
153Joseph H. Simons, Problems of the American University (Boston, 
The Christopher Publishing House, 1967), p. 158. 
154Paul 1. Dressel and William H. Farley, Return to Responsibility 
(San Francisco: Joseey-Bass Inc., Publishers, 1972), p. 4. 
155 Hook, p. 84. 
156Martin Myerson, "The Ethos of the American Student: Beyond the 
Protests" in The Contemporary University: U.S.A., ed. RobertS. Morrison 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966), p. 284. 
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Not all of the activism was on the part of the students. During the 
1960's the tendency was for more liberal faculty to de-emphasize academic 
freedom in favor of other causes. 157 Still, even many well known liberal 
faculty members opposed protests and the mixing of politics and academic 
affairs because they perceived that mixing as a threat to academic 
freedom. They tended however to make a distinction between 
158 demonstrations and disruptions. More conservative faculty members 
tended to view any concessions to students as threats to academic 
freedom. 159 
As a result of faculty activism, the old arguments concerning the 
faculty member's right to academic freedom when speaking outside of his 
160 field rose again during the 1960's. 
Regarding academic freedom in community colleges, which were just 
beginning their rapid growth in the 1960's, little was said or written, 
yet the issue did exist. 161 Before 1960, most community college faculty 
162 worked without tenure under systems of annual contracts. The growth 
of academic freedom and tenure in those colleges during the 1960's was 
slowed by several factors. 
157Ladd and Lipset, p. 206 
158 Ibid, p. 233. 
159 Ibid., p. 210. 
160 Dressel and Farley, p. 5. 
161 Monroe, p. 258. 
162Ibid., p. 268. 
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Academic freedom was much more widely accepte:d at the large 
universities than at the high school level where there was more public 
pressure and where the faculties were not well organized. Community 
colleges, with their high school roots, were faced with a problem· similar 
to that faced by the high schools. 163 
Student and faculty activism was markedly less of a factor at the 
community college level. Nevertheless, public sentiment against academic 
freedom and tenure in the universities resulting from activism in those 
institutions, spilled over to affect the two-year colleges. The problem 
was compounded by the large number of people served by the two year 
colleges who thus became concerned with how those institutions were 
administered. 164 Faced with such pressures, community college 
administrators were reluctant to push for the recognition of academic 
freedom. 165 
The problems facing academic freedom and tenure in both two-year and 
four-year colleges carried over into the next decade where they were 
compounded by a strong supply of available teachers. 166 
163 Ibid., p. 256. 
164 Arthur M. Cohen, College Response to Community Demands 
(San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc., Publishers, 1975), p. 145. 
165 Monroe, p. 256. 
166 Cohen, p. 146. 
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The 1970's were characterized by a political swing to the right 
which left college faculties more liberal than the general population, a 
trend which tended to alienate those educators. 167 The general opinion 
of the time, however, was that faculty members were free from both 
internal and external forces to express their views on any subject. 168 
With that freedom finally established, the major threat of the 
1970 1 s came in the form of threats to tenure, long regarded as a 
safeguard of academic freedom. Attacks on tenure took many forms. 
Colleges and universities, faced with the financial problem of inflation 
and the consequent reduction of real income, and t.,rith declining 
enrollments and changing student needs in the latter part of the decade, 
faced the problem of dismissal of 169 some tenured faculty members. 
Reduction in force became a problem in the 1970's, and tenure stood in 
170 the way. Even the issue of whether tenure actually protects academic 
freedom was raised again. 171 
Public opinion regarding college faculty was also generally either 
negative or apathetic. A 1978 Gallup poll indicated that the percentage 
of respondents with no opinion on college teachers doubled from the 
167
1' 150 ~pset, p. • 
168 Dressel and Farley, p. 17. 
169 Lipset, p. 151. 
170 Cohen, p. SO. 
171Theodore Walden, "Tenure: A Review of the Issues," The 
Educational Forum, March 1980, p. 364. 
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172 percentage in the poll of the previous year. Furthermore, business 
people, including those serving on college governing boards, tended to 
have antitenure views. College administrators were found to be in 
general agreement with the antitenure views. 173 Administrators showed 
more willingness to question American Association of University 
Professors reports during the 1970 1 s. 174 
One of the major reasons for the attacks on tenure was the enormous 
increase in the number of faculty members with tenure during the 1970's. 
At the major universities, tenure systems were firmly entrenched, with 
the percentage of universities having more than 50 percent of their 
faculties tenured increasing from 46 percent in 1972 to 81 percent in 
1974. One survey for the 1977-1978 academic year found the percentage of 
male faculty members with tenure to be 60.6 percent, compared with 42.5 
176 percent for women, for an overall figure of 56 percent. 
Adding impact to those figures was the fact that the majority of 
those tenured faculty members were young, having come into higher 
172 Murphy, p. 25. 
173Patricia R. Plante, "The Attack on Tenure: The Threat from 
Within," Change, November/December 1983, p. 10. 
174 Dressel and Farley, p. 96. 
175 Walden, "Tenure," p. 370. 
176National Center for Education Statistics, "Professors with 
Tenure," Chronicle of Higher Education, 8 May, 1978. 
177 education in the 1960's. 
Colleges responded to the high percentages of tenured faculty by 
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making tenure increasingly difficult to obtain through policies such as 
eight- to ten-year probationary periods, and offering in its place 
alternatives to tenure such as one-year contracts. Such actions have led 
178 some faculty members to seek help from the courts. 
In 1972, the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education recommended 
more nontenure track positions as a hedge against an uncertain future, 
since nontenure track positions offered the college more flexibility and 
179 a way out of the rapid growth in the numbers of tenured faculty. 
Alternatives to tenure continued to grow more common throughout the 
1970's. In 1977 four out of ten people seeking teaching positions in 
higher education had been in the market before, and three out of ten 
180 placements were temporary. In a related development, more Ph.D's 
sought employment with two year colleges and secondary schools as the 
decade progressed, going from of 3.2 percent in 1970 to 5.3 percent in 
1976. 181 
177walden, "Tenure," p. 370. 
178Elaine R. DiBiase, Tenure, Alternatives-to-Tenure and the Courts 
(Boston: American Educational Research Association, [1980]), p. 1. 
179Roemer and Schnitz, P• 520. 
180 Ibid., p. 528. 
181 Ibid., p. 518. 
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Community colleges also felt the impact of moves away from tenure, 
though tenure never was as entrenched at the two year colleges. A 1972 
survey done for the American Council of Education indicated that tenure 
systems were in effect in all public and private universities and 94 
percent of private colleges, but in only about 66 percent of the two-year 
182 colleges (including both public and private colleges). 
Before the 1960's few states had provisions for community college 
teachers in their statutes, instead leaving such policies to local 
183 community college districts. Thus many states had no system wide 
tenure policy. 184 
In spite of having to develop it themselves, many community colleges 
initiated some form of tenure and due process procedures including lists 
of requirements for obtaining tenure, clear evaluation criteria and 
procedures, means to challenge violations of the enture policy, and a 
general statement of the college's commitment to academic freedom. 186 
At other community colleges, boards of trustees and administrators 
opposed the formation of tenure and due process systems because of the 
182Lois Vander Vaerdt, "Affirmative Action and Tenure During 
Financial Crisis," Journal of Law and Education, October 1982, p. 518. 
183 Monroe, p. 268. 
184william F. McHugh, "Faculty Unionism," in The Tenure Debate, ed. 
Bardwell L. Smith (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc., Publishers, 1972), 
p. 163. 
185 Monroe, p. 269. 
186 McHugh, p. 163. 
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complications such systems would cause and because many were reluctant to 
go through those procedures and still not be sure they would win. 187 
The states that did enact legislation concerning tenure in community 
colleges showed no clear trend. In 1973 Virginia changed to a system of 
fixed time contracts. 188 In the late 1970's, North Carolina Senate 
bill 266 was introduced. The bill denied local boards of trustees the 
right to grant tenure. At the time of the introduction of that bill, a 
poll was taken at one of the state's community colleges having a tenure 
system in force: Surry Community College. The surveyed faculty members 
indicated their belief that voiding the tenure policy would make hiring 
and retention of qualified faculty members more difficult and result in a 
decrease in academic freedom at the institution. 189 
As the decade ended, the Illinois community college boards of 
trustees, which had the power to grant tenure if they wished, were 
required to have a tenure system by legislation which went into effect in 
January of 1980. That legislation specified criteria for obtaining 
tenure and for the dismissal of both tenured and nontenured faculty. 190 
187 Monore, p. 270. 
188 Cohen, p. 146. 
189 Claude Ayers. The Effects of Voiding the Tenure Policy at 
Surgery Community College (Nova University: ERIC Document Reproduction 
Service, ED 188 691, 1979), p. 6. 
190 Hans A. Andrews and Bruce C. Mackey. Reductions in Force in 
Higher Education: One College's Response to the Illinois Community 
College Tenure Act (ERIC Document Reproduction Service, ED 216 736, 
1982), p. 5. 
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Although specific on the surface, such laws often failed to define 
key terms and left room for interpretation by local boards of trustees 
provided they stayed within the spirit of the law. 191 Such was the case 
in the Illionis system where the statute failed to define some key terms. 
As an example, the Illionis statute stated that no tenured faculty member 
was to be dismissed while any probationary faculty member remained, 
provided the tenured faculty member was "competent to render" the same 
service. "Competent to render" was thus left to local boards of trustees 
to define. 192 
In the 1970's direct attacks on tenure came in the form of 
legislation, and also indirect attacks such as the strengthening of the 
rights of nontenured faculty, the related controversy over the division 
of the faculty into "haves" and "have nots" by a tenure system, and the 
193 implementation of affirmative action programs. Tenure became more 
difficult to obtain in the 1970's at all levels of higher education. 194 
A marked increase in tenure-related court cases also occurred in the 
195 1970's due largely to the threats to tenure mentioned above. Those 
191Ibid. 
192Ibid., p. 2. 
193Robert O'Neal, "Tenure Under Attack" in The Tenure Debate, ed. 
Bardwell L. Smith (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc., Publishers, 1973), 
pp. 179-191. 
194 Lip set, p. 151. 
195Perry A. Zirkel, "Avoiding Litigation in the Tenure Process," 
Journal of General Education, Winter 1979, p. 275. 
court cases tended to become complex as in the case of Johnson v. The 
University of Pittsburgh which lasted seventy-four days with twelve 
thousand pages of testimony from seventy-three witnesses and over one 
thousand exhibits. 196 In the majority of those cases the defendant 
197 college won. 
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Court cases often involved nontenured faculty, and in some of those 
cases the courts ruled that the faculty member in question had what 
amounted to de facto tenure, "depending on the objectivity of their 
expectation or the severity of their stigmatization."198 At one college, 
suit was brought over a dismissal because the president's letter of 
appointment said "it is our sincere hope that your tenure with us will be 
happy and fruitful." 199 
Since 1915, there have been many threats to academic freedom; 
however, most have been reduced or eliminated through decisions within 
colleges on individual cases, changes in college policies, legislation, 
200 and interpretation by the courts. In the 1980's faculty members have 
a great deal of authority in deciding how to teach and what to teach. 201 
196Ibid., P• 276. 
197Ibid., p. 277. 
198Ibid., P• 275. 
199Ibid. 
200 Lewis B. Mayhew, Arrogance on Campus (San Francisco: Jessey-Bass 
Inc., Publishers, 1970), p. 95. 
201 Derek Bok, Beyond the Ivory Tower (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1982), p. 35. 
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Yet that freedom is tempered by the widely held assumption that academic 
freedom does not include the right to teach (Italics mine) any subject, 
and that it does not mean the freedom to indoctrinate students or 
202 encourage them to violate rules. 
Public opinion concerning academic freedom had become more positive 
by the 1980's. 203 In a survey done by Group Attitudes Corporation, 
32.4 percent of college graduates and 25.4 percent of those surveyed with 
no college education responded "very positively" to the term academic 
freedom. 204 
While progess has been made with regard to some aspects of academic 
freedom, further inroads have been made against tenure. In the 1980's 
the American Association of University Professors receives over two 
thousand inquiries per year on problems relating to its standards, and 
approximately on half of those inquiries result in the opening of a file 
on a formal complaint. 205 • When a complaint concerns academic freedom 
and tenure and the college administration refuses to discuss the matter 
or submit to mediation, the American Association of University Professors 
may start an investigation in which an ad hoc committee visits the 
202Ibid., p. 26. 
203Ibid., p. 27. 
204 "Public Backs College Education in Poll," Chronicle of Higher 
Education, 13 October 1982. 
205 Jordon E. Kurland, "Mediating the Implementation of AAUP 
Standards" in New Directions for Higher Education-Resolving Conflict in 
Higher Education, ed. Jane E. McCarthy (San Francisco: Jessey-Bass Inc., 
Publishers, 1980), p. 10 
college, meets with the parties involved and prepares a report to 
Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure which can authorize 
206 publication of the report. 
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If the dispute is not resolved before the American Association of 
University Professors' annual meeting, censure may be imposed. In 1980, 
forty-six institutions were on the censured list. 207 
Faculty members and administrators also have mixed opinions on 
tenure. Not surprisingly, those faculty members and administrators 
208 possessing tenure tend to favor it. Others are less supportive. 
There are three distinct groups of college faculty in the 1980's. Those 
groups are tenured faculty, faculty with access to tenure (in tenure 
track positions) and faculty with no access to tenure at a11. 209 A 1981 
survey of 222,000 faculty members at 1,200 four-year colleges and 
universities indicated that 67.4 percent of the faculty were tenured and 
210 25.5 percent was in tenure track positions, but not yet tenured. 
Those higher percentages of faculty in tenured and tenure track 
positions pose problems for college administrators. As a result, the 
trend for college administrators to move away from tenure track 
positions in favor of term contracts or to adopt some less severe 
206Ibid., p. 13. 
207Ibid., p. 14. 
208Theodore Walden, "Higher Education: Attitudes Toward Tenure," 
Phi Delta Kappan, November 1980, p. 217. 
209 Roemer and Schnitz, p. 514. 
210 "A Recent Survey on Tenure Practices at Four Year Institutions," 
Change, March 1981, p. 46. 
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modifications such as extended probationary periods, tenure quotas, or 
periodic evaluation of tenured faculty membe.:s continues into the 
1980's. 211 
Tenure in the 1980's is also threatened by the raising of the 
retirement age to seventy years of age. Retirement has been used in the 
212 past as a termination of the tenure contract. Faced with that problem 
along with declining enrollments, more college administrators are 
reevaluating tenure policies and at the same time are developing more 
213 reduction in force policies. 
One solution to the tenure and enrollment problems used increasingly 
in the 1980's is the employment of part-time faculty, an alternative that 
becomes more feasible as the supply of new master's and doctoral 
214 graduates exceeds the demand. Part-·time employees are more at the 
mercy of the institution, thus posing problems concerning their academic 
freedom. 215 Competition between full and part-time faculty also poses a 
211Richard P. Chait and Andrew T. Ford, "Beyond Traditional Tenure," 
Change, July/August 1982, p. 44. 
212 Walter Y. 0.: "Academic Tenure and Mandatory Retirement Under 
the New Law," Science, 21 December 1979, p. 1373. 
213Ib"d ~ ., p. 1374. 
214 N. Carol Eliason, "Part-Time Faculty: A National Perspective" in 
New Directions for Community Colleges-Using Part-Time Faculty 
Effectively, ed. Michael H. Parsons (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc., 
Publishers, 1980), p. 8. 
215 Richard R. Beman, "Observations of an Adjunct Faculty Member" in 
New Directions for Community Colleges-Using Part-Time Faculty 
Effectively, ed. Michael H. Parsons (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc., 
Publishers, 1980), p. 82. 
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threat, but that situation is often welcomed by administrators. 216 
Two additional threats to academic freedom in the 1980's must be 
mentioned. Both concern factors external to the college. that tend to 
restrict a faculty member's independence. The first of those factors is 
outside funding. While fifty years ago grants from philanthropic 
foundations and the federal government were relatively rare, in the 
1980's they are considered a necessity in many fields, and restrictions 
217 often accompany funding. 
The other factor is "student consumerism," a term used to refer to 
providing the students with what they want in terms of what is taught and 
how it is taught. 218 If "student consumerism" is carried to an extreme 
it becomes a precondition for teaching and therefore restricts freedom in 
h . 219 teac 1.ng. 
A related trend of the 1980's is a growing emphasis on 
"vocationalism," with the general goal being to give the student a set of 
marketable skills. Such policies may lead to instructional goals that 
are quite specific with prescribed syllibi and learning broken down into 
220 tasks and subtasks with acquired skill levels being measured. 
216Louis S. Albert and Rollin J. Watson, "Mainstreaming Part-Time 
Faculty: Issue or Imperative?" in New Directions for Community 
Colleges-Using Part-Time Faculty Effectively, ed. Michael H. Parsons 
(San Francisco: Jessey-Bass Inc., Publishers, 1980), p. 74. 
217 Bok, p. 24. 
218 Gerald M. Reagan, "Contemporary Constraints on Academic Freedom," 
Educational Forum, Summer 1982, p. 393. 
219Ibid. 
220Ibid. 
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Summary 
A review of the pertinent literature shows that threats to academic 
freedom have existed as long as there have been colleges and 
universities, and ·that threats still exist today. Although some threats 
have been lessened or eliminated through the years others have alarmingly 
resurfaced while new threats have also developed, especially regarding 
tenure, which for nearly a century has been viewed as one of the 
principal safeguards of academic freedom. 
Through the years the threats to academic freedom and tenure have 
changed as society and the problems faced by society have changed. In 
some cases those problems have resulted in pressures on colleges to 
restrict academic freedom. In other instances, pressure has been more 
directed at individual faculty members. 
Over the years more safeguards have been developed to stave off 
threats to academic freedom. Especially in the twentieth century, 
academic freedom came to be viewed by academics and later in the century 
by the courts as a right possessed by faculty members, with tenure and 
due process viewed as ways of protecting that right. Thus, due process 
tends to become a right in itself and, therefore, should be available to 
every faculty member regardless of tenure status. 
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CHAPTER III 
LEGAL ASPECTS OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE IN COMMUNITY COLLEGES 
The historical roots of college freedom in personnel matters go back 
to the statutes that established those colleges, laws that in many cases 
gave the institutions far-reaching authority over faculty members under 
the assumption that the college was best qualified to have that 
h 
. 1 aut or~ty. However, governance of colleges is the responsibility of lay 
boards. That fact has led in some instances to more attention being paid 
to community pressures than to academic freedom, as in a situation where 
2 a faculty member is dismissed for the expression of controversial views. 
Some state legislatures have seen fit to remedy that situation 
described above with statutes that apply to personnel matters. Often the 
colleges will institute policies for the protection of academic freedom, 
and those policies may be reflected in the wording of faculty member's 
contracts. Whether by state statute, by college policy, or by contract 
clause, the courts will order the college to comply with that statute, 
3 policy, or contract. 
1 Malcolm Moss and Francis E. Rourke, The Campus and the State 
(Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1959), p. 149. 
2 Ibid., p. 296. 
3 William A. Keplin, The Law of Higher Education (San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass Inc., Publishers, 1978), p. 131. 
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Thus, faculty members possess the academic freedqm granted them by 
statute, college policy, or contract. College policies are often 
patterned after American Association of University Professors statements 
and if so, the courts often consider those AAUP statements whether or not 
they are directly in the contract if they are considered an important 
4 source of "custom and usage" at the college. 
Contracts and statutes may distinguish between tenured .:-nd 
nontenured faculty members; however, where constitutional issues are 
involved tenure is not considered by the courts to be necessary for the 
5 protection of constitutional rights. For nontenured faculty members 
such protection may be the extent of their job security. 6 The state 
cannot deny any person equal protection under the law. In addition, the 
Fourteenth Amendment has been interpreted by the courts as safeguarding 
the rights of academic freedom for a professor to teach free and clear of 
7 arbitrary restrictions by the state. 
4 Ibid., p. 41 
5Ibid. 
6virginia D. Nordin, "Legal Protection of Academic Freedom," in The 
Courts and Education, ed. Clifford Hooker (Chicago: University of--
Chicago Press, 1978), p. 312. 
7casimir J. Kowalski, Phillip c. Chamberlain and Joseph P. Cangemi, 
"Some Legal Aspects of Higher Education," College Student Journal, Fall 
1977, p. 283. 
Tenure and academic freedom, while linked, are not identical. A 
distinction must be made, as will be done in this chapter. Academic 
freedom specifically is afforded very little statutory protection. 8 
Academic freedom is often discussed in court cases involving the 
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constitutional rights of faculty members, and the courts have tended to 
use the term as a "catch all" to refer to a faculty member's legal 
rights. 9 
The concept of academic freedom has developed more through the 
efforts of the AAUP than through state statutes or from case law. Though 
several Supreme Court justices, both past and present, have argued for 
academic freedom under the First Amendment, "most cases are decided on 
rather narrow procedural grounds and never reach the underlying question 
of whether and how academic freedom might be practically protected by 
1 1110 aw. 
Thus, for the purpose of examining the legal aspects of academic 
freedom and tenure it is necessary to examine three topics: (1) academic 
freedom as a constitutional right; (2) academic freedom for nontenured 
faculty members; and (3) academic freedom for tenured faculty members. 
This chapter will look at the topics indicated above as they are 
affected by three factors; (1) state statutes; (2) college policies; and 
(3) decisions. 
8 Nordin, p. 313. 
9Kaplin, L~w of Higher Education, 141. 
10 Nordin, p. 313. 
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State Statutes 
A formal tenure system is a type of employment security, serving, 
once tenure has been achieved, to limit the procedures administrators can 
follow in terminating a faculty member. Dismissal can be accomplished 
only ~fter proper procedures have been followed. Among those procedures 
are notice of reasons for dismissal, notice of a hearing, the opportunity 
for a hearing where the faculty member may respond to the reasons given 
for nonretention. 11 
Tenure systems can arise from two sources, college policy or state 
statute or from a combination of both. Most states have tenure statutes, 
but they usually apply to public elementary and high school teachers with 
12 higher education covered by a different statute or not covered at all. 
In some states, college faculty members are covered by the state employee 
personnel system, and unless the laws are clear on the point, if the 
13 state also has educational statutes, conflicting coverage may result. 
Fifteen state statutes offer much protection to nontenured faculty 
members. One of the few types of legislative enactment states have 
restricting the termination of probationary faculty members is contract 
11Harry W. Pettigrew, "Constitutional Tenure: Toward a Realization 
of Academic Freedom" in The Constitutional Status of Academic Tenure, ed. 
Walter P. Metzger (New York: Arno Press, 1977), pp. 477, 508-511. 
12 Ibid., p. 477. 
13 Moss, p. 149. 
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law. Thus a distinction is made between a dismissal during the term of 
the contract and a nonrenewal of the contract for the following year. 
The former may entail procedural safeguards, while the latter usually 
14 does not. 
Another protection for faculty members deals with the limitation of 
state statutes by the courts. 15 In Keyishian, the United States Supreme 
Court stated that public employment is not a privilege to which the state 
can attach restrictions to the employee's constitutional rights, and that 
teachers deserve special protection because of society's interest in 
academic freedom. Thus, state statutes must not infringe on a teacher's 
constitutional rights unless there is an "overriding public interest" in 
16 doing so. 
While as indicated above, most states have tenure statutes affecting 
public school teachers and not college and university faculty members, 
the situation regarding community colleges is much less clear, due in 
part to the evolution of those colleges as outlined in Chapter II. There 
are three basic ways that community colleges are classified by the 
states. Community colleges can be classified as part of the public 
school system. They can be included as a part of the state's system of 
higher education, or they can compose a separate community colleges 
system. In many instances, tenure policies are left up to individual 
colleges. 
14Pettigrew, p. 480. 
15Keyishian v. Board of Regents of State of New York, 385 U.S. 589, 
87 S. Ct. 675, 17 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1967). 
16Pettigrew, p. 492. 
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An analysis of the community college tenure laws of the fifty states 
was conducted for this study, and the results are summarized in Table 1 
with the applicable statutes presented in the Appendix. 
In keeping with the tendency allowing institutions of higher 
education to establish tenure policies, Table 1 indicated that 
thirty-three state codes do not include tenure for community college 
faculty members. Sixteen states do not provide procedures for dismissal 
or nonrenewal of faculty members, and academic freedom in community 
colleges is only mentioned in the statutes of four states. For those 
states making no mention of dismissal procedures, the law enumerating the 
powers of the board of trustees, specifically their power to hire faculty 
members, is often interpreted as giving them the power to dismiss faculty 
members as well. For that reason, such statutes have been included in 
the Appendix where no more specific statute exists. 
In listing the powers of the boards of trustees, nine state laws 
specifically include the power to terminate faculty appointments and in 
sixteen states the power to set the terms of employment. Such powers may 
be in the hands of either a state board or of local boards. Four states 
provide for termination at the discretion of the state board, and seven 
states let the state board set the terms of employment. In a state with 
a large community college system, making the state board responsible for 
dismissals would leave that board with a monumental task. The states 
such as New Mexico and Kentucky that give such power to their boards have 
small community college systems, or in the case of South Dakota, offer 
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TABLE 1 
SUMMARY OF STATE STATUTES 
AL AK AZ AR CA CO CT DE FL GA HI 
I. Tenure not mentioned X X X X X X X X X 
II. Dismissal/nonrenewal procedure 
not mentioned X X X X 
III. Academic freedom mentioned X X X 
IV. Dismissal/nonrenewal at 
discretion of 9tate board X 
v. Employment terms set by 
state board X X 
VI. Dismissal/nonrenewal at 
discretion of local board X X 
VII. Employment terms set by 
local board X X X X 
VIII. Provision for contracts X X 
IX. Probationary faculty 
A. Nonrenewal at discretion of 
local board 
B. Written notice of nonrenewal X X 
c. Hearing X 
D. Notice required for dismissal X 
E. Grounds for dismissal 
F. Due process procedures 
outlined X 
G. Provision for suspensions X 
H. Judicial review X 
X. Tenured or continuing contract 
faculty 
A. Procedure for attainment 
B. Notice of nonrenewal/dismissal X X 
c. Grounds for dismissal X X lx:* 
D. Hearing X X 
E. Due process procedures outlined X X 
F. Provision for suspensions X X 
G. Judicial review X X 
XI. Collective bargaining 
A. To set employment terms 
B. Hearing 
c. Arbitration 
D. Judicial review 
* Only one ground given for dismissal 
I. 
II. 
III. 
IV. 
v. 
VI. 
VII. 
VIII. 
IX. 
X. 
XI. 
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
SUMMARY OF STATE STATUTES 
ID IL IN IA KS KY LA ME MD MA MI 
Tenure not mentioned x X X X 
Dismissal/nonrenewal procedure 
not mentioned X X 
Academic freedom mentioned 
Dismissal/nonrenewal at 
discretion of state board X 
Employment terms set by 
state board 
Dismissal/nonrenewal at 
discretion of local board 
Employment terms set by 
local board X X 
Provision for contracts X X 
Probationary faculty 
A. Nonrenewal at discretion of 
local board X 
B. Written notice of nonrenewal X X X X X 
c. Hearing X tx! X 
D. Notice required for dismissal X X X 
E. Grounds for dismissal 
F. Due process procedures 
outlined 
G. Provision for suspensions X 
H. Judicial review 
Tenured or continuing contract 
faculty 
A. Procedure for attainment 
B. Notice of nonrenewal/dismissal X X X X 
c. Grounds for dismissal X X X 
D. Hearing X X X X 
E. Due process procedures outlined X X X X 
F. Provision for suspensions X X X 
G. Judicial review X X X 
Collective bargaining 
A. To set employment terms X X X 
B. Hearing X 
c. Arbitration X X 
D. Judicial review X 
hearing only if question exists of violation of constitutional 
rights 
X 
X 
X 
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
SUMMARY OF STATE STATUTES 
MN MS MO MT NE NV NH NJ NM NY NC 
I. Tenure not mentioned X X X x+ X X X 
II. Dismissal/nonrenewal procedure 
not mentioned x+ X X 
III. Academic freedom mentioned 
IV. Dismissal/nonrenewal at 
discretion of state board X 
v. Employment terms set by 
state board 
VI. Dismissal/nonrenewal at 
discretion of local board x@ X x@ 
VII. Employment terms set by 
local board X 
VIII. Provision for contracts X X X 
IX. Probationary faculty 
A. Nonrenewal at discretion of 
local board X X X 
B. Written notice of nonrenewal X X 
c. Hearing X 
D. Notice required for dismissal 
E. Grounds for dismissal 
F. Due process procedures 
outlined 
G. Provision for suspensions 
H. Judicial review 
X. Tenured or continuing contract 
faculty 
A. Procedure for attainment X 
B. Notice of nonrenewal/dismissal X X X X X 
c. Grounds for dismissal X X x* X X 
D. Hearing X X X X 
E. Due process procedures outlined X X X X 
F. Provision for suspensions X X X 
G. Judicial review X X 
XI. Collective bargaining 
A. To set employment terms X 
B. Hearing X 
c. Arbitration 
D. Judicial review 
+ law now being written 
@ through delegation to president 
* only one ground given for dismissal 
I. 
II. 
III. 
IV. 
v. 
VI. 
VII. 
VIII. 
IX. 
x. 
XI. 
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
SUMMARY OF STATE STATUTES 
ND OH OK OR PA RI SC SD TN TX UT 
Tenure not mentioned 
Dismissal/nonrenewal procedure 
not mentioned 
Academic freedom mentioned 
Dismissal/nonrenewal at 
discretion of state board 
Employment terms set by 
state board 
Dismissal/nonrenewal at 
discretion of local board 
Employment terms set by 
local board 
Provision for contracts 
Probationary faculty 
A. Nonrenewal at discretion of 
local board 
B. Written notice of nonrenewal 
c. Hearing 
D. Notice required for dismissal 
E. Grounds for dismissal 
F. Due process procedures 
outlined 
G. Provision for suspensions 
H. Judicial review 
Tenured or continuing contract 
faculty 
A. Procedure for attainment 
B. Notice of nonrenewal/dismissal 
c. Grounds for dismissal 
D. Hearing 
E. Due process procedures outlined 
F. Provision for suspensions 
G. Judicial review 
Collective bargaining 
A. To set employment terms 
B. Hearing 
c. Arbitration 
D. Judicial review 
# for technical institutes 
@ through delegation to president 
$ terms include tenure policy 
X 
X 
** applied to all junior college faculty 
X X X X X xll X X 
X X X X X x# X 
X 
X 
X X X~ 
X 
X 
X 
x*i. 
x*)\ 
x*~ 
x*~ 
x*~ 
x*~ 
x*~ 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
SUMMARY OF STATE STATUTES 
VT VA WA WV WI WY 
I. Tenure not mentioned X X X 
II. Dismissal/nonrenewal procedure 
not mentioned X X 
III. Academic freedom mentioned 
IV. Dismissal/nonrenewal at 
discretion of state board 
v. Employment terms set by 
state board X 
VI. Dismissal/nonrenewal at 
discretion of local board 
VII. Employment terms set by 
local board 
VIII. Provision for contracts X X 
IX. Probationary faculty 
A. Nonrenewal at discretion of 
local board X X 
B. Written notice of nonrenewal X X 
c. Hearing X 
D. Notice required for dismissal 
E. Grounds for dismissal X 
F. Due process procedures 
outlined X X 
G. Provision for suspensions 
H. Judicial review X 
X. Tenured or continuing contract 
faculty 
X X A. Procedure for attainment 
B. Notice of nonrenewal/dismissal 
c. Grounds for dismissal X X 
D. Hearing X X 
E. Due process procedures outlined X X 
F. Provision for suspensions 
G. Judicial review X 
XI. Collective bargaining 
A. To set employment terms X 
B. Hearing 
c. Arbitration 
D. Judicial review 
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junior college courses at teachers' colleges or in partnership with other 
four-year colleges. It is far easier for a state board to simply set 
state-wide employment terms. 
Local boards are given such powers in some states. Five states let 
local boards dismiss faculty members at the discretion of the board, and 
nine states provide for employment terms to be set by the local board. 
While the use of employment contracts is very widespread, only eight 
states specifically provide for contracts in their statutes. 
Of the fifteen states that provide tenure systems and/or some form 
of due process protection for community college faculty members, thirteen 
provide some measure of protection for probationary faculty members as 
well. That protection falls into a number of categories. Twelve states 
provide for notice to be given if the faculty member is not to be rehired 
for the next year, whereas only six states require notice for dismissal 
during the academic year, possibly due to the fact that such dismissals 
constitute situations in which faculty members must be removed quickly 
for the good of the college. That is also the thinking behind provisions 
for the suspension of probationary faculty members pending a hearing. 
Such suspensions are provided in the statutes of three states. 
Seven states provide for hearings for probationary faculty members. 
Due process procedures at the hearing are specified in the statutes of 
four states. While there is some variation in the due process procedures 
of hearings from state to state, they typically include an opportunity 
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to respond to charges, an opportunity to present and cross-examine 
witnesses, representation by counsel if desired, and the making of a 
transcript of the proceedings. Grounds for dismissal of probationary 
faculty members are required in only two states. Three states also 
provide for judicial review should it be desired once a college's own due 
process procedures have been exhausted. 
As would be expected, tenured faculty members receive more 
protection under state statute than do probationary faculty members. Of 
the nineteen states having either statutory tenure or dismissal systems, 
twelve require notice be provided to the faculty member before dismissal. 
Grounds for dismissal are required in fourteen states, though 
Florida and Nebraska list only one ground each for dismissal. In Florida 
that ground is disruptive activity. In Nebraska it is unsatisfactory 
performance. California's statute is illustrative of a more complete 
list of grounds. Those grounds are ( 1) immoral or unprofessional 
conduct; (2) certain violations of the Penal Code; (3) dishonesty; 
(4) incompetency; (5) unfitness for service; (6) any physical or mental 
condition making the instructor unfit for service; (7) persistent refusal 
to obey school regulations; (8) conviction of a felony or crime involving 
moral turpitude; (9) membership in the Communist Party. 17 Even those 
grounds allow a great deal of interpretation by boards of trustees. 
17california, Government Code, Ch. 1010, Section 87732. 
72 
Hearings are required before dismissal in thirteen states' codes, 
and the due process procedures included in the hearing are outlined in 
all thirteen states. Minnesota community college faculty members work 
under collective bargaining agreements. Any due process is handled 
through a grievance procedure which is explained in the state's 
legislative enactment. Maine and Massachusetts have similar provisions. 
Thus all states providing for due process specify the nature of that due 
process for tenured faculty members. 
The notice and hearings required in some states result in the 
passage of a good deal of time before the actual dismissal of a faculty 
member can take place. The delay is often intentional, giving the 
faculty member the opportunity to correct any faults. In California, for 
example, if a faculty member is charged with unprofessional conduct or 
incompetency, notice must be specific as to demonstrated instances of 
that unprofessional conduct or incompetency, and an opportunity must be 
provided to correct this situation. 
Such delays before dismissal can result in problems where immediate 
removal is desirable due to the nature of the charge against a faculty 
member. As a solution to that problem, nine states have provided for the 
suspension of tenured faculty members. In Colorado for example, a 
faculty member may be suspended for up to fifteen days if in the 
judgement of the chief administrative officer the continued presence of 
that faculty member would substantially disrupt the operations of the 
college. 
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Nine states provide for judicial review of dismissal decisions, once 
procedures internal to the college have been exhausted. Such provisions 
typically give time limitations and the issues the court can consider in 
the review. 
Five states deal with the dismissal or nonrenewal of community 
college faculty members at least in part through collective bargaining. 
Minnesota, Maine, Massachusetts, Maryland, and Wisconsin use such 
procedures to set terms of employment. As mentioned above, those states 
provide for due process through grievance procedures and arbitration. 
Wisconsin has a tenure law providing for notice, hearings, and grounds 
for dismissal; however, that state's law also provides for modification 
or waiver of any of the sections of the tenure law under a collective 
bargaining agreement. 
Though in most cases the procedure for acquiring tenure is left to 
state or local boards of the trustees to develop, three states outline 
that procedure in their statutes. New Jersey, for example, gives the 
required time period before tenure can be attained, exceptions to that 
time period, and who is to make the decision on granting tenure. 
As mentioned above, when states have a personnel law for state 
employees, a confusing situation can result if the statutes are not clear 
on whether faculty members are included, and states vary on their 
inclusion. On the one hand, Minnesota does cover its community college 
faculty members under its state civil service law, while on the other 
hand North Carolina specifically excludes them from coverage under its 
state personnel act. 
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College Policies 
Thirty-one states do not provide for either tenure or dismissal of 
community college faculty members in their statutes. As a result, 
contracts and internal po~icies concerning dismissals are important in 
the two-year colleges, and in all institutions of higher education. 
Therefore, college trustees will often include in their regulations 
procedures similar to those found in state statutes for the dismissal of 
public school teachers, and those regulations then become incorporated 
into faculty members' contracts. 18 
College administrators have a great deal of flexibility in setting 
personnel policies, especially in states that do not provide them with 
statutory or other state level guidelines. However, once the rules and 
regulations are established they must be followed. When there is a 
deviation from those regulations, the matter often ends up in a court of 
law. Litigation can result not only from a failure to follow college 
regulations but also from questions arising as to who is to implement the 
regulations. For example, questions can arise as to who is to negotiate 
19 and execute the employment contract. 
Sindermann20 provides an example of how a college's regulations and 
policies can become binding in the opinion of the courts through the 
18Pettigrew, p. 480. 
19Thomas E. Blackwell, College Law (Washington: American Council on 
Education, 1961), p. 59. 
20 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S Ct. 2694, 33 L. Ed. 2d 570 
(1972). 
75 
recognition of a professional or at least a "customary law" where. state 
guidelines and in this case the college's Faculty Guide included language 
21 that gave the faculty member the equivalent of tenure. 
Judicial Decisions 
Academic Freedom. Only since \\Torld war II have the courts recognized 
academic freedom as part of a teacher's First Amendment rights, no longer 
viewing it as a matter internal to the college but seeing it as a concern 
f i L - 22 o soc ety as a w~~ole. The Supreme Court had already spoken to the 
23 issue of the teacher's right to teach in Meyer. However, it was in the 
court cases of the 1950's and 1960's that the Supreme Court gave academic 
freedom constitutional status under the First Amendment rights to freedom 
of speech and association, under the Fifth Amendment right to protection 
from self-incrimination, and under the Fourteenth Amendment right to due 
process. Some of those Supreme Court cases contained statements 
24 supporting academic freedom. 
21Matthew W. Finkin, "Toward a Law of Academic Status" in The 
Constitutional Status of Academic Tenure, ed. Walter P. Metzger--
(New York: Arno Press, 1977), p. 593. 
22John S. Brubacher, The Courts and Higher Education (San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass Inc., Publishers, 1977), p. 57. 
23 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S. Ct. 625, 67 L. Ed. 1042 
(1923). 
24 Kaplin, Law of Higher Education, p. 142. 
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25 Slochower speaks to the matter of due process, stating that loThile 
a teacher does not have a constitutional right to a job, and while the 
state does have broad powers to dismiss employees, due process is 
desirable before such dismissal takes place. 
The first case where academic freedom is actually discussed is 
26 Adler where, in his dissenting opinion, Justice William 0. Douglas 
describes the consequences of stifling academic freedom. 27 With Sweezy, 
academic freedom went from the dissenting opinions of the Supreme Court 
to the majority opinion with six justices in the majority. 28 That 
majority opinion struck a balance between the interests of the individual 
and the interests of society in favor of the individual since such a 
29 balance is ultimately beneficial to society. The opinion also stated 
that 
the essentiality of freedom in the community of the American 
Universities is almost self evident. No one should under estimate 
the vital role in a democracy that is played by those who guide and 
train our youth. To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual 
leaders in ~tlr colleges and universities would imperil the future of 
our Nation. 
25s1ochower v. Board of Higher Education of City of New York, 350 
U.S. 551, 76 S. Ct. 637, 100 1. Ed. 692 (1956). 
26Adler V. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 92 S. Ct. 380, 96 1. 
Ed. 517 (1952). 
27 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354, U.S. 234, 77 S. Ct. 1203, 1 1. Ed. 
2d 1311 (1957). 
28 William P. Murphy, "Academic Freedom-An Emerging Constitutional 
Right" in The Consitutional Status of Academic Freedom, ed. 
Walter P. Metzger (New York: Arno Press, 1977), p. 455. 
29 Burbacher, p. 57. 
30 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S., p. 250. 
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31 32 Keyishian, in rejecting Adler, demonstrated the changes in 
33 the Supreme Court 1 s views on academic freedom. In Keyishian the 
Supreme Court stated that our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding 
academic freedom which is of transcendent value to all of us and not 
merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special 
concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a 
pall over the classroom. 34 
In the end, however, it is·significant that the case was not decided 
35 on the grounds of academic freedom. 
36 Pickering continues the trend favoring teacher rights with the 
Supreme Court stating that teachers may not be required to give up their 
First Amendment right to comment on matters of public concern. Again a 
balancing of the rights of the teacher and the state is involved. 
Thus, a teacher's constitutional rights do not stop when he enters 
37 the school, a point that was made clear in Tinker • While that case 
31 Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the State of New York, 385 U.S. 
589, 87 S. Ct. 675, 17 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1967). 
32Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 92 S. Ct. 380, 96 L. 
Ed. 517 (1952). 
33 Kaplin, Law of Higher Education, p. 146. 
34 Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the State of New York, 385 U.S. 
p. 603. 
35 Nordin, p. 319. 
36Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School District 
205, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S. Ct. 1732, 20 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1968). 
37Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 
U.S. 503, 89 S. Ct. 733, 21 L. Ed. 2d 731 (1969). 
78 
dealt directly with student rights, the Supreme Court saw fit to apply 
the decision to .teachers as well. 
Academic freedom, as interpreted in the decisions indicated above, 
is not a right. Rather, it is a freedom because it gives immunity from 
the authority of others to prevent the individual from exercising his 
constitutional rights. It is therefore a personal liberty to teach and 
research freely, within the reasonable limits set by a sense of 
professional responsibility. For example, a psychology professor crying 
"fire" in a crowded theater to observe stress would go beyond the 
limits. 38 
Since academic freedom involves the freedom to teach and research, 
it is closely tied to employment at a college or university. Therefore, 
it is a freedom protected by the constitution in public institutions of 
39 higher learning. 
The courts have used the term academic freedom as a "catch all" to 
include a range of teacher rights. "This judicial conception of academic 
freedom is essentially an attempt to reconcile basic legal principles 
with the courts' notions of academic freedom's social and intellectual 
role in American education."40 
Due to the attempts of the courts to balance the interests of the 
38 William Van Alstyne, "The Specific Theory of Academic Freedom and 
the General Issue of Civil Liberty" in The Constitutional Status of 
Academic Freedom, ed. Walter P. Metzger (New York: Arno Press, 1977), 
pp. 71, 78. 
39 Ibid., p. 74. 
40 Kaplin, Law of Higher Education, p. 141. 
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teacher and the college in each case, it is difficult for administrators 
to make generalizations as to the establishment of policies regarding 
academic freedom. However, the court decisions do provide some guidance. 
Administrators 1 authority over the exercise of academic freedom is 
limited, especially outside of the classroom. That authority increases 
as the job relatedness of the teacher's activity increases. Therefore 
college regulations should be specific in nature, devoid of vague 
generalizations. Administrators should also avoid any interference with 
free speech, especially outside of the classroom. Due process procedures 
should be provided whenever a faculty member is deprived of liberty or 
property. Dismissals should not be based on actions that are legitimate 
41 exercises of constitutional rights. 
Academic Freedom for Nontenured Faculty Members. While tenured faculty 
members are protected by the procedural safeguards of their tenure 
systems, both tenured and nontenured faculty members are protected from 
42 infringement of their constitutional rights. 
Under the Fourteenth Amendment all faculty members have a right to 
due process under certain conditions, whether they are tenured or not. 
That conclusion is based primarily on two cases decided on the same day 
43 44 by the Supreme Court, Roth and Sindermann. Among the legal questions 
41 Ibid., pp. 156-158. 
42Pettigrew, p. 495. 
43Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S. 
Ct. 2701, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972). 
44Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S. Ct. 2694, 33 L. Ed. 2d 
570 (1972). 
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addressed in those cases were whether a nontenured faculty member may 
have the right to continued employment based on state law, and whether 
such a faculty member may be deprived of a liberty or property interest 
45 without due process of law. 
Those cases came at a time when the circuits were split as to 
whether the Fourteenth Amendment required due process prior to the 
nonrenewal of teacher contracts and whether nonrenewal was a violation of 
First Amendment speech rights. The Supreme Court answered those 
questions, stating that teachers were entitled to due process when it is 
46 proven that they have been deprived of liberty or property. 
Tenure is irrelevant to liberty claims. The Supreme Court ruled 
that Sindermann's lack of tenure was not a consideration in his free 
speech claim, and that the government cannot deny a benefit because an 
employee exercises a constitutional right. 47 Although the case does not 
directly address the issue of pretermination hearings involving free 
speech violations, the wording of the case indicates that infringement of 
free speech rights leads to the requirement of a hearing before 
termination. However, the teacher must have a legitimate free speech 
45Elaine R. DiBiase, "Tenure, Alternatives to Tenure and the 
Courts", paper presented at the 1980 American Educational Research 
Association meeting, April, 1980. 
46 Carol H. Shulman, "Employment of Nontenured Faculty: Some 
Implications of Roth and Sindermann" in The Constitutional Status of 
Academic Tenure,~ Walter P. Metzger (New York: Arno Press, 1977), 
p. 215. 
47Kaplin, Law of Higher Education, p 142. 
interest. Simply holding a teaching position is not sufficient to 
48 require due process if that position is taken away. 
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49 In Roth , the Supreme Court found no liberty interest was infringed 
by the teacher's nonrenewal. The lower court had stated that Roth's 
interest in securing a job must be weighed against the administration's 
need for discretion in employment decision, but according to the Supreme 
Court such a weighing need only be done after a liberty or property 
interest has been proven. 50 No such liberty interest was demonstrated by 
Roth, since the Supreme Court found that simple failure to renew his 
appointment did not damage his standing in the conununity or his prospects 
for future employment. Therefore the fact that a teacher is not rehired 
51 for a particular job does not lead to a requirement of due process. 
The Supreme Court was not unanimous in that opinion. In his 
dissenting opinion in Roth, Justice William 0. Douglas stated that 
nonrenewal of a teacher's contract is tantamount in effect to a 
dismissal, and the consequences may be enormous. Nonrenewal can 
be a blemish that turns into a permanent scar and effectively limits 
any chance th52techer has of being rehired as a teacher, at least in his state. 
48 Shulman, p. 226. 
49 Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S. 
Ct. 2701, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972). 
50 Shulman, p. 217. 
51 Kaplin, Law of Higher Education, p. 133. 
52 Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S., p. 585. 
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) 
The Supreme Court defines an expectancy of employment as a property 
right, but no such property right exists if the expectancy is only in the 
mind of the teacher. 53 The Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of 
Appeals when the lower court stated that mere subjective e~pectancy was 
protected by due process. 54 In Sindermann , the Supreme Court stated that 
in order for the expectation to be.a legitimate property interest with 
accompanying rights to due process protection, the expectation must be 
derived from state laws or practices of the college. Those laws or 
practices can result in de facto tenure. As stated in Sindermann, 55 
" ••• absence of ••• such explicit contractural provision [providing for 
tenure] may not always foreclose the possibility that a teacher has a 
property interest in continued employment." Such a property interest 
requires due process protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Thus the Supreme Court created a kind of quasi-tenure applicable to 
some faculty members and not to others, and in doing so left college 
administrators and the courts with a great deal of discretion. 56 For 
example according to the decision in Roth, 57 a distinction must be made 
53Larry W. Hughes and William M. Gordon, "Frontiers of the Law", in 
The Courts and Education, ed. Clifford P. Hooker (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1978), p. 353. 
54 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S., p. 601. 
55rbid. 
56william Van Alstyne, "The Supreme Court Speaks to the Untenured: 
A Comment on Board of Regents v. Roth and Perry v. Sindermann", in The 
Constitutional Status of Academic Tenure, ed. Walter P. Metzger--
(New York: Arno Press, 1977), p. 267. 
57Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S., p. 578. 
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between the faculty member whose contract is still in force and the 
faculty member whose contract has exp~red. The former has an interest 
that requires due process protection. 
58 Bishop, although not dealing with a school environment, has been 
linked to the education cases because it deals with due process 
protection for liberty and property interests. In Bishop• 59 a police 
officer was fired and orally informed in private of the decision and the 
reasons for it. The Supreme Court found that no property interests had 
been infringed since. the wording of the ordinance dealing with the 
employment of police officers could not reasonably lead to an expectation 
of continued employment, and because the officer in this case was given 
the reasons in private, no liberty interest was involved. 
In the decision indicated above on due process, the Supreme Court 
has indicated which situations require such protection: (1) when the 
rules or practices of the institution or state laws result in a mutual 
understanding that employment will be continued, thus creating a property 
interest claim; (2) when an institution in the process of terminating an 
appointment makes charges against a faculty member that damage his 
reputation or standing in the community, thus creating a liberty interest 
claim; (3) where termination results in a stigma that leads to the 
barring of the faculty member from employment in teaching, again 
58 Bishop v. Wood, 426, U.S. 341, 96 S. Ct. 2074, 48 L. Ed. 2d 684 
(1976). 
59 Kaplin, Law of Higher Education, p. 136. 
involving a liberty interest; and (4) when the termination interferes 
with the faculty members free speech rights, also creating a liberty 
60 claim. 
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Since those 1972 Supreme Court guidelines were handed down, numerous 
cases have come to the courts where faculty members have claimed 
infringement of liberty and property interest without their being 
afforded the benefit of due process. In Johnson61 the United States 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals expanded on the property interest 
criteria of the Supreme Court, stating that a teacher who has held a 
position for a substantial length of time has the equivalent of tenure 
and therefore has a property interest requiring due process protection. 62 
The Court of Appeals also stated that dismissal of a teacher for no 
reason after many years of service would result in a stigma, and 
63 therefore a liberty interest would be involved. 
64 Walker illustrates how expectation of continued employment does 
not constitute a property interest if it exists only in the mind of the 
teacher. Walker read into a letter from the president of the college a 
meaning that was not intended. The letter wished him a happy tenure with 
60Ibid., pp. 136-138. 
61 Johnson v. Fraley, 470 F. 2d 179 (1972). 
62 Ibid., p. 181. 
63 Ibid., p. 182. 
64 Walker v. California State Board of Trustees, 351 F. Supp. 977 
(M.D. Pa. 1972). 
the college. Since Walker was not accused of anything, the District 
Court also ruled that no liberty interest was involved. 65 
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The same District Court also took a narrow view of liberty interests 
66 in Berry. The District Court stated that though the charges brought 
against Berry were likely to damage her professional reputation, those 
charges (dealing with her competence as a teacher) were not severe enough 
to create a stigma, and that only such charges are immorality or 
disloyalty to the nation involved in a liberty interest. 67 
Failure of a college to follow state statutes is illustrated in 
68 Ramey. Although the case did not involve a faculty member, it did 
involve a dismissal from a college position and demonstrated that where a 
state statute calls for due process procedures a property interest is 
created. Those procedures provided by legislative enactment must be 
69 followed for covered employees whether or not they have tenure. 
70 Ducorbier gives an example of how another district court rejected 
a claim to a property interest based on what the District Court 
considered to be a unilateral expectation of continued employment. 
Ducor bier was an instructor, and by college rules was therefore 
ineligible for tenure. 
65 Ibid., p. 998. 
66 Berry v. Hamblin, 356 F. Supp. 306 (M.D. Pa. 1973). 
67 Ibid., p. 308. 
68 Ramey v. Des Moines Area Community College, 216 N.W. 2d 345 
(1974). 
69 Ibid., p. 347. 
70 Ducorbier v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University, 
386 F. Supp. 202 (E.D. La. 1974). 
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Ducorbier71 is more significant for the decision regarding the 
instructor's liberty claim. The District Court ruled that the 
institution was under no obligation to determine if the job market could 
absorb Ducorbier before letting her go. She had claimed that her 
termination to make room for faculty members working on their doctoral 
degrees had stigmatized her. 
72 Burdeau also helped clarify where the courts stand on liberty 
interests, specifically regarding the creation of stigmas. Burdeau 
claimed that his dismissal with no reasons given would be interpreted 
negatively, but the Ninth Court of Appeals found no evidence to that 
73 effect. In contrast, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals had found in 
74 Johnson, that a dismissal for no reason created a stigma. In that 
case, however, the Fourth Circuit was dealing with a teacher who had been 
employed for twenty-nine years, whereas Burdeau was in his first year of 
employment. Taking those decisions together, the length of service of 
the teacher has to be considered to be the difference between a dismissal 
for no reason resulting in a stigma and the same type of dismissal 
producing no harmful effect. 
The property interest claim in Burdeau75 followed the typical 
pattern, with the Court of Appeals finding that Burdeau's sincere belief 
71 Ibid. , p. 205. 
72 Burdeau v. Trustees of California State Colleges, 507 F. 2d 770 
(9th Cir. 1974). 
73 Ibid., 773. 
74Johnson v. Fraley, 470 F. 2d 179 (4th Cir. 1972). 
75Burdeau v. Trustees of California State Colleges, 507 F. 2d, 
p. 774. 
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in his qualifications did not give him a legitimate property claim. 
In Markwell, more objective proof than simply a teacher's opinion 
was offered in support of property and liberty claims. 76 That evidence 
consisted of the teaching awards and numerous contract renewals given to 
Markwell prior to his criticism of the administration. However, the 
United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals did not find such evidence 
to be proof of an expectation of continued employment. The evidence was 
also found to be insufficient to prove that Markwell was terminated 
because of his criticism of the administration. 77 
Adequate proof of a property interest was provided in Assaf. 78 The 
university had failed to follow its own regulations regarding the timely 
notification of a faculty member that his appointment was not to be 
renewed. Although the board did follow another, conflicting regulation, 
the District Court held that the failure to notify the teacher by the 
required date led to an objective expectancy of continued employment and 
79 thus to a property interest. 
Regarding the conflicting regulations, the District Court stated 
that the university " ••• takes with one hand what it has just bestowed 
with the other hand [and such a situation is not] ••• the kind of fair play 
and substantial justice required by due process. 1180 
76Markwell v. Cullwell, 515 F. 2d 1258 (5th Cir. 1975). 
77 Ibid., p. 1259. 
78 Assaf v. University of Texas System, 399 F. Supp. 1245 (S.D. Tx 
1975). 
79Ibid., p. 1249. 
80Ibid. 
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81 Keddie concerned a liberty claim, and the decision of the District 
Court helped to further define liberty interests. Keddie was denied 
tenure, and his appointment was not renewed because he failed to meet the 
standards of excellence necessary for a grant of tenure. The District 
Court stated that a charge of failure to meet standards of excellence 
would not damage a teacher's career and furthermore, even if the charge 
had been incompetence, a liberty interest would not have been involved. 82 
Keddie's other liberty claim was that the failure to grant him 
tenure was the result of his political activity and his criticism of the 
adminstration. The District Court stated that a college may limit a 
faculty member's right to free speech where a compelling need exists to 
promote a close working relationship between the faculty member and the 
administration. The District Court also stated that academic freedom may 
83 be limited to activities that do not disrupt the educational process. 
The United States Supreme Court dealt with the termination of a 
84 teacher's appointment on multiple grounds in Mt. Healthy. In that case 
a teacher was dismissed for making obscene gestures at female students 
and for making a school memorandum public. There were numerous other 
incidents that could have resulted in charges; however, the board cited 
only the two incidents indicated above. The District Court and the Court 
81Keddie v. Pennsylvania State University, 412 F. Supp. 1264 (M.D. 
Pa. (1976). 
82rbid., p. 1274. 
83rbid., p. 1270. 
84Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 
U.S. 274, 97 S. Ct. 568, 50 L. Ed. 2d 471 (1977). 
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of Appeals found for the teacher since the activities cited by the board 
were considered exercises of free speech. The United States Supreme 
Court vacated the ruling, stating that where a teacher is terminated on 
multiple grounds, even though some of the grounds were based on 
constitutionally protected activity, if there are other grounds not so 
protected, and if the teacher's appointment would have been terminated on 
the basis of that unprotected activity, the termination is valid. To do 
otherwise, stated Justice William Rhenquist, might cause a school to 
retain a teacher against whom valid charges have been brought. 85 
Since Ht. Healthy, in order for a teacher to have a valid claim to a 
liberty interest, the protected activity must be proven to be the 
principal factor in the decision to dismiss, and that the decision would 
not have been made without the protected activity. 
While the Supreme Court sets the standards, the states are not 
obligated to follow them exactly, as long as the state's own standards do 
not fall below the federal standards. That statement was made in the 
West Virginia case of McLendon v. Morton. 86 In that case an associate 
professor had met the eligibility standards published by the community 
college, yet was denied tenure. The Supreme Court of Appeals of 
West Virginia found that s.ince she met the requirements for tenure she 
87 could not be denied tenure without due process. 
85 Ibid., p. 575. 
86 McLendon v. Morton, 249, S.E. 919 (W. Va. 1978). 
87 Ibid., p. 925. 
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Failure of a college to meet its own standards or standards set by 
the state is the principal cause for d~smissal and nonrenewal cases being 
decided in favor of the faculty member. 89 In Silbert, however, such a 
failure worked against the person who sought to keep his position. 
Silbert was an administrator, but his contract stated that he was 
included under the college's tenure policy. When he was dismissed he 
sued; however, the Supreme Court of Montana upheld his dismissal on the 
grounds that under state law administrators were not eligible for tenure, 
and that the board had no authority to grant tenure to administrators 
since state law did not give the board of trustees that power. 90 Silbert 
is an important case for community colleges. As stated earlier in this 
chapter, thirty-two states have no tenure provisions for community 
colleges in their statutes. In those states the legislative enactment 
enumerating the powers of the trustees is often interpreted as giving 
boards the power to set tenure policies if they choose to do so. The 
finding in Silbert demonstrates that an assumption that a board of 
trustees has the power to make tenure decisions cannot be taken for 
granted. 
Another case dealing with college regulations that were violated and 
91 with the powers of college boards is Causey. In Causey a probationary 
teacher was denied tenure based on the recommendations of a tenure review 
committee's evaluation of his teaching. His teaching had never been 
89silbert v. Community College of Flathead County, 587, P. 2d 26 
(Mt. 1978). 
90 Ibid., p. 28. 
91 Causey v. Board of Trustees of Community College District V, 638 
P. 2d 98 (Wa. 1982). 
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formally observed, and the committee did commit several procedural 
errors. When Causey sued, the Court of Appeals of Washington affirmed a 
lower court ruling that since Causey was probationary he could be 
terminated without cause, and irregularities in the committee's work 
could not constitute a denial of due process since no due process was 
required. Furthermore, it was the board and not the tenure review 
committee that had the authority to make the final tenure decision. 92 
Dismissal and nonrenewal cases are not always decided on narrow 
procedural grounds. 93 In Goss for example, a liberty interest was 
created when Goss' appointment was terminated because of her engagement 
in constitutionally protected activity. Goss illustrates how the courts 
use the criteria established in Mt. Healthy94 to weigh various grounds 
for dismissal. The board dismissed Goss under a reduction in force 
policy because her evaluation had ranked her toward the bottom of the 
instructors in her department. However, the fact that points which would 
have raised her evaluation score were left out and the fact that she had 
been involved in disagreements with the board were considered by the 
Court of Appeals to be sufficient to decide the Mt. Healthy test in her 
favor. The disagreements with the board were found to be the principal 
reason for her nonrenewal, and she would have been retained except for 
the protected activity. 95 Goss is also significant because in the 
92 Ibid., p. 100. 
93Goss v. San Jacinto Junior College, 588 F. 2d 96 (5th Cir. 1979). 
94Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429, 
U.S. 274, 97 S. Ct. 568, 50 L. Ed. 2d 471 (1977). 
'95 
Goss v. San Jacinto Junior College, 588 F. 2d, p. 99. 
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wording of that decision college administrators can learn what not to do 
if they are to avoid academic freedom cases. 96 
97 Daulton, a more recent decision from the Fourth Circuit, reached 
much the same conclusions. Daulton divorced her husband and married a 
student. Thereafter she was cited for, among other things, be~ng late 
for classes and inaccessible to students. She was also critical of the 
college administration, and that criticism was viewed as further evidence 
of her negative attitude. 98 99 Citing Sindermann and Mt. Healthy, the 
United States Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the lower court 
ruling that Daulton's appointment had not been renewed because of her 
criticism of the administration, thereby infringing on her First 
Amendment rights. The Court of Appeals found that such criticism was the 
100 principal reason for her nonrenewal. In its decision the Court of 
Appeals weighed the school's interest in regulating conduct against the 
teacher's right to speak out and found that in this case, Daulton's 
i i i i 1 d . i 101 cr t c sms were not ser ous y 1srupt ve. 
96wi!liam A. Kaplin, The Law of Higher Education, 1980 
(San Francisco: Jossey Bass Inc., Publishers, 1980), p. 60. 
97Daulton v. Affeldt, 678 F. 2d 487 (4th Cir. 1982). 
98 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S. Ct. 2694, 33 L. Ed 2d 570 
(1972). 
99Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 
U.S. 274, 97 S Ct. 568, 50 L. Ed 2d 471 (1977). 
100Daulton v. Affeldt, 678, F. 2d, p. 491. 
101Idid. 
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Academic Freedom for Tenured Faculty Members. The courts have left 
boards of trustees and administrators with a great deal of discretion in 
nonrenewal decisions involving nontenured faculty members, and while 
administrators generally favor that discretion and the flexibility it 
gives the institution, most administrators are not as strict as they 
legally could be. Tenure systems are very common, and many colleges' 
policies provide nontenured faculty members reasons for nonrenewal of 
102 appointments. 
College administrators have long recognized the value of academic 
freedom and the importance of due process procedures in protecting 
academic freedom with tenure systems being a means of institutionalizing 
103 that due process. Even where there is no written contract tenure can 
be considered a contract and thus is afforded due process protection 
under the Fourteenth Amendment if (1) it has been granted in writing; (2) 
it has been granted after a probationary period during which the 
teacher's work has been evaluated; (3) the nature of the institution's 
work leads to a need for tenure for the benefit of society; and (4) the 
institution's policies indicate that the tenure decision has been given 
serious thought and that it will be of long duration. 104 
102 Shulman, pp. 229-230. 
103 Ibid., p. 469. 
104Robert Hendrickson, "Legal Aspects of Faculty Reduction" in New 
Directions for Institutional Research-Coping with Faculty Reductions, ed. 
Stephen R. Hemple (San Francisco: Jessey-Bass Inc., Publishers, 1981), 
p. 26. 
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The courts have :f.ndicated what is required to satisfy due process 
for tenured faculty members: (1) a written statement of the basis for 
dismissal; (2) a description of the process used in reaching the 
dismissal decision; (3) the information on which the decision was based; 
105 and (4} an opportunity to respond. 
College administrators continue to face legal problems when tenured 
faculty members are dismissed, especially when the dismissal is for 
"cause" as provided in some state statutes and college regulations. The 
critical issue becomes the standards of determination for "cause." 
Therefore, some colleges and state legislatures have come up with more 
specific reasons for dismissal, the most common being incompetency, 
insubordination, immorality, and medical disability. Those terms are 
also broad, however, and college administrators must clearly define them 
if they wish to minimize their liability. 106 
Due process is required in cases involving the dismissal of tenured 
faculty members, and the issue of who carries out the due process 
107 procedures is also important as illustrated in Bowing. The Washington 
Court of Appeals stated that while state law intended for tenured 
teachers to be dismissed only for cause and after due process, the board 
was not bound by the results of that due process when it was carried out 
b i . 108 y a rev ew comm~ttee. 
105 Ibid., p. 31. 
106 Kaplin, Law of Higher Education, p. 53. 
107 Bowing v. Board of Trustees of Green River Community College 
District No. X, 521, P. 2d 220 (Wa. 1974). 
108 Ibid., p. 224. 
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Bowing's dismissal had not been recommended by the review committee, 
but the board dismissed her anyway. In its decision, the Washington 
Court of Appeals ordered the board to give her a hearing since the final 
decision on her dismissal rested with the b~ard. 109 
Saunders110 illustrates how the grounds given for dismissal can 
result in legal action being taken by a tenured faculty member. Saunders 
was discharged for inefficiency and insubordination, and he sued, 
claiming an infringement of his constitutional rights to free speech and 
expression. The board had more specific charges to back up the 
inefficiency and insubordination grounds for dismissal. Among those 
charges were his failure to teach the prescribed curriculum or use the 
textbook and his refusal to discuss his teaching problems with the 
administration. The Supreme Court of Missouri found the specific charges 
to be sufficient evidence to back up Saunders' dismissal for inefficiency 
and insubordination and stated that his dismissal did not result in an 
infringement of his constitutional rights since college administrators 
had the authority to set curriculum standards and to see that those 
standards were maintained. 111 
As mentioned above, the courts have established a pretermination 
hearing to be one of the requirements of due process for tenured faculty 
109Ibid., 
110 Saunders v. Reorganized School District No. 2 of Osage County, 
520 S.W. 2d 29 (Mo. 1975). 
111 Ibid., p. 35. 
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members. The nature of that hearing and its timeliness came into 
i . Ch 112 quest on 1n ~· Chung claimed that since his hearing cam~ after 
the initial decision to terminate his appointment, he was denied due 
113 process. Citing Sindermann, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit ruled that a hearing need not be held prior to 
termination, but the hearing must be held prior to the termination of 
benefits if the requirements for due process are to be satisfied. The 
Court of Appeals also stated that the purpose of due process to be the 
determination of whether a dismissal is "unreasonable, arbitrary or 
114 capricious." 
Although the courts have allowed institutions flexibility in their 
due process procedures, such procedures, even if followed to the letter, 
may be inadequate to protect the college from litigation if those 
procedures are used for intimidation to discourage the exercise of 
tit ti 11 t t d i ht they Were in Trotman. 115 cons u ona y pro ec e r g s as In 
Trotman, the college president came into conflict with a large number of 
faculty members over a reduction in force policy. He used letters and 
telegrams containing implicit and explicit threats to stifle picketing 
and other protest actions against the policy and against subsequent 
actions taken by the president. The college's due process procedures 
were followed. For example, letters were sent to every faculty member 
112 Chung v. Park, 377 F. Supp. 524, affd. C.A., 514 F. 2d 382, cert. 
den. 451 U.S. 986, 10. S. Ct. 2320, 68 L. Ed. 2d 844 (1980). 
113 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S. Ct. 2694, 33 L. Ed. 2d 
570 (1972). 
114 Chung v. Park, 377 F. Supp. p. 429. 
115Trotman v. Board of Trustees of Lincoln University, 635 F. 2d 
216, cert. den. 451 u.s. 986, 101 S. Ct. 2320, 68 L. Ed. 2d 844 (1980). 
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notifying them of nonrenel~al. This was done to conform to the college 
policy of written notification before dismissal. The District Court 
found that the president had acted in good faith since he did follow the 
college's procedures, but the United States Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals overturned the lower court decision stating that the result of 
the president's letters and telegrams was a stifling of free speech that 
could not be justified on the basis that the speech would have resulted 
in serious disruption of the educational process. The exception was a 
protest by two faculty members where they stood in a classroom, an act 
which the Court of Appeals did find to be disruptive and therefore not 
116 constitutionally protected. 
Summary 
Based on an analysis of cases, the trend suggests that the courts 
will most often support college administrators' decisions in dismissal 
and nonrenewal situations. The decisions are likely to be supported 
whether the faculty member has tenure or not. In many cases the courts 
have expressed regret at having to decide matters best left to the 
college administration to decide. However, where constitutional issues 
are raised the courts have readily become involved. 
Although academic freedom is mentioned in numerous cases, the courts 
are more likely to rely on the concept of protection of liberty and 
property interests in making their deciions. 117 Both tenured and 
nontenured faculty members raise liberty claims, while for tenured 
faculty members tenure itself clearly constitutes a property interest. 
116 Ibid., p. 225-226. 
117 Nordin, p. 330. 
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The Supreme Court left the definitions of liberty and property 
interests rather open, and the lower courts have had to determine where 
such interests exist and where they do not. Apparently the Supreme Court 
intended that such individual determinations take place as evidenced in 
118 Justice William 0. Douglas' dissenting opinion in Roth where he stated 
that a weighing of interests is necessary in each case. 
An analysis of the judicial decisions suggests that nontenured 
faculty members will win whenever a liberty interest has been infringed 
by a termination, and that infringement been interpreted to include 
violation of the right to free speech. However, such an infringement 
must be the principal reason for termination. 
The situation is less clear when the claim involves a liberty 
interest created because of a stigma. There is some disagreement among 
the courts with some stating that a charge of incompetence or in some 
cases the absence of a charge can create a stigma while others have found 
that only such charges as immorality do enough damage to a faculty 
member's standing to require due process protection. If administrators 
uish to play it safe and avoid litigation in the area of liberty 
interests, they should avoid damaging a teacher 1 s reputation in the 
community and discrediting the teacher in such a way as to impair the 
119 teacher's ability to secure employment. 
118 Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S., p. 583. 
119 Shulman, p. 224. 
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The direction of the courts regarding property interests of 
nontenured faculty members is more obvious. If college administrators 
follow their own rules and state legislative enactments they will avoid 
the creation of de facto tenure where it is not intended. To avoid 
property interest cases, college employment policies should be very 
specific concerning contracts and probationary status. 120 Should state 
statute or policy, or the regulations or practices of the college imply 
that the faculty member has some form of tenure, due process will be 
required before that faculty member can be removed. In the majority of 
cases that come before the courts, however, the expectation of continued 
employment has existed only in the mind of the faculty member. That kind 
of subjective expectancy does not result in a property interest. 
Tenured faculty members clearly have a property interest and are 
protected by due process, but only if that due process is handled by the 
board of trustees is it not open to question. Tenure system usually 
provide grounds for dismissal; however, those grounds are often quite 
broad. The trend is for the courts to rely on the judgement of college 
administrators and boards of trustees as to what constitutes "cause", 
inefficiency, or any of the other common grounds for dismissal. Again, 
the courts will intervene when such grounds for dismissal involve 
participation by faculty members in constitutionally protected activity. 
Nine of the cases indicated involve community colleges due in part 
to the failure of many states to provide statutory guidance in the area 
120Ibid. 
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of dismissals and nonrenewals of faculty members. As indicated in 
Chapter II, community college systems were still developing at a time 
when tenure systems were having problems. Thus, many have no formal 
tenure systems, forcing faculty members to rely on the courts for due 
process protection. 
When community colleges are established under local political 
subdivisions such as a city, county, or community college district, 
special immunity problems may result. 121 In such cases the college may 
not share the state's immunity from suit. Community college 
administrators and boards of trustees must therefore be especially wary 
of the damage claims that can accompany a faculty member's suit. 
121Kaplin, Law of Higher Education. p. 70. 
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CHAPTER IV 
REVIEW OF COURT DECISIONS 
This chapter presents a review of landmark decisions and other 
significant court decisions in the three categories outlined in 
Chapter III. An overview is presented for each category. Specific facts 
and judicial decisions are presented as well as a discussion of the 
significance of each case to the category into which it is placed. 
Categories and cases are listed below: 
1. Academic Freedom as a Constitutional Right 
Meyer v. Nebraska (1923) 
Slochower v. Board of Higher Education (1956) 
Sweezy v. New Hampshire (1957) 
Keyishian v. Board of Regents (1967) 
Pickering v. Board of Education (1968) 
Tinker v. Des Hoines Independent Community School District 
(1969) 
2. Academic Freedom as it Relates to Nontenured Faculty 
Perry v. Sindermann (1972) 
Board of Regents v. Roth (1972) 
Johnson v. Fraley (1972) 
Walker v. California State Board of Trustees (1972) 
Berry v. Hamblin (1973) 
Ramey v. Des Moines Area Community College (1974) 
Ducorbier v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University 
(1974) 
Burdeau v. Trustees of California State Colleges (1974) 
Markwell v. Culwell (1975) 
Assaf v. University of Texas System (1975) 
Keddie v. Pennsylvania State University (1976) 
Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle 
(1977) 
McLendon v. Morton (1978) 
Silbert v. Community College of Flathead Countz (1978) 
Goss v. San Jacindo Junior College (1979) 
Causey v. Board of Trustees of Community College District V 
(1982) 
Daulton v. Affeldt (1982) 
3. Academic Freedom as it Relates to Tenured Faculty 
Bowing v. Board of Turstees of Green River Community College 
District No. X (1974) 
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Saunders v. Reorganized School District No. 2 of Osage County 
(1975) 
Chung v. Park (1975) 
Trotman v. Board of Trustees of Lincoln University (1980) 
The landmark United States Supreme Court decisions are reviewed 
because they have established legal precedents which influence decisions 
related to academic freedom and tenure. Other cases present decisions 
from various courts in the American judicial system. 
Academic Freedom as a Constitutional Right 
Overview. The recognition of academic freedom by the courts has been 
slow in coming. The courts have been reluctant to substitute their 
judgement for that of academic administrators, yet they will do so if 
they see the need. The cases presented in this category deal with 
academic freedom in four-year colleges and in the public schools. Yet 
the decisions in both types of cases have been applied frequently to 
decisions involving community colleges. 
The cases presented in this first section emphasize the rights of 
teachers that have to be balanced against the compelling state interest 
in education. In some instances those teacher rights have been given the 
name academic freedom. In others, the rights are referred to by the more 
specific names taken from the Constitution, such as freedom of speech. 
Meyer v. Nebraska 
262 U.S. 390, 43 S. Ct. 625, 67L. Ed. 1042 (1923) 
Facts. While an instructor at Zion Parochial School, the plantiff, 
Robert T. Meyer, had taught German to a ten-year-old pupil in violation 
of a Nebraska statute which held that only English be taught to students 
103 
who had not completed the eighth grade. Meyer was found guilty by the 
District Court of Hamilton County and the Supreme Court of Nebraska 
affirmed, holding that the state statute did not conflict with the 
Fourteenth Amendment, but was instead a valid exercise of police power 
since it prevented children from thinking in foreign languages. Thinking 
in those languages could result in the children having sentiments in 
favor of a foreign country. 
Decision. Justice James C. McReynolds delivered the opinion of the 
United States Supreme Court, stating that the Fourteenth Amendment does 
not simply afford protection from bodily restraint, but among other 
things includes the freedom to engage "in any of the common occupations 
of life." 1 The Nebraska statute interfered with the liberties protected 
by the Fourteenth Amendment, and the United States Supreme Court held 
that that interference was not acceptable. Therefore, the judgement of 
the Nebraska Supreme Court was reversed and the Nebraska law was held to 
be unconstitutional. 
Discussion. This case shows the Supreme Court's recognition of the 
constitutional rights of teachers. Justice James C. McReynolds stated 
that Meyer's "rights to teach and the right of parents to engage him so 
to instruct their children, we think, are within the liberty of the 
Amendment." 2 
1 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S., p. 399. 
2 Ibid., p. 400. 
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Those rights may at times conflict with the interests of the 
state," ••• but the individual has certain fundamental rights which must 
be respected." 3 
Administrators should thus be aware that policies and rules must be 
developed so as not to interfere with the exercise of constitutional 
rights which include the teacher's right to teach. 
Slochower v. Board of Higher Education of City of New York 
350 U.S. 551, 76.S. et. 637, 1001. Ed. 692 (1956) 
Facts. Under the Charter of the City of New York, Slochower was 
dismissed from his teaching position for invoking the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination before the Subcommittee to 
Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other 
Internal Security Laws of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. In 
testimony before the subcommittee, Slochower said that he was not a 
member of the Communist Party. He generally indicated a willingness to 
answer questions concerning his political beliefs since 1941. However, 
he refused to answer questions concerning his membership in groups during 
1940 and 1941. This refusal resulted in his being suspended from his 
Brooklyn College teaching position and his dismissal under the New York 
City Charter. Since Slochower was tenured, he asserted that he was 
entitled to due process, but the New York Court of Appeals found that his 
use of the Fifth Amendment was equivalent to resignation and therefore he 
was not entitled to due process. 
3Ibid., p. 401. 
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Decision. The United States Supreme Court, in a five-four decision found 
that the New York City Charter imposed a penalty upon an individual for 
the exercise of a constitutional right. Furthermore, the Supreme Court 
held that invoking the Fifth Amendment is not the equivalent of 
resignation and therefore Slochower's right to due process was violated. 
Thus the decision of the New York court was reversed. 
Discussion. The significance of the case to this section is that in its 
decision, the Supreme Court goes further in defining the rights and 
interests of the teacher and of the state: 
This is not to say that Slochower has a constitutional right to be 
an associate professor of German in Brooklyn College. The State has 
broad powers in the selection and discharge of its employees, and it 
may be that proper inquiry would show Slochower's continued 
employment to be inconsistent with a real interest of the state. 
But there has been no such inquiry here. We hold t~at the suunnary 
dismissal of appellant violates due process of law. 
Boards of trustees and college administrators should be aware that 
although they do possess wide ranging powers regarding dismissal, those 
powers are tempered by constitutional safeguards such as the right to due 
process. 
Sweezy v. New Hampshire 
354 U.S. 234, 77S. Ct. 1203, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1311 (1957) 
Facts. A New Hampshire statute declared subversive organizations 
unlawful and subversive people ineligible for employment in state 
government, including teaching positions. Under that legislative 
enactment, all present and prospective state employees were required to 
4slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 350 U.S., p. 555. 
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make sworn statements that they were not subversive. The attorney 
general was given the authority to investigate possible violations and, 
through the State Superior Court'· could hold witnesses in contempt. 
Sweezy was called to testify and, though he did appear, he refused 
to answer several questions. No action was taken by the attorney 
general. Five months later Sweezy was called to testify again at which 
time he confided that he was a Marxist and a socialist. He refused to 
answer questions concerning the Progressive Party and its members, the 
subject matter of a lecture he had given, or concerning his beliefs. The 
Superior Court held him in contempt. That decision was upheld by the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court although it was conceded that Sweezy's rights to 
lecture and associate with whom he pleased were infringed by the 
investigation. The court held that the infringement was outweighed by 
the need of the legislature to have information on-subversives. 
Decision. The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the 
New Hampshire court stating that "we do not now conceive of any 
circumstance where a state interest would justify infringement of rights 
5 in these fields." The Supreme Court went on to declare that holding a 
person in contempt under the New Hampshire Statute was not in accordance 
with due process under the Fourteenth Amendment since the legislature was 
seeking the information but the attorney general was conducting the 
investigations. Such a separation of the legislative power to 
investigate from the responsibility to direct that power deprives 
5 Sweezy v. Hampshire, 354 U.S., p. 251. 
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individuals of due process. A contempt citation under such a law is an 
invasion of liberties in the areas of academic freedom and political 
expression. 
Discussion. While this case was decided on other merits, the right to 
academic freedom is specifically mentioned as illustrated in 
Justice Earl Warren's opinion: 
We believe that there unquestionably was an invasion of petitioner's 
liberties in the areas of academic freedom and political expressiog 
- areas in which government should be extremely reticent to tread. 
Justice Felix Frankfurter's concurring opinion is more specific: 
When weighed against the grave harm resulting from governmental 
intrusion into the intellectual life of a university, such 
justification for compelling a witness to discuss the contents 
of his lecture appears grossly inadequate. Particularly is this 
so where the witness has sworn that neither the lecture or at any 
other time did he 'ver advocate overthrowing the government by 
force or violence. 
Thus academic freedom is recognized specifically as one of a teacher's 
liberties and its importance is stated to be such that it is not to be 
infringed under most circumstances. 
Keyishian v. Board of Regents of State of New York 
385 U.S. 589, 87S. Ct. 675, 17 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1967) 
Facts. A section of the New York Civil Law referred to as the Feinberg 
Law and a 1956 addition to that section were challenged by Keyishian, 
another faculty member and by a library employee. The Feinberg Law 
stated that persons advocating forceful otherthrow of the government were 
ineligible for state employment. The law had been challenged previously 
6 Ibid., p. 250. 
7 Ibid., p. 261. 
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in Adler. 8 In that case the law had been found to be constitutional 
by the Supreme Court which also held that although people employed or 
seeking employment in the public schools of New York have a right to free 
speech, assembly and beliefs, they did not have a right to work for the 
school system on their own terms and would not be denied free speech if 
they were denied employment in the schools for advocating the overthrow 
of the government. 
The 1956 addition to the Feinberg Law required each employee to sign 
the Feinberg Certificate stating that the employee had read the law, was 
not a member of the Communist Party and if the employee had ever been a 
member that membership had been reported to the president of the State 
University of New York. 
Keyishian was a faculty member at the University of Buffalo when it 
became a part of the state system. He refused to sign the certificate, 
and his one year term contract was not renewed. 
Before the case went to trial in 1965 the Feinberg Certificate was 
rescinded; however, the courts found that the rescission did not meet the 
questions raised, and the hearing proceeded as if the certificate were 
still a part of the law. 
Decision. With Justice William Brennan writing the majority opinion in 
9 the five-four decision, the United States Supreme Court held that Adler 
was not dispositive of the constitutional issues in Keyishian because in 
8Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 72 S. Ct. 380, 96 L. Ed. 
517 (1952). 
9rbid. 
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the former the Supr~me Court did not consider that the New York law might 
be unconstitutionally vague. 
The Supreme Court found the New York law to be unconstitutionally 
vague in that under that statute it was impossible for a teacher to know 
where to draw the line between seditious and nonseditious utterances. To 
illustrate the vagueness of the law Justice Brennan asked if the law 
applied when a teacher merely tells of the existence of a seditious 
doctrine. 
In addition, the Supreme Court held that knowing membership in an 
organization is not an adequate reason to bar someone from state 
employment if they do not also work for the aims of that organization. 
The New York law was therefore too broad for that reason as well. 
Thus the Supreme Court declared the law unconstitutional stating 
that while the state does have a legitimtate interest in protecting its 
education system, legislative enactments to that end should be specific 
because "First Amendment freedoms need breathing room to survice."10 
Discussion. Before Keyishian, the Supreme Court had said that teachers 
work for school systems which can lay down reasonable terms for their 
contractual employment. Should the teacher choose not to work under 
those terms that is his privilege. Keyishian marks a departure from that 
notion as Justice Brennan said in a quotation from Silbert v. Verner. 11 
10 Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the State of New York, 385 U.S., 
p. 604. 
11 Silbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83S. Ct. 1790, 10L. Ed. 2d 965. 
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It is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion 
and expression may be infri~2ed by the denial or placing conditions 
upon a benefit or privilege. 
Keyishian is also noted for illustrating the Supreme Court stand on 
academic freedom: 
Our Nation is deeply commited to safeguarding academic freedom, 
which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the 
teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of 
the First Amendment which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of 
orthodoxy over the classroom ••• The classroom is peculiarly the 
"market place of ideas." That Nation's future depends upon leaders 
trained through wide experience to that robust exchange of ideas 
which discovers truth out of a multitude of i~ngues, (rather) than 
through any kind of authoratative selection. 
Keyishian has major significance for the issues of academic freedom 
and tenure since it has been used as a precedent frequently in academic 
freedom and tenure cases up to the present day. 
In light of Keyishian, college administrators and boards of trustees 
should be careful not to make rules and regulations so broad as to 
violate a teacher's First Amendment rights. 
Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School District 205 
391 U.S. 563, 88 S. Ct. 1731, 20 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1968) 
Facts. Marvin Pickering was dismissed from his teaching position in 
Township High School District 205 of Will County, Illinois for sending a 
letter to a local newspaper in reference to a proposed tax increase. The 
letter criticized the board's handling of past bond and tax proposals and 
its allocation of funds between educational and athletic programs. 
12 Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the State of New York, 385 U.S., 
p. 605 
13 Ibid., p. 603. 
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At a hearing the board charged that many statements in Pickering's 
letter were false and that its publication questioned the competence of 
the board and the school administrators, thereby leading to a disruption 
of faculty discipline. 
Pickering appealed the board's decision to dismiss him. The Circuit 
Court of Will County upheld the board decision as did the Illinois 
Supreme Court. 
Decisions. The United States Supreme court, with 
Justice Thurgood Marshall delivering the opinion held that teachers may 
not be required to give up their First Amendment rights to comment on 
matters of public concern, and that they cannot be dismissed for 
commenting on such matters. In fact, Justice Marshall noted that the 
right to speak out on school issues is especially important for teachers 
who are in a position to have informed opinions. 
However, even if a teacher's statements are erroneous, a teacher's 
right to engage in discussion of public issues outweighs the school 
adminstrator' s interest in limiting such discussion, as long as the 
teacher's public statements do not intefere with performance of his 
duties or the regular operation of the schools and as long as the 
statements are not recklessly made or knowingly false. 
Discussion. Like the other cases in this section, Pickering involves the 
balancing of the rights of the teacher against the interests of the state 
in administering education. Among other cases, Justice Marshall cites 
Keyishian: 
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The theory that public employment which may be denied altogether may 
be subject to any conditf~ns, regardless of how unreasonable, has 
been uniformly rejected. 
In addition to the finding that a teacher has a right as a citizen 
to comment on matters of public concern, the Supreme Court also pointed 
out that the nature of the employment relationship between a school board 
and a teacher is such that criticism of a school board by a teacher will 
not cause great harm to their relationship. 
This case has been cited in later dismissal cases, especially where 
a dismissed faculty member has been publically critical of the board. 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District 
293 U.S. 503, 89 S. Ct. 733, 21 L. Ed. 2d 731 (1969) 
Facts. John Tinker, his sister Mary Beth and Christopher Eckhardt wore 
black armbands in spite of a policy against it passed by school 
principals who had heard of the plan to wear armbands. The three 
students were suspended from school until they returned without the 
armbands and the students took the matter to court. The United States 
District Court dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit upheld the dismissal. 
Decision. Justice Abe Fortas delivered the seven-two majority opinion of 
the United States Supreme Court which overturned the Court of Appeals' 
decision, and stated that the wearing of armbands for the purpose of 
expressing certain views is a type of free speech and is therefore 
protected by the First Amendment. Furthermore, First Amendment rights 
14Ibid., p. 605-606. 
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are available to both students and teachers. Those rights are not 
surrendered upon entering the school. 
While state authorities and school administrators do have the 
authority to control conduct in the schools, they must·be mindful of the 
constitutional rights of students and teachers. Mere fear or 
apprehension of a disturbance is not a good enough reason to prohibit 
freedom of expression. Administrators can only act if the expression 
would materially and substantially interfere with the operation of the 
school. 
Discussion. While this case is directly concerned with students, the 
Supreme Court saw fit to apply the principles addressed to teachers as 
well. Indeed, among the cases cited in Tinker are three of the cases in 
this section: 15 16 17 Meyer, Sweezy and Keyishian, all leading to the 
conclusion "it can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed 
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the 
schoolhouse gate." 18 
15 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S. Ct. 625, 67 L. Ed. 1042 
(1923). 
16 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 77 S. Ct. 1203, 1 L. Ed. 2d 
1311 
17 Keyishian v. Board of Regents of State of New York, 385 U.S. 589, 
87 S. Ct. 675, 17 L. Ed. Ed. 2d 629 (1967). 
18 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 
u.s. p. 506. 
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Another passage from Tinker19 sets limitations on the 
administration's authority to maintain order: 
As we have discussed, the record does not demonstrate any fact which 
might reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial 
or material interference with school activities, and no disturbances 
on the school premises in fact occurred. 
Academic Freedom as it Relates to Nontenured Faculty 
Overview. Though tenured faculty members have many forms of protection 
connected with their tenure, nontenured faculty members have had to rely 
on constitutional protection alone. That protection falls into two 
general categories as discussed in Chapter III: liberty interests and 
property interests. Some of the cases in this section deal with liberty 
interests, in particular the right to freedom of speech. 
Other cases deal with property interests, in particular the 
nontenured faculty member's right to a job through some understanding 
that equates to tenure. In some instances it may be difficult to 
determine whether the faculty member has tenure or not. 
Many of the cases in this section involve the question of whether 
the faculty member did indeed have some form of tenure that would result 
in entitlement_ to due process before dismissal. Some of the cases in 
this section deal with both liberty and property interests. 
Perry v. Sindermann 
408 U.S. 593, 92 S. Ct. 2694, 33 L. Ed. 2d 570 (1972) 
Facts. Robert Sindermann was employed for two years at the University of 
Texas, for four years at San Antonio Junior College and for four years at 
Odessa Junior College under a series of one-year contracts. During the 
19 Ibid., p. 514. 
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1968-1969 academic year.he became involved in public disagreements with 
some policies of the Board of Regents who voted in May, 1969 not to offer 
him a contract for the following academic year. He was given no 
statement of reasons for his nonrenewal and no opportunity for a hearing. 
Perry brought action in District Court, claiming he was not renewed 
because of his criticism of the board, thereby violating his right to 
free speech. Furthermore, he alleged that he was entitled to due process 
in the form of a hearing. The District Court found for the defendants, 
but the United States Court of Appeals reversed. 
Decision. Justice Potter Stewart gave the opinion of the United States 
Supreme Court which held that even if Sindermann did not have tenure, his 
claim regarding the infringement of his freedom of speech was not 
defeated. The government may not deny a person a benefit on the basis of 
exercise of constitutional rights. However, the faculty member must show 
a deprivation of a constitutional right. Merely showing failure to 
rehire does not prove the existence of a liberty interest. 
In addition, the Supreme Court held that a college teacher may have 
a property interest in reemployment even if no formal tenure exists, if 
tenure may be applied, In such a situation, the teacher is entitled to 
due process. In order to determine if such a property interest exists it 
is necessary to examine the rules and conduct of the college 
administration. Such rules or conduct may result in the teacher having 
de facto tenure. However, a mere subjective expectancy of reemployment 
would not be protected. 
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In Sindermann, the Coordinating Board of the Texas College and 
University System's guidelines provided that a teacher employed for seven 
years had some form of tenure. In addition, Odessa Junior College's 
faculty handbook stated: 
Odessa College has no tenure system. The administration of the 
college wishes the faculty member to feel that he has permanent 
tenure as long as his teaching services are satisfactory and as 
long as he displays a cooperative attit~fie toward his co-workers, 
and as long as he is happy in his work. 
In light of those statements, the Supreme Court found that Sindermann had 
a property interest just as if he had been formally tenured, and 
therefore he was entitled to due process. 
Discussion: This case, together with Board of Regents of State Colleges 
v. Roth21 .has been used in almost every case involving nontenured faculty 
members since they were handed down by the Supreme Court. 
Sindermann deals with both liberty and property interests. 
Regarding liberty interests, specifically freedom of speech, the Supreme 
Court cited Pickering, 22 stating that a teacher's public criticism of 
superiors is protected. However, the opinion in Sindermann goes on to 
state that while the free speech claim is a legitimate issue to raise, 
the fact that the teacher was dismissed is not proof that the claim is 
valid. 
20 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S., p. 600. 
21Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S. 
Ct. 2701, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972), 
22Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School District 
205, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S. Ct. 1731, 20 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1968). 
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Regarding the property interest claim, the Supreme Court held that 
there may be an "unwritten common law" that gives certain employees the 
23 equivalent of tenure. It was clearly pointed out in this case that the 
expectancy of continued employment could not be merely subjective. 
24 Combined with the decision in Roth, these cases represent the 
standards by which later liberty and property interest claims have been 
evaluated. 
Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth 
408 U.S. 564, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972) 
Facts. David Roth was a nontenured assistant professor at a state 
university. He was hired for a fixed term of one academic year and was 
later informed that he would not be rehired for the next academic year. 
No explanation was given for the decision since university rules did not 
require that reasons be given. 
Under Wisconsin law, a state univeristy teacher could acquire tenure 
as a permanent employee after four years. Nevertheless, Roth took the 
matter to court, claiming infringement of his Fourteenth .Amendment 
rights. Specifically, he claimed that the real reason for his nonrenewal 
was his criticism of the adminstration and that he had been denied due 
process since he was not informed of the reasons for his nonrenewal. The 
District Court granted summary judgement for Roth and the Court of 
Appeals affirmed. 
23 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S., p. 602. 
24Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S. 
Ct. 2701, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972). 
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Decision. The United States Supreme Court, with Justice Potter Stewart 
delivering the opinion, reversed the lower court decision and remanded 
the case, finding that due process protection applied only to the 
infringement of interests proctected by the Constitution. A teacher's 
interest in holding a job is not by itself a liberty interest, nor is it 
a property interest unless there exists a legitimate claim of entitlement 
to the job. 
The Supreme Court opinion went on to extend the definition of 
property interests to encompass any claim to entitlement to benefits that 
comes about because of rules or understandings arising under state law or 
college policy. In the absence of such statute or policy there is 
normally no constitutional interest in reemployment. Therefore, to have 
property interest in reemployment, a faculty member must have more than 
the need or desire for reemployment. 
The Supreme Court found that Roth did not have a property interest 
in reemployment and therefore his lack of due process did not constitute 
an infringement of Fourteenth Amendment rights. 
Discussion. 25 When taken with Sindermann, this case shows the Supreme 
Court's position on liberty and property claims. 26 In Sindermann, the 
teacher had a reasonable expectancy of continued employment as a result 
of state and school policies, and thus he was entitled to due process. 
25 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 s. Ct. 2694, 33 L. Ed. 2d 
570 (1972). 
26Ibid. 
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In Roth there was no such expectation since he was informed in advance 
that his appointment would be for one year only. 
Regarding liberty interests, the Supreme Court stated that where a 
person 1 s t:eputation or good name is at risk because of government action·, 
due process is required; however simply not rehiring someone in a 
particular job does not result in a stigma sufficient to require the 
protection afforded by due process. 
Since the decisions in Roth and Sindermann27 were handed down they 
have been cited in many cases by both faculty members and the college 
administrators because the Supreme Court left a great deal of room for 
interpretation regarding the validity of liberty and property claims. A 
clue to the reason for the Supreme Court's decision may be found in Roth 
in the dissenting opinion of Justice William 0. Douglass: 
There is some times a conflict between a claim for First Amendment 
protection and the need for orderly administration of the school 
system, as we noted in Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 
563, 569, 88 S. Ct. 1731, 1735, 20 L. Ed. 2d 811. That is one 
reason why summary judgements are seldom appropriate. Another 
reason is that careful fact finding is often necessary to know 
whether the given reason for nonrzgewal of a teacher's contract is 
the real reason or a feigned one. 
Johnson v. Fraley 
470 F. 2d 179 (1972) 
Facts. Evelyn Johnson sued the school board and the superintendent under 
the Civil Rights Act for their decision not to reemploy her as a teacher 
without giving her a hearing or the reasons for her nonrenewal. She also 
27 Ibid. 
28 Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S., p. 583. 
120 
claimed that such action was in violation of school board regulations and 
state law. The District Court found for the defendants, stating that 
Johnson was employed under a series of one-year contracts without 
provision for tenure although she had continuously taught in the school 
system for twenty-nine years. 
Decision. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
vacated the decision and remanded the case, holding that where a teacher 
has taught for a long period of time and then is abruptly dismissed, 
there may be injury to the teacher's reputation and thus due process is 
called for. Furthermore, a long period of continuous employment can 
equate to tenure in which case due process is required. Therefore 
Johnson was entitled to due process. 
Discussion. In deciding this case the Court of Appeals cited 
Sindermann29 and Roth. 30 Those cases declared that injury to one's 
professional reputation caused by abrupt termination after a long period 
of employment can result in damage to the teacher's reputation with the 
accompanying protection afforded by due process. 
Thus Johnson had a right to due process protection on two grounds. 
Her dismissal after twenty-nine years might seriously have damaged her 
29 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S. Ct. 2694, 33 L. Ed. 2d 
570 (1972). 
30 Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S. 
Ct. 2701, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972). 
121 
standing and association in the community, thereby threatening a liberty 
interest. In addition, her longevity in her job resulted in the 
equivalent of tenure, providing her with a property interest. 
Walker v. California State Board of Trustees 
351 F. Supp. 997 (M.D. Pa. 1977) 
Facts. James Walker taught from 1967 to 1979 at which time he was 
terminated on September 18. Walker sued, claiming he had de facto tenure 
although the faculty manual explained that new faculty members were hired 
for a probationary period. The basis of Walker's claim was a letter from 
the president of the college sent to Walker when he was first hired. The 
letter stated in part that "it is our sincere hope that your tenure with 
us will be happy and fruitful. "31 
Decision. The United States District Court found that Walker had no 
tenure or expectancy of tenure since the faculty manual explained that 
his employment was probationary. Therefore he had no property interest 
requiring a hearing or reasons for dismissal. 
In addition, since he was not accused of anything, his standing and 
associations were not harmed. Thus no liberty interest existed. 
Discussion. This case illustrates how the Roth32 and Sindermann33 
31 Walker v. California State Board of Trustees, 351 F. Supp., 
p. 997. 
32 Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S. 
Ct. 2701, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972). 
33 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 u.s. 593, 92 S. Ct. 2694, 33 L. Ed. 2d 
570 (1972). 
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decisions are applied by the lower courts. In this instance the court 
found the faculty member's claim based on the letter from the president 
to have more form than substance. 
Applying the criteria given in those Supreme Court decisions, the 
District Court found no evidence of de facto tenure since no reasonable 
expectancy of continued employment existed. 
This case illustrates the problems that can be caused by careless 
wording of a seemingly harmless document. One sentence in a welcoming 
letter resulted in a de facto tenure claim and a lawsuit. 
Berry v. Hamblin 
356 F. Supp. 306 (M.D. Pa. 1973) 
Facts. Plaintiff Barbara Berry brought action against the president and 
trustees of Lock Haven State College after she was discharged without a 
hearing. Berry had been a physical education teacher at the college for 
three years and had previously been considered for tenure. On that basis 
she asserted that she had a property interest in continued employment. 
Berry was given the reasons for her dismissal in a letter from the 
president. Among those reasons were inadequate attentiorr to students who 
did not do well at sports, hostility toward colleagues, indifference to 
departmental rules, and failure to show potential for professional 
growth. Berry asserted that such charges damaged her good name and 
professional reputation and thus constituted an infringement of her 
liberty. 
Decision. The United States District Court determined that she did not 
have a property interest because she did not show that her contract or 
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any college rule gave her an objective expectancy of continued 
employment. 
The District Court also rejected her liberty claim, saying that 
while the charges against Berry may indeed have damaged her professional 
reputation, they did not entitle her to a hearing. The opinion went on 
to state that discharge based on charges of immorality, or disloyalty to 
the nation are the kind of charges involving a liberty interest. 
In light of the District Court's opinion, Berry was given twenty 
days to prove her claims to Fourteenth Amendment protection. 
Discussion. This case, decided three months after Walker, also deals 
with liberty and property claims. 34 While in Walker college rules 
indicated that the professor did not have tenure, in Berry there was no 
such rule. Instead it was up to the teacher to prove that a rule existed 
that would have led to an objective as opposed to a subjective expectancy 
of continued employment. 
Regarding the liberty claim, the District Court took a fairly narrow 
view of what constitutes a stigma: " ••• While these charges may injure 
Plaintiff's professional reputation, they are not the type of charges 
which entitle her to a hearing." 35 
Ramey v. Des Moines Area Community College 
216 N.W. 2d 345 (1974) 
Facts. Walter Ramey was the supervisor of a federal vocational project 
being operated in the Des Moines school system. For reasons not stated 
34walker v. California State Board of Trustees, 351 F. Supp. 997 
(M.D. 35a. 1977). Berry v. Hamblin, 356 F. Supp., p. 308. 
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in the case he "fell from the favor of defendants. " 36 He received a 
notice that his contract would be terminated on October 31, 1971 and that 
he had a right to a hearing under the Iowa Code. His contract was 
cancelled and he brought action in Polk District Court which ruled in his 
favor. 
Decision. The Supreme Court of Iowa upheld the lower court finding that 
Ramey's contract was not terminated in accordance with state law since 
the move to terminate him and the letter of termination was not timely. 
The board of trustees did comply with a state statute dealing with 
summary discharge. However, the court found that compliance to be 
irrelevant since the board had proceeded under the continuing contract 
statute. 
Discussion. While not involving a faculty member, this case does involve 
a dismissal from a college position covered by legislative enactment. In 
the opinion, the Iowa Supreme Court expressed surprise that Ramey's 
contract contained a clause placing him under the continuing contract 
statute since the program involved was federally funded and therefore 
37 constituted a "perilous vocation." However, because the contract did 
include the clause, the state statute had to be followed, and the board 
did not do so. 
36 Ramey v. Des Moines Area Community College, 216 N.W., p. 346. 
37Ibid. 
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This case illustrates the importance of carefully drafting contracts 
and the value of knowing the applicable state laws and the implications 
of legislative enactments. 
Ducorbier v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University 
386 F. Supp. 202 (E.D. La 1974) 
Facts. Freda Ducorbier was first employed by Louisiana State University 
in New Orleans for the fall semester of 1964. She then left to work on 
her master's degree, and returned to the college the following September. 
She was offered three successive yearly appointments. After the first 
semester of the third academic year she resigned for maternity reasons, 
then returned the following September and served for two more academic 
years. In February, 1971 she was informed that she would not be 
reappointed for the following academic year. 
Ducorbier followed the college grievance procedure during which the 
following reasons for nonrenewal were made known to her: (1) that her 
renewal was not favored by the permanent faculty; (2) that she had shown 
no outstanding merit since she had received her master's degree; (3) that 
she did not possess sufficient rank to acquire tenure; and (4) that she 
was near the end of the time of service at which American Association of 
University Professors guidelines recommended that a tenure decision be 
made. 
Decision. The United States District Court dismissed Ducorbier's motion, 
finding that she had neither a liberty or property interest. Regarding 
her claimed property interest, the District Court found that in light of 
university policy she had only a unilateral expectancy of continued 
employment. 
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Ducorbier also claimed that the charges against her resulted in a 
stigma and thus a liberty interest was involved. The District Court held 
that nonrenewal in order to reserve positions for instructors working on 
their doctoral degrees did not result in a stigma. 
Discussion. This case illustrates now another District Court interpreted 
Roth. 38 In connection with the liberty interest claim this decision went 
into more detail when it stated that the university "was under no duty to 
determine whether the job market could absorb Mrs. Ducorbier before 
1 i h u39 re eas ng er. 
Burdeau v. Trustees of California State Colleges 
507 F. 2d 770 (9th Cir. 1974) 
Facts. Howard Burdeau was a nontenured assistant professor at California 
State College, San Bernardino on a one-year appointment for the 1970-1971 
academic year. In February of that year he was informed that he would 
not be reemployed for the next year. He availed himself of the college 
grievance procedure, but then refused to proceed unless he was provided 
with the evidence that had been used in making the nonrenewal decision. 
That evidence was not provided to him, and Burdeau brought action in 
District Court claiming a denial of his right to due process. The 
District Court dismissed the action and the plaintiff appealed. 
38Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S. 
Ct. 2701, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972). 
39Ducorbier v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University, 
386 F. Supp., p. 205. 
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Decision.· The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the decision of the District Court, stating that failure to give 
a reason for nonrenewal did not impose a stigma since there was no proof 
that dismissal with no reason given would be interpreted negatively. 
The Court of Appeals, citing Roth40 and Sindermann, 41 found that 
Burdeau' s sincere belief in his qualifications and his hope of 
reemployment gave him no property claim. 
Discussion. The decision on the property interest claim is consistent 
with the decisions of the other federal courts. Regarding the liberty 
interest, the Appeal Court found that failure to give reasons for 
nonrenewal did not impose a stigma. 42 In Johnson, reviewed earlier in 
this section, failure to give reasons did result in a stigma. However, 
the Johnson court coupled the failure to give reasons for nonrenewal with 
the length of service of the teacher. Since Burdeau was in his first 
year of employment, the decision .in this case is not inconsistent with 
the decision in Johnson. 
Markwell v. Culwell 
515 F. 2d 1258 (5th Cir. 1975) 
Facts. Dick Markwell had been employed under a series of seven one-year 
contracts at San Antonio College on probationary status. Prior to 
40Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S. 
Ct. 2701, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972). 
41 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 s. Ct. 2694, 33 L. Ed. 2d 
570 (1972). 
42Johnson v. Fraley, 470 F. 2d 179 (1972). 
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receiving tenure he was terminated. Markwell brought suit, asserting 
that his termination was in retaliation from his criticism of his 
department and thus was an infringement of his First Amendment rights. 
He offered as proof of his claim the fact that he had been offered 
repeated contract renewals and had received teaching awards. Those 
renewals and rewards, he claimed, also created de facto tenure and he was 
therefore entitled to a hearing. The District Court rejected his claims, 
and the teacher appealed. 
Decision. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
affirmed the decision of the District Court, finding that renewals and 
awards did not create a property interest and thus no hearing was 
necessary. Furthermore, the court found Markwell's teaching awards to be 
inadequate proof of a causal link between his criticism of the 
administration and his termination. 
Discussion. This case illustrates how the burden of proof is placed on 
the teacher who claims the exercise of First Amendment rights as the 
cause of termination. This case also serves to illustrate how the courts 
43 interpret Sindermann. It is not the various contract renewals that 
lead to an objective expectation of continued employment. Rather it is 
the legislative enactments and college policies regarding those renewals 
that lead to a property interest. 
43Ibid. 
44Ibid. 
44 In Sindermann, a teacher employed 
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for a certain length of time had some form of tenure under state policy, 
and college policy stated that all faculty members enjoyed a form of 
informal tenure. No such policies existed in Markwell and therefore no 
such interpretation of his numerous contract renewals was possible. 
Assaf v. University of Texas System 
399 F. Supp. 1245 (S.D. Texas 1975) 
Facts. Dr. Said Assaf was a nontenured faculty member at The University 
of Texas Health Science Center at Houston, employed under the Rules and 
Regulations of the Board of Regents of the University of Texas System. 
Those rules included procedure for notification of nonrenewal of 
nontenured faculty members. Dr. Assaf did receive 't>Tritten notice that 
his appointment would be terminated. However, he received the notice in 
March when, according to the rules of the system he should have been 
notified in December. The Board of Regents claimed that it had acted 
under another rule which stated that when a faculty member had not 
received word of his renewal or nonrenewal it was up to the faculty 
member to make inquiry. 
Decision. The United States District Court held that both the professor 
and the university were bound by the professor's contract and by the 
college's rules and regulations. In this case there were two conflicting 
regulations and the District Court held that the second regulation was 
unconstitutional since it shifted the burden of inquiry to the faculty 
member. Going further, the District Court stated that when a nontenured 
faculty member is likely to prevail in a challenge to termination, where 
such termination would result in a loss of professional standing and 
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where a hearing would create little or no burden for the college, that 
the public's interest in education would be best served if the faculty 
member is given the opportunity for a hearing. Thus the District Court 
issued an injunction against Assaf's termination pending a hearing. 
Discussion. This case illustrates the consequences of the failure to 
follow college rules and regulations and of having conflicting 
regulations. The court found that a body of statutes or rules must be 
viewed in their entirety and thus rejected the board's argument that 
while it had failed to comply with one rule regarding nonrenewal it had 
lived up to another, conflicting rule. The District Court found that: 
In this posture, the question squarely presented is whether in the 
present context a state institution can by some legerdemain divest 
an individual of a procedural right which that institution has 
ostensibly already vested upon him. This court concludes that 
the conduct of the University of Texas insofar as it takes with 
one hand that which it has just bestowed with the other hand is 
not the kind of fair play and substantial j~~tice required by 
due process under the fourteenth amendment. 
Regarding Assaf's property claim, the District Court followed the 
46 . . 47 
standards set by Roth and S~ndermann, finding that the university's 
failure to notify the professor by the required date resulted in an 
objective expectation of continued employment thus creating a property 
right sufficient to require a hearing. 
45Assaf v. University of Texas System, 399 F. Supp., p. 1249. 
46Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S. 
Ct. 2701, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972). 
47 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S. Ct. 2694, 33 L. Ed. 2d 
570 (1972). 
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In dealing with the professor's liberty claim, the court took a more 
liberal stand than had the other courts, finding that a hearing was 
necessary because of the damage to the professor's career that would 
result simply from termination. The court explained that such protection 
was necessary where the professor was likely to prevail in challenging 
termination, stating that: 
The public has a right to expect that faculty members who will 
directly or indirectly affect the education of their children 
shall be of impeccable character and have the highest credentials. 
An accompanying interest of at least equal importance is an interest 
that there be a fair determination that the educational system is 
not being deprived of the expertise of people of superior caliber 
for merely frivolous reasons not relevant to academic excellence. 
Until such a determination of the validity of termination has been 
made, then a presumption of competence and integrity which is an 
integral part of public confidence in public education mandates that 
a professor be retained. In a broader sense, this court is saying 
that the public interest in the present context is best served by 
not terminatin~8an individual until due process prescribed has been ·complied with. 
Keddie v. Pennsylvania State University 
412 F. Supp. 1264 (M.D. Pa. 1976) 
Facts. Wells Keddie was employed as a nontenured associate professor at 
Pennsylvania State University. When he neared the time of eligibility 
for tenure, a tenure review committee was assembled to consider him for 
tenure. His department chairman did recommend him but stated that he 
found Keddie "impatient and imprudent."49 
The committee determined that Keddie's performance was not 
outstanding enough for him to be considered for tenure. As a result of 
the denial of tenure Keddie was not renewed for the following year and 
48Ibid. 
49Keddie v. Pennsylvania State University, 412 F. Supp., p. 1268. 
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he brought an action seeking relief and damages on the basis that his 
constitutional rights had been infringed and that his termination 
amounted to a stigma. Specifically, Keddie asserted that he had been 
denied tenure because of his active support of political causes and his 
criticism of the university administration. 
Decision. The United States District Court denied Keddie's claim, 
holding that the evidence failed to support his allegations. In 
connection with Keddie's free speech claim, the court found that the 
right of the state to maintain discipline, promote harmony, and to 
encourage a close working relationship between the professor and the 
administration may limit a professor's right to free speech. 
Furthermore, academic freedom may be limited to activities which are not 
disruptive to the educational process. 
The District Court also held that where a professor is not renewed 
because of failure to meet standards of excellence and where no other 
charges have been made, there is no damage to the teacher's career or to 
his good name. Even if he had been discharged for incompetence, a 
liberty interest would not have been involved. 
Discussion: This case shows the reluctance of the courts to intervene in 
tenure decisions: 
The judiciary is not qualified to evaluate academic performance. 
The courts do not possess the academic expertise which should 
enlighten an academic committee's decisio~0 The courts will not serve as a Super-Tenure Review Committee. 
50rbid., p. 1210. 
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Regarding the free speech issues raised in this case, the District 
.Court held that academic freedom does have its limits • 
••• Academic freedom is not a license for uncontrolled expression 
or activity at variance with established curricular content or job 
related procedures and requirements, nor does academic freedom 
encompass activies which are internally destructive to the proper 
function~yg of the university or disruptive of the education 
process. 
52 Pickering is cited as one basis for that finding. 
Regarding Keddie's due process claim, the District Court cited 
53 Sindermann, stating that a hearing held after the decision has already 
been made is adequate to satisfy due process, but that in any case, 
Keddie's lack of a property interest meant that he was not entitiled to 
due process. 
Boards of trustees and administrators thus should be aware that they 
do have power to control the college environment and that academic 
freedom is not an unlimited freedom for faculty members. 
Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle 
429 U.S. 274, 97 S. Ct. 568, 50 L. Ed. 2d 471 (1977) 
Facts. Fred Doyle was an untenured teacher who had worked under a series 
of three, one-year contracts and then under a two-year contract. During 
the latter he was elected president of the Teachers' Association. In 
that capacity he had come into some conflict with the Board of Education. 
51rbid. 
52Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School District 
225, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S. Ct. 1731, 20 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1968). 
53Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S. Ct. 2694, 33 L. Ed. 2d 
570 (1972). 
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During that same period Doyle was also involved in several incidents 
including an altercation with another teacher, swearing at students, 
arguing with cafeteria workers, making obscene gestures at female 
students, and making public a school memorandum concerning teacher dress 
codes by giving that information to a radio station. The board notified 
Doyle that he would not be rehired and gave as reasons the obscene 
gestures and the radio station matter. As a result, Doyle brought action 
against the board. The District Court found for the teacher since the 
radio station matter and the gestures were protected by the First 
Amendment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court decision. 
Decision. The United States Supreme Court, with Justice 
Hilliam Rehnquist delivering the opinion, vacated the decision of the 
Court of Appeals and remanded the case, holding that where a school 
board's decision is based in part on conduct protected by the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments, the court should go on to determine whether the 
evidence shows that the board would have reached the same conclusion even 
without the protected conduct. 
In a reaffirmation of earlier decisions, the Supreme Court also held 
that the fact that a teacher does not have tenure does not defeat claims 
that First and Fourteenth Amendment rights have been infringed, even 
though the teacher could have been discharged for no reason whatsoever. 
Dicsussion. The decision affirms Roth54 which states that nontenured 
54Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S. 
Ct. 2701, 33 L. Ed. 2d (1972). 
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faculty members do have protection for the exercise of their 
constituional rights. 
This decision has been cited frequently since it was handed down 
because it deals with situations where there is more than one cause for 
nonrenewal. In Mt. Healthy the Supreme Court gives boards and 
administrators guidelines to determine if a termination is within 
constitutional bounds. 
A rule of causation which focuses solely on whether protected 
conduct played a part, "substantial or otherwise, in a decision 
not to rehire, could place an employee in a better position as a 
result of the exercise of constitutionally protected conduct 
than he would have occupied had he done nothing. The difficulty 
with the rule enunciated by the District Court is that it would 
require reinstatement in cases where a drastic and perhaps abrasive 
incident is inevitably on the minds of those responsible for the 
decision to rehire, and does indeed play a part in that decision 
even if the s3~e decision would have been reached had the incident 
not occurred. 
McLendon v. Morton 
249 S.E. 919 (W Va 1978) 
Facts. Vonceil McLendon was an assistant professor at Parkersberg 
Community College who sought a writ of mandamus against the Board of 
Regents and the chancellor claiming that she was denied due process where 
the college decided not to grant tenure. McLendon based her claim on the 
college's tenure standards as published in a policy bulletin. Those 
standards, she claimed, set criteria which if met would result in a 
property interest and thus due process would be necessary before tenure 
could be denied. 
55Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 
U.S., p. 575. 
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Decision. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia awarded the 
writ, agreeing with the teacher that since she had met the eligibility 
standards for tenure she could not be denied tenure on the basis of her 
competence without due process. Providing such due process would not 
adversely affect the state's interest in awarding tenure only to 
competent teachers. The decision went on to say that minimal due process 
would include a notice of the reasons for denying tenure, and the 
opportunity to submit evidence before an unbiased tribunal. 
The court also stated that while the decision in this case goes 
beyond the due process considerations outlined by the United States 
Supreme Court, the lower court is not required to hand down decisions 
identical to those of the United States Supreme Court if those lower 
court decisions do not let the state star.dard fall below the federal 
standard. 
Discussion. This case is unique because of some of the statements made, 
more than for the outcome of the case. This case demonstrates how state 
courts can set the standards of due process protection higher than the 
federal standard • 
••• Our analysis of liberty and property interests was hinged to our 
constitutional due process standard, West Virginia Constitution, 
Article III, Section 10. Consequently, while we may utilize the 
teachings of the United States Supreme Court in its due process 
cases, we are not constrained by identicality ~g long as we do not 
diminish our state below the federal standard. 
56 McLendon v. Horton, 249 S.E., p. 992. 
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57 58 While Roth and Sindermann were considered in this case, the West 
Virginia court did not find them precisely relevant stating that "a 
precise line cannot be drawn around the concepts of property and liberty 
interest since these terms expand with society's enlightened values."59 
The court went on to find that 
••• the Board's Bulletin recognizes tenure is inextricably tied to 
academic freedom. Tenure once acquired is a substantial right. We 
cannot blind ourselves to the fact that tenure is a paramount 
professional and egsnomic goal for a teacher. This is a valuable 
property interest. 
Silbert v. Community College of Flathead County 
587 P. 2d 26 (Mt. 1978) 
Facts. Victor Silbert was hired as Manager of Services of a community 
college, an administrative position, in 1969. In May, 1975 he signed a 
twelve-month contract which contained a clause stating that the position 
was tenured and that it fell under the college tenure policy. In March, 
1976 his position was discontinued. Silbert sued, asserting that the 
district had failed to give him tenure. The District Court for Flathead 
County granted summary judgement for the community college and Silbert 
appealed. 
57 Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 u.s. 564, 92 S. 
Ct. 2701, 33 1. Ed. 2d 548 (1972). 
58 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S. Ct. 2694, 33 1. Ed. 2d 
570 (1972). 
59Mc1endon v. Morton 249 S.E. 919 (W Va. 1978). 
60 Ibid., p. 926. 
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Decision. The Supreme Court of Montana upheld the lower court decision, 
holding that a community cpllege may not grant tenure except to those 
authorized to receive it, and since S.ilbert' s position was administrative 
he was not eligible in spite of his contract. 
That decision was based on the finding that in the absence of a 
statute authorizing community college trustees to grant tenure, grants of 
tenure are ultra vires. 
Discussion_: This case is especially important for community colleges 
because in thirty-three states there are no statutes dealing directly 
with tenure for faculty members. In such states the statute enumerating 
the powers of the board, in particular the power to hire faculty members 
is interpreted as also giving them the right to dismiss or to set terms 
of employment, including tenure policies. In this case the court has 
failed to make such a broad interpretation of the statute. 
Goss v. San Jacinto Junior College 
588 F. 2d 96 (5th Cir. 1979) 
Facts. Patsy Goss was hired by San Jacinto Junior College in 1966 and 
her contract was renewed annually for six years. During that time she 
helped form a chapter of the National Faculty Association and a chapter 
of the Texas Junior College Teachers' Association and campaigned for her 
husband when he ran for a seat on the college's board of regents. After 
a hearing her contract was not renewed for the 1973 academic year. She 
filed a complaint asserting infringement of her First Amendment rights 
and was reinstated in the fall of 1974. In her suit Goss sought back 
pay, which was awarded by a jury, and the college appealed, claiming that 
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her nonrenewal had been due to declining enrollment and to her 
evaluations in which she ranked in the bottom three instructors. 
Decision. The Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals affirmed the 
lower court decision, finding that there was ample evidence ·to support 
Goss' claim that she had not been rehired because of her "political and 
professional activities."61 For example, she was not awarded evaluation 
points to which she was entitled that would have raised her to the middle 
of the instructors of her department. 
62 Discussion. The Board of Regents cited Mt. Healthy as part of its 
63 defense in this case. Under Mt. Healthy, two conditions must be met 
before a decision can be made in favor of the teacher: (1) that the 
protected activity was a principal fact in the decision not to rehire; 
and (2) that the decision not to rehire would not have been made without 
the protected activity. The Court of Appeals found evidence that the 
situation in Goss met the Mt. Healthy64 test, that the teacher would not 
have been dismissed except for the protected activity. Although the 
Board of Regents asserted that reduction in force was the reason for 
Goss' nonrenewal, the omission of points that should have been added to 
her evaluation tended to discount the Board of Regents' claim. 
61 Goss v. San Jacinto Junior College, 588 F. 2d, p. 98. 
6 ~t. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 
U.S. 274, 97 S. Ct. 568, 50 L. Ed. 2d 471 (1977). 
63Ibid. 
64Ibid. 
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Causey v. Board of Trustees of Community College District V 
638 P. 2d 98 (Wa 1982) 
Facts. Charles Causey was hired as a probationary teacher for a one-year 
appointment and was rehired on two more one-year contracts. Two months 
later than required by state statute, a tenure review committee was 
formed to evaluate his teaching. The committee functioned informally. 
Its membership changed over the years of Causey's appointment and his 
teaching was never formally observed. Nevertheless, the committee 
recommended that he not be given tenure based on evaluations of his 
teaching and on declining enrollment in his department. Causey sued, 
asserting that under state law teaching effectiveness should be the 
primary reason for denying tenure, and that the tenure review committee 
had not met as prescribed by state law. The Snohomish County Superior 
Court found for the board and the teacher appealed. 
Decision. The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1 affirmed the 
lower court ruling, finding that since the teacher was probationary and 
no constitutionally protected activity was involved, he could be 
terminated without cause and that the board need not provide him with 
reasons for his termination. 
The Washington Court of Appeals also held that while there had been 
irregularities in the tenure review procedure such irregularities did not 
mean that tenure had to be granted. 
Discussion. This case provides another illustration of how the courts 
deal l-7ith board powers and the delegation of those powers. In many 
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instances boards of trustees delegate the power to make personnel 
decisions, but as this case shows, such delegation does not legally take 
the final decision away from the board. In handing down the decision in 
this case, the Washington Court oi' Appeals held that it was the board and 
not the tenure rev~ew committee that had to make the final decision, and 
therefore the irregularities in that committee's work were not a factor 
in the case. 
The Washington Court of Appeals held further, that the college's 
reduction in force procedure applied only to employees under binding 
contracts and not to probationary faculty members whose contracts had 
expired. Only while the contract was in force did the teacher have an 
expectancy of continued employment. 
Daulton v. Affeldt 
678 F. 2d 487 (4th Cir. 1982) 
Facts. Judy Daulton had been a well-thought-of instructor at Forsyth 
Technical Institute for five years before she divorced her husband and 
shortly thereafter married a student at the college. After her divorce 
and remarriage she was cited by the administration for being late for 
class, inaccessible to students, and too affectionate with her husband at 
college. Her denial of the charges was viewed by the administration as 
evidence of a negative attitude, and she was notified in a memorandum 
that she had to make changes if she wanted to keep her job. Improvements 
were noted after the memorandum was sent. However, on a faculty data 
sheet which asked instructors to list the school 1 s strengths and 
weaknesses she was critical of the administration, specifically their 
lack of concern for students. She also expressed concern over being 
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required to prepare a course outline for a course she was not teaching, 
and as a result she was not required to prepare it, but in his evaluation 
of her, her supervisor noted the criticisms on the data sheet and other 
disagreements as evidence of her negative attitude, and he recommended 
that her contract not be renewed. 
The dean agreed about Daulton's attitude, although lte noted that her 
classroom performance was satisfactory. As a result of the 
recommendation, the president and the board of trustees went along with 
the decision not to renew her contract, and she sued, claiming that her 
constitutional right to free speech had been violated. The District 
Court found in favor of the teacher. 
Decision. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in 
affirming the decision of the District Court held that Daulton had a 
. claim if she could prove that the decision not to rehire her was based on 
protected activity even though she did not have tenure and though the 
board of trustees could fail to renew her at the end of her contract. 
65 Citing Mt. Healthy, the Court of Appeals also stated that Daulton had 
to prove that the protected speech was the motivating factor in the 
decision not to rehire her. 
Based on those statements, and Daulton's evidence, the court found 
that her disagreements with the administration did not cause significant 
disruption for the trustees' action to be justified and that " ••• the 
importance of protecting Daulton's First Amendment right to speak out on 
65Ibid. 
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these subjects outweighs the school's interest in regulating the conduct 
66 of its employees." Thus the court affirmed that a teacher has the 
right to express concern over matters affecting education. 
Discussion: 67 This case illustrates how the tests of Mt. Healthy and 
68 Sindermann are used by the lower courts. In Daulton a liberty interest 
was infringed by the nonrenewal of the instructor and this proved to be 
69 the "substantial and motivating factor" in her nonrenewal. Her 
nonrenewal for having a negative attitude was not considered to be the 
motivating factor in part because improvements had been noted following 
the warning memorandum. College administrators and boards of trustees 
should be mindful of the liberty and property interests of faculty 
members and should be sure that terminations meet the Mt. Healthy70 test 
that the termination would have occurred even without considering the 
protected activity engaged in by the faculty member. 
Academic Freedom as it Relates to Tenured Faculty 
Overview. Tenured faculty members clearly possess an expectancy of 
continued employment, and therefore are entitled to due process. Since 
66 Daulton v. Affeldt, 678 F. 2d, p. 491. 
67Ht. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 529 
U.S. 274, 97 S. Ct. ~68, 50 L. Ed. 2d 471 (1977). 
68Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S •. Ct. 2694, 33 L. Ed. 2d 
570 (1972). 
69 Daulton v. Affeldt, 678 F. 2d, p. 491. 
70Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 529 
U.S. 274, 97 S. Ct. 568, 50 L. Ed. 2d 471 (1977). 
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that fact is widely recognized, tenure systems do provide some form of 
due process. As a result, the;e are fewer instances where teachers must 
rely on the courts for protection. However, even where college policies 
provide for due process, questions as to the adequacy and fairness of 
that protection do arise. The cases presented in this section are 
illustrative. 
Bowing v. Board of Trustees of Green River Community College District 
No. X 
521 P. 2d 220 (Wa 1974) 
Facts. Shirley Bowing was a tenured faculty member at Green River 
Community College. The president of the college notified her of the 
following charges against her: (1) ineffective teaching; and (2) 
inability to work effectively with other staff members. Bowing was 
afforded a hearing before a committee where she was represented by 
counsel and where witnesses were cross-examined. The committee found 
that the charges against Bowing were not supported by the evidence and 
recommended that she not be dismissed. The Board of Trustees accepted 
the committee's finding as to the first charge but asked the committee to 
reconsider the second charge. The committee came to the same conclusions 
as before. Nevertheless, the board voted to dismiss Bowing. She brought 
suit, and the Superior Court of King County found in her favor. The 
board appealed. 
Decision. The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1 reversed the 
lower court decision, finding that the tenure statute of Washington 
intended that while a teacher should only be dismissed for cause and 
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after due process, a bo.ard of trustees is not bound by the results of 
that due process when it is carried out by a review committee. The 
boards do not have the power to delegate dismissal. 
On the other hand, the Washington Court of Appeals stated that 
tenure is a property right and that due process to be an effective 
protector of it must be conducted at "a meaningful time and in a 
meaningful manner", which would have been accomplished in this case only 
by a hearing before the board after the committee had reconsidered its 
decision. 71 In spite of that finding, the court held that the 
appropriate remedy was not to reverse the board's decision, but to grant 
Bowing a proper hearing. 
Discussion. This case illustrates the differences between tenured 
faculty members and nontenured faculty members. Where tenure exists, due 
process is unquestionably required, but the form of that due process is 
open to interpretation. If the actual process is delegated by the board, 
the board retains authority over due process. 
Saunders v. Reorganized School District No. 2 of Osage County 
520 S.W. 2d 29 (Mo. 1975) 
Facts. James Saunders was a tenured English teacher at Linn Technical 
Junior College who '11as discharged by the school board. His dismissal 
stemmed from charges that he had refused to teach the prescribed 
curriculum, that he would not discuss that refusal with the 
administration, that he had refused to prepare a course outline, that, 
71 Bowing v. Board of Trustees of Green River Community College 
District No. X, 521 U.S., p. 225. 
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after he was suspended on those charges and then allowed to return to 
work, he refused to return, that he had refused to use the required 
textbook, that he had refused to discuss teacher evaluations, that he had 
been absent an excessive number of times, and that he was inefficient. 
Before he was terminated he was notified of the charges and given a 
hearing before the school board which found evidence to support the 
charges and Saunders sued. The circuit count found in favor of the board 
and the teacher appealed. 
Decision. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the lower court 
decision, holding that administrators have a great deal of power to 
manage their schools and the courts may not interfere with that power 
unless it is used in an arbitrary or unreasonable way. The Missouri 
Supreme Court also held that terminating a tenured teacher for 
inefficiency and insubordination was not a violation of the teacher's 
free speech right. In this case, sufficient evidence of the charges of 
incompetency, inefficiency, and insubordination did exist to justify the 
action of the board. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari 
in this case. 
Discussion. This case is typical of dismissal cases involving tenured 
faculty members. It illustrates the limited nature of the protection 
afforded by tenure and the bounds of academic freedom in the classroom. 
72 Regarding the latter, the Missouri Supreme Court ruled that Keyishian 
72 Keyishian v. Board of Regents of State of New York, 385 U.S. 589, 
87 S. Ct. 675, 17 1. Ed. 2d 629 (1967). 
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did not apply because that case did not address freedom of teaching. The 
Missouri Supreme Court cited Meyer73 in finding for the board, stating 
74 that in Meyer 
••• the thrust of the decision seems to be not that there is an 
unlimited freedom to teach, but that the state may not interfere 
in the teaching process as pr~scribed by 7ge schools without some 
relationship to a justifiable state goal. 
The Missouri Supreme Court went on to state that: 
••• no one denies the power of a School Administrator to establish a 
curriculum and require its use, nor do any of the authorities 
justify the action of a teacher in rejecting in whole or in part 
the curriculum 'gd calendar established by the School 
Administration. 
Thus as long as the curriculum is not unreasonable or arbitrary, the 
teacher is obligated to follow it, and tenure offers no protection to the 
teacher other than the right to due process before termination. 
Chung v Park 
377 F. Supp. 524, affd. C.A., 514 F. 2d 382, Cert. Den. 96 S. Ct. 364 
(1975) 
Facts. In-Cho Chung was a professor at Mansfield State College for five 
academic years on a series of one-year appointments. In December of the 
fifth year the college president recommended to the board of trustees 
that Chung not be rehired for the following year giving as reasons 
73Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S. Ct. 625, 67 L. Ed. 1042 
(1923). 
74Ibid. 
75 Saunders v. Reorganized School District No. 2 of Osage County, 520 
s.w. 2d, p. 34. 
76Ibid., p. 35. 
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Chung's poor teaching and his refusal to cooperate with his department to 
correct his teaching problems. 
Chung was notified of the charges and agreed to put the matter 
before an arbitration panel. After a thorough hearing including 
representation by counsel and cross-examination of witnesses, the panel 
found sufficient evidence to support the charges against Chung. 
Chung sued, claiming infringement of his constitutional rights. 
Specifically he claimed that he was denied due process because his 
hearing came after the decision to terminate him had been made, and 
because the burden of proof had been placed on him to show that the 
termination was unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious. The United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania found for the 
college and Chung appealed. 
Decision. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
affirmed the lower court ruling, holding that whether Chung was tenured 
or not (which was also in question), he had waived his right to a hearing 
under the college's tenure policy when he had agreed to have the matter 
decided by the arbitration panel, and that he had been afforded the 
minimum protection necessary for a property interest: (1) a written 
notice of charges: (2) disclosure of the evidence against him; (3) the 
right to cross-examine witnesses; (4) the chance to be heard and to 
present witnesses; (5) the right to have the matter heard by a neutral 
body; and (6) a written statement by that body on the evidence used in 
making the decision. 
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The Court of Appeals also ruled that the hearing need not be held 
prior to the decision to terminate, but that it must be held before the 
termination of benefits. Therefore a hearing held before the end of the 
academic year would be adequate whether the professor had tenure or not. 
Discussion. This case is included with the section on tenured faculty 
members in spite of the question of whether Chung actually had tenure. 
The Court of Appeals proceeded as if he did have tenure. This case sheds 
light on the court's view of the nature and function of due process and 
of adequate due process. 
In Chung the Court of Appeals noted that the determination of the 
adequacy of due process depends on a weighing of the interest of the 
teacher in avoiding unreasonabl~ termination against the board of 
trustees' interest in maintaining a competent faculty. Thus "due process 
should not be employed to insure that this exercise of discretion [by the 
adminstration] is 'wise' but only that it is not unreasonable, arbitrary, 
or capricious."77 
Trotman v. Board of Trustees of Lincoln University 
635 F. 2d 216, cart. den. 451 U.S. 986 (1980) 
Facts. Herrr.an Branson, president of Lincoln University, developed a 
retrenchment plan in order to increase the student-faculty ratio in 
compliance with state guidelines. The faculty rejected the plan, voted 
to censure Branson, and asked the governor to replace him. Two days 
later on April 28, 1977, Branson sent every faculty member a notice of 
77 Chung v. Park, 377 F. Supp., p. 529. 
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termination whether they had tenure or not. He did so in order to comply 
with a faculty bylaw requiring a one-year notice for terminations. All 
of the notices were later rescinded except for the one sent to Trotman, 
former chairman of the English Department and an outspoken critic of 
Branson, who was subsequently denied tenure and fired. 
Another English professor, Edward Groff, asked for a medical leave 
in order to have brain surgery and was granted such leave by the vice 
president. He later discovered that he had been retired, an action that 
led to more faculty protests and to the reinstatement of Groff. 
One of the leading critics of Branson was William Johnson, who was 
removed from the chairmanship of the Chemistry Department by the 
president. 
Another incident occurred on September 1, 197 7. Trotman and 
Alfred Farrell, another English teacher, stood in a classroom to protest 
the class being taught by Gladys Willis, the new head of the department. 
The class had formerly been taught by Farrell. Trotman and Farrell were 
arrested by campus police but the board of trustees did not press 
charges. In connection with that incident, the faculty sought to censure 
Willis on a motion by Julius Bellone. Later Branson sent a letter to 
Bellone stating in part: "Please treat this as a warning that any 
further breaches of commonly accepted academic principles of fair play 
will be considered cause for appropriate discipline, including 
termination for your employment contract at Lincoln. 1178 Bellone did not 
make the motion to censure again. 
78 Trotman v. Board of Trustees of Lincoln University, 635 F. 2d, 
p. 222. 
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In May, 1978 Virginia Gunn criticized her department chairman who 
later that day wrote a memorandt~m to the administration criticizing her 
teaching ability. Eight faculty members sent a letter to the department 
chairman condemning the memorandum. Branson sent those faculty members a 
letter objecting to their action and requesting that they attend a 
meeting 't-7hich turned out to be a disciplinary hearing with Branson's 
letter serving as the notice required by due process. No disciplinary 
action was taken, however. 
Two faculty members spoke to newspaper reporters about the 
retrenchment policy and the resulting problems, and stories on the 
situation were printed. Branson sent those faculty members letters 
implying that they had made false statements and they should check their 
statements' accuracy and that they had violated American Association of 
University Professors standards. 
Another incident occurred in April, 197 8. A group of faculty 
members was planning to picket during a visit to the campus by former 
President Ford. The picketing was planned to call attention to the 
problems at the school. Some of the faculty members involved in the plan 
received telegrams to the effect that picketing during the term of the 
collective bargaining agreement would be grounds for dismissal. 
As a result of the incidents mentioned, Trotman, Farrell, Johnson, 
Groff, Bellone and others sued alleging infringement of their freedom of 
speech. The District Court granted the college's request for a dismissal 
finding that the adminstrations' actions were made in good faith and that 
the letters and telegrams sent by Branson did not prevent faculty members 
from exercising their free speech rights. 
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Decision. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
vacated the lower court decision and the United States Supreme Court 
denied certiorari. The Court of Appeals held that faculty members' free 
speech could not be restricted simply because that speech was discordant, 
and that picketing was also protected by the First Amendment if it was 
done in a reasonable manner. 
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals stated that neither good faith on 
the part of administrators, nor the fact that the faculty members 
persisted in the protected activity was an adequate reason for 
restriction of free speech. The letters and telegrams contained explicit 
and implicit threats that constituted an infringement of free speech. In 
order to justify such a restriction, the administration would have had to 
prove that the faculty members' conduct 'muld have seriously disrupted 
the operation of the college. 
Finally, the Court of Appeals found that the trial judge had erred 
in placing the burden of proof on faculty members to show that 
adminstrative action would not have occurred except for the protected 
activity. 
Discussion. This case involved both tenured and nontenured faculty 
members. It also involved many academic freedom issues. It is included 
with this section because tenured faculty members and the protection 
afforded them are involved, but it also deals with nontenured faculty 
members. Thus the Court of Appeals cites cases that have been presented 
in the other two sections of this chapter. This case demonstrates how, 
when a college abuses its own system of due process, the courts are 
willing though regretfully so, to intervene. 
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79 Citing Pickering, the Court of Appeals recognized that a faculty 
member's right to free speech is limited. It cannot be allowed to 
adversely affect education. However, legitimate criticism does not 
qualify. To determine a standard for evaluating free speech the Court of 
Appeals cited Tinker80 and stated: 
It is particularly important that in cases dealing with academia, 
the standard applied in evaluating the employer's justification 
should be one applicable to the rights of teachers and students ••• In 
an academic environment, supression of speech or opinion cannot be 
justified by an "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of 
disturbance" ••• Restraint on such protected activity can be sustained 
only upon a showing that such activity would "materially and 
substantially" interfere with the requirem§yt of appropriate 
discipline in the operation of the school. 
In making that determination, the overall picture must be examined. "An 
analysis of each discrete allegation without considering the impact of 
all of the facts and circumstances in combination would overlook the 
82 proverbial forest for the trees. The fact that the administration 
acted in good faith, if true, was irrevelant as was the persistence of 
the faculty members in their protected activity. Otherwise "such a 
defense would limit the protection of the First Amendment to those who 
are timid but eliminate it for those who are brave."83 
79Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School District 
205, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S. Ct. 1731, 20 L. ed. 2d 811 (1968). 
80Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 
U.S. 503, 89 S. Ct. 733, 21 L. Rd. 2d 731 (1969). 
81 Trotman v. Board of Trustees of Lincoln University, 635 F. 2d, 
p. 230. 
82Ibid., p. 229. 
83Ibid., p, 227. 
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The Court of Appeals also looked at the president's retaliation for 
84 the exercise of free speech by faculty members citing Pickering and 
85 Mt. Healthy, although the court did not consider that to be central to 
the case. 
Finally, the Court of Appeals stated its opinion on academic freedom 
and the courts' place in protecting it: 
The academic process entails, at its core, open communication 
leading to reasoned decisions. Our society assumes in almost all 
cases with good reason, that different views within the academic 
community will be tested in an atmosphere of free debate. It is the 
dialectic process which underlies learning and progress ••• Although 
our judicial reponsibility requires that we take jurisdiction of the 
issues and decide the case, we are cognizant, and we hope the 
parties are, th~~ some other process of resolution would have been 
far preferable. 
84Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School District 
205, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S. Ct. 1731, 20 L. ed. 2d 811 (1968). 
85Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 
U.S. 274, 97 S. Ct. 568, 50 L. Ed. 2d 471 (1977). 
86Trotman v. Board of Trustees of Lincoln University, 635 F. 2d, 
P• 219. 
155 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The teacher's rights to teach and research have been recognized for 
centuries as something to be treasured. Only if the teacher is free to 
make inquiries and search for truth can teaching be done in a 
professional manner. Only if the teacher is free to speak out can there 
be satisfaction that the duty of an educator has been successfully 
performed. 
As valuable as academic freedom is to the teacher, it is or should 
be of equal value to college adminstrators. If a college's goal is to 
seek the truth, then administrators shall not be afraid of the expression 
of divergent points of view. Any attempt to stifle academic freedom not 
only affects the teacher directly involved, but also casts a pall over 
the entire institution, discouraging originality, innovation, and the 
growth that comes only from free and open debate. 
Such action is detrimental to society as a whole. In a nation that 
values free expression, it would indeed be unfortunate for the future 
leaders of the country to be educated in an atmosphere of uniformity, 
where divergent and controversial opinions are met with swift 
retaliation. 
Fortunately, most college adminstrators and boards of trustees 
recognize the value of academic freedom and have established policies, 
rules, and regulations to safeguard it. One of the surest ways to stifle 
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a teacher's dissent is to fire him. Tenure systems help protect teachers 
from the arbitrary dismissals that may at times stem from the exercise of 
of academic freedom. By insuring the faculty member of due process, 
tenure systems help to safeguard aGademic freedom. Thus the American 
Association of University Professors has long emphasized the link between 
academic freedom and tenure and has worked to encourage college boards of 
trustees to adopt tenure systems. 
While not guaranteeing the teacher a job, tenure, through its 
provisions for due process, does insure that the teacher has a chance to 
know the charges brought and affords a chance to refute these charges. 
Tenure systems have not eliminated the threats to academic freedom. 
Grounds for dismissal under such systems are often broad, and college 
administrators and trustees can sometimes rid themselves of controversial 
faculty members on the basis of those broad grounds when, if the 
situation were examined more closely, the specific reasons for dismissal 
may involve academic freedom. 
Threats to tenure also exist. Declining enrollment, cutbacks in 
government funding, and the high percentage of faculty members having 
tenure have caused some colleges to question, revise, and in some cases 
do away with tenure systems. Eliminatio~ or modification of 'tenure 
systems may leave faculty members with little or no due process 
protection. That protection has only rarely been enjoyed by nontenured 
faculty members. Few colleges afford them even minimal due process. As 
a result, nontenured faculty members may be more timid than their tenured 
colleagues. 
The elimination of some tenure .systems with the possibility that the 
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requirements for due process will be eliminated as well, together with 
the right to due process, has effectively increased. the threats to 
academic freedom. 
Though college administrators tend to be tolerant of classroom 
activity within reasonable limits, they tend to be less forgiving when it 
comes to criticism of the college by faculty members. Often they 
consider such criticism to be outside the bounds of academic freedom. 
They view such criticisms as divisive and disruptive. In such cases, an 
avoidance of due process may be vie~~ed by administrators as a way to 
prevent disruption without delay. 
Administrators who wish to avoid the negative consequences of a 
stifling of academic freedom, however, must consider the impact of 
denying due process to a faculty member. They should also remember that 
teachers are also citizens of the nation and that they possess all the 
rights held by other citizens. Those rights include the right to due 
process protection whenever a public institution seeks to deprive a 
citizen of liberty or property. Under such circumstances, tenure is not 
a consideration. Thus, all faculty members have the right to due process 
where constitutionally protected activity is the reason for dismissal or 
nonrenewal. It is the purpose of this study to provide community college 
administrators with guidelines that will help them in the recognition of 
teacher rights so they may avoid wrongful dismissals with the 
accompanying damage to academic freedom. This study should also serve to 
remind them of the value of academic freedom to their institution and to 
society, and of how fragile academic freedom can be when a teacher is 
faced with dismissal. 
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Additional damage to the college can occur as a result of litigation 
that may result from dismissals and nonrenewals. The courts, though 
reluctant to interfere in matters internal to the college, will not 
hesitate to protect the constitutional rights of faculty members. 
Administrators should be familiar with those rights, or the courts will 
familiarize them. This study, through the analysis of state statutes 
and judicial decisions should also serve to help community college 
administrators know their rights, specifically, how far they can go in 
dismissal and nonrenewal situations, and how they can rid themselves of 
truly disruptive elements while avoiding dismissals that lvill be 
overturned in court. 
The nature and history of community colleges has led to tenure 
systems being less common than they are at four-year colleges. Where 
tenure systems do not exist, administrators must still be aware of the 
constitutional rights of faculty members and should not believe that in 
the absence of a tenure system they can dismiss faculty members at will. 
Summary of This Study 
From Plato to the present day academic freedom has been a recurring 
issue in postsecondary education governance. Tenure has been connected 
with academic freedom for at least a century. Yet the relationship 
between academic freedom and tenure is still debated as is the issue of 
academic freedom for nontenured faculty members. Colleges which destroy 
tenure systems and the many community colleges that never had tenure 
systems still face the problem of how to safeguard faculty rights and at 
the same time effectively administer institutions. 
Chapter II provided the reader with a historical background 
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concerning academic freedom and tenure so the reader might better 
understand relevant judicial decisions and the current state legislation. 
As a guide to educational and legal research, several key questions 
were formulated and listed in Chapter I. While Chapter II provided 
answers to some of those questions, most of the answers were contained. in 
Chapters III and IV. The answers to those questions may serve as a major 
part of a set of legal guidelines which community college administrators 
can use when making decisions involving the dismissal of nonrenewal of 
faculty members. 
The first question listed in Chapter I was: Under what 
circumstances, if any, are constitutional rights of faculty involved when 
administrators of community colleges and technical institutes are faced 
with academic freedom and tenure problems? 
I. Constitutional rights become involved in academic freedom problems 
A. when a teacher is denied rights that are due as a citizen of 
the nation such as the right to belong to certain groups or the 
right to engage in his profession; 
B. when a teacher's right to freedom of speech and expression 
either in or out of the classroom will be infringed by a 
dismissal or nonrenewal and the speech or expression is not 
materially or substantially disruptive; 
C. when a teacher's ability to secure another teaching position is 
substantially harmed by a dismissal or nonrenewal. 
II. Constitutional rights become involved in tenure problems 
A. when tenured faculty members are dismissed without due process; 
B. when by state law, policy, or by college policy or practice a 
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nontenured faculty member having an objective expectancy of 
continued employment and thus having de facto tenure, is 
dismissed or not renewed and due process is not afforded him; 
C. when the college administrators and board of trustees fail to 
follow their own regulations or state laws or regulations. 
The second question in Ch.apter I asked: What are the major 
education issues regarding academic freedom and tenure in community 
colleges and technical institutes? 
The major educational issues are the following: 
I. teachers' rights to academic freedom both in and out of the 
classroom; 
II. the linking of academic freedom with tenure or some other system of 
due process to protect teachers from arbitrary dismissals; 
III. the large percentage of faculty members already tenured on some 
campuses; 
IV. pressure on community colleges due to fluctuating enrollments; 
V. increasing use of part-time and temporary faculty members who 
usually have no institutionalized due process rights; 
VI. the ability of the community college to win community support for 
academic freedom and for the accompanying due process safeguards; 
VII. governance of community colleges by administrators who have 
educational philosophies which make academic freedom a high priorty 
and who are willing to support policies protecting academic freedom 
even when faced with community pressure. 
The third question in Chapter I asked: Which of these educational 
issues involve legal questions as reflected in court cases concerning 
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community colleges and technical institutes? Since the courts have seen 
fit to apply the same dismissal and nonrenewal decisions to all public 
educational institutions, all such cases are of concern to community 
colleges and technical institutes. The right of the teacher to teach and 
specifically to make decisions in the classroom has increased largely due 
to the recognition of that right by the courts. The courts have also 
recognized the link between academic freedom and tenure. While a number 
of cases have mentioned academic freedom, tenure systems and other due 
process procedures are more often the bases of court decisions. 
The fourth question asked in Chapter I dealt with the academic 
freedom and tenure issues that are under litigation at this time. Since 
the Supreme Court saw fit to leave the determination of whether 
constitutional rights are involved to the lower courts on a case-by-case 
basis, the issues before the courts are the same issues given in answer 
to the first question in Chapter I. In virtually every nonrenewal and 
dismissal case, both liberty and property issues are raised. 
The fifth and sixth questions concerned the trends determined by an 
analysis of court cases and the guidelines for administrators that are 
needed as a result of those trends. Such guidelines should help 
community college administrators prevent legal action in situations 
involving academic freedom and tenure. An analysis of judicial decisions 
suggests that the courts will most often support college administrators' 
decisions in dismissal and nonrenewal situations. Although academic 
freedom is mentioned in numerous cases, the courts are more likely to 
rely on the concept of protection of liberty and property interests in 
making their decisions. Both tenured and nontenured faculty members can 
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raise liberty claims, while for tenured faculty members tenure itself 
clearly constitutes a property interest. 
An analysis of court cases indicates that faculty members will win 
their cases if they can prove an infringement of their free speech rights 
has resulted from their terminations. They must also prove that the 
exercise of free speech was the principal reason for termination. A 
liberty interest is involved in this situation. 
The situation is less clear when a faculty member's claim involves· a 
liberty interest created because of a stigma attached to nonrenewal. 
There is some disagreement among the courts as to what constitutes a 
stigma. 
The direction of the courts regarding property interests is more 
obvious. For faculty members without formal tenure, if state statutes or 
policies, or college regulations and practices imply that the faculty 
member has some form of tenure, due process will be required before that 
faculty member can be removed. Tenured faculty members clearly have a 
property interest and are protected by due process. 
If administrators wish to avoid litigation in the area of liberty 
interests they should avoid terminations where the principal ground 
involves the faculty member's exercise of .free speech. Administrators 
should also avoid damaging a faculty member 1 s reputation in the 
community. 
To avoid property interest cases, college employment policies should 
be very specific concerning contracts and probationary status. 
Administrators must strictly follow those policies and state statutes 
were applicable. Failure to do so may result in the creation of de facto 
tenure. 
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Conclusions of This Study 
Based on an analysis of judicial decisions, the.following general 
conclusions are made concerning the legal aspects of academic freedom and 
tenure in community colleges. It should be noted, however, that these 
conclusions may not be valid in a particular case if the circumstances 
are different than in the cases on which this analysis was based. 
1. Courts will intervene when the teacher's right to free speech is 
infringed, with free speech broadly interpreted to include most 
forms of expression as long as they are not materially or 
substantially disruptive of the education process. 
2. Courts will intervene when a dismissal or nonrenewal has infringed 
upon a property interest, and such interest may exist in some cases 
even if the faculty member is not formally tenured. This is often 
called de facto tenure. 
3. Courts will intervene when colleges fail to follow established 
policies, rules, and customs, and when colleges fail to follow 
state procedures and statutes. 
4. Most dismissal and nonrenewal cases will involve both liberty and 
property claims by the teacher. 
5. Liberty and property claims and procedural grounds will continue to 
be the basis for judicial decisions. Academic freedom, though 
recognized by courts, will not be the basis of judicial decisions. 
6. When multiple grounds for dismissal are involved, courts will use 
the Mt. Healthy criteria, meaning that the court must determine if 
protected activity is the principal reason for dismissal and if the 
dismissal would have occurred without that protected activity. 
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7. Tenure systems will continue to be threatened by declining and 
fluctuating enrollment. Enrollment changes make the already strong 
desire of administrators for flexibility even stronger. That 
desire may be frustrated by tenure systems. 
8. The growing trend toward political conservatism will in all 
likelihood increase the threat to academic freedom through 
community pressure to silence controversial faculty members. 
9. The right of community college board of trustees and administrators 
to establish curriculum standards and enforce those standards will 
continue to be sustained by judicial review. 
Recommendations of This Study 
Boards of trustees and school officials responsible for the 
organization and governance of community colleges must be informed of the 
constitutional issues and legal developments affecting community colleges 
if they are to avoid litigation. Boards of trustees and administrators' 
regulations must be carefully formulated and carefully followed. Boards 
of trustees and administrators need a thorough knowledge of state 
legislative enactments and policies and the interpretation of statutes by 
the judiciary and state attorneys general in order to effectively 
administer and avoid litigation. 
Once adopted, a policy must be made clear to administrators at every 
level. The administrative interpretation of the policy, the specifics of 
its implementation, and the consequences of violating the policy, should 
be thoroughly explained to all employees. 
In formulating dismissal and nonrenewal policies and, where 
applicable, tenure policies, boards might use Roth and Sindermann and 
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Mt Healthy as guidelines. Predicated on the findings of this study, 
specifically the findings of the United States Supreme Court's landmark 
cases the following guidelines concerning academic freedom and tenure in 
community colleges have been formulated. Yet even though the guidelines 
seem to be legally acceptable, it is worthwhile remembering that facplty 
members who feel their constitutional rights have been infringed may 
initiate litigation against the college regardless of policies adhering 
to the guidelines. 
GUIDELINES FOR A POLICY CONCERNING DISMISSALS AND 
NONRENEWALS OF CO~illUNITY COLLEGE FACULTY MEMBERS 
I. Community college policies concerning dismissal and nonrenewal 
should be formally adopted by the board of trustees. 
A. The policy should contain a statement of the board of trustees' 
support for academic freedom and the board of trustees' 
commitment to the protection of the constitutional rights of 
faculty members. 
B. The policy should be developed with the help of faculty members 
and American Association of University Professors guidelines 
within the constraints established by applicable state laws. 
C. Procedures for implementation of the policy should be 
explicitly given, and while implementation may be delegated (if 
allowed by state law) the final decision rests with the board 
of trustees. 
II. For probationary faculty members and faculty members in colleges 
without tenure systems: 
A. A due process committee should be established to deal with 
objections in dismissal and nonrenewal cases. 
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B. The fact that the faculty member has no form of tenure should 
be explicitly stated. 
C. If the faculty member is employed under contract, the policy 
should state that there is no requirement that the contract be 
renewed. 
D. During the academic year, if a faculty member is to be 
dismissed while under contract, the policy should make 
provisions for due process as given in III, B below. 
E. In community colleges without tenure systems, due process 
procedures as indicated in III, B below should be used when 
nonrenewal involves a faculty member who has served for many 
years. 
F. When a nontenured faculty member feels that constitutional 
rights have been infringed by appointment nonrenewal, 
opportunity should be afforded to present the claim before the 
college due process committee which will then determine the 
validity of the claim, and if it is valid the committee will 
recommmend to the board of trustees that the appointment be 
renewed. 
III. For community colleges wishing to establish a tenure policy: 
A. Procedures for attainment of tenure should be covered in 
detail, including the following: 
1. A probationary period should be established of a duration 
sufficient to fairly evaluate the faculty member. 
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2. Evaluation procedures should be specific and the criteria 
used in the evaluation should be made known to the faculty 
member in advance. 
3. Opportunity should be given to the faculty member who has 
been denied tenure to "appeal" by addressing the due 
process committee. 
B. Due process procedures used in the dismissal of tenured faculty 
members should be indicated and should include the following: 
1. Notice of dismissal should be given at least four months 
before the end of the academic year. 
2. The grounds for dismissal should be made known to the 
faculty member and should come from a list of grounds 
established by policy. 
3. The faculty member should be given the opportunity for a 
hearing at which time evidence and witnesses may be 
presented in his defense. 
4. A transcript of the hearing should be made and provided to 
all parties involved. 
5. Provisions should be made for appeal of the dismissal 
decision, either to an arbitrator or to the courts. 
Recommendations for Further Study 
As indicated in this chapter, the growing trend toward political · 
conservatism may pose additional threats to academic freedom as college 
administrators face pressures to terminate controversial faculty members. 
Future research could examine the impact of this political trend on 
academic freedom, tenure, and dismissal cases. 
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Faced with declining enrollment, some college administrators have 
recently turned to reduction-in-force procedures. Future research could 
analyze judicial decisions to determine if reduction-in-force policies 
are being used by administrators as a· convenient way of ridding 
themselves of faculty members who would otherwise be protected by 
constitutional rights and perhaps by tenure as well. 
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APPENDIX A 
RECOMMENDED POLICY 
RECOMMENDED COMMUNITY COLLEGE POLICY FOR 
DISMISSAL AND NONRENEWAL OF FACULTY M~ffiERS 
I. Statement of policy. 
The Board of Trustees of ---------------------------
177 
recognizes the 
importance of academic freedom to the mission of this institution and to 
the community served by this institution. Furthermore, it is the intent 
of the board to protect the constitutional rights of faculty members in 
every circumstance. To these ends the board will act under the following 
policy. 
II. Probationary faculty members. 
Probationary faculty members do not possess any form of tenure. 
Length of app~intment is determined by contract which may be renewed upon 
the mutual agreement of the board and the faculty member. Regarding 
dismissals of and contract nonrenewals for probationary faculty members, 
the following procedures shall be followed: 
A. If a probationary faculty member is to be dismissed during the 
term of the contract, that faculty member will be afforded due 
process prior to the termination of salary and benefits. Such 
due process will include (1) notice of the charges brought; 
(2) the opportunity for a hearing before the college due process 
committee with such committee to be composed of the president or 
the president's designee and two faculty members; (3) the 
opportunity for a hearing before the board if the due process 
committee finding is unsatisfactory, at which the faculty member 
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may present evidence and witnesses and cross-examine witnesses 
for the board of trustees; (4) provision of a transcript of the 
hearing to the faculty member; and {5) appeal to an arbitrator 
selected mutually by the faculty member and the board of 
trustees. Any activity that materially and substantially 
interferes with the educational process shall be grounds for 
dismissal as indicated in the board of trustees policy relating 
to contract performance. 
B. Probationary faculty members serving beyond a period of seven 
academic years shall be afforded due process before the 
nonrenewal of the contract. The specific due process procedures 
to be followed are provided in II, A above. 
C. In keeping with the college's commitment to the protection of 
the constitutional rights of faculty members, any faculty member 
with length of service less than seven years who sincerely feels 
that nonrenewal of the contract has infringed upon 
constitutional rights may appeal the nonrenewal to the college 
due process committee which shall make a recommendation 
concerning the nonrenewal to the board. 
NOTE: For colleges with tenure systems, the following would be added to 
the policy stated above. 
III. Tenured faculty members. 
A. Faculty members shall be considered for tenure upon completion 
of seven academic years of service to the college. 
B. A tenure review committee shall be established consisting of the 
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president or the president's designee and three members of the 
faculty, at least one of whom shall be from the same department 
as the faculty member being considered for tenure. The 
committee will base its decision on the faculty member's 
teaching effectiveness, research (where applicable) and 
potential for academic growth. Objective evidence shall be used 
in the evaluation including but not limited to formal 
observation of the faculty member's teaching and records of 
additional course work and training engaged in by the faculty 
member. 
c. vfuen the committee's recommendation to the board of trustees is 
that tenure be denied, the faculty member shall, after being 
informed of the reasons for denial, have the opportunity to 
address the board of trustees and show cause why the committee's 
recommendation shall not be acted upon. 
D. Once a faculty member has been granted tenure, dismissal cannot 
take place except for one or more of the following reasons: 
(1) incompetency; (2) immorality; (3) conviction of a felony; 
(4) insubordination; (5) inefficiency; (6) medical disability; 
and (7) reduction in force necessitated by declining enrollment 
where no probationary faculty member may be dismissed. Such 
reasons as provided in (1) through (6) shall be grounds for 
dismissal only if they cause material and substantial 
interference with the educational processes that are the primary 
mission the college. 
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E. Before the termination of salary and benefits, a tenured faculty 
member shall be afforded due process. Such due process will 
include (1) notice of the charges brought; (2) the opportunity 
for a hearing before the college due process committee; (3)· the 
opportunity for a hearing before the board if the due process 
committee finding is unsatisfactory at which evidence and 
witnesses may be presented and witnesses for the board of 
trustees may be cross-examined; (4) provision of a transcript of 
the hearing to the faculty member; and (5) appeal to an 
arbitrator selected mutually by the faculty member and the board 
of trustees. 
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APPENDIX B 
STATE STATUTES 
182 
ALABAMA 
In Alabama each junior college is set up by provision of state statutes 
with its own section for rules and regulations. Although not all of 
those sections are worded the same, the following is typical: 
16-60-21. The board of trustees shall have full, ample and sufficient 
power and authority to make, adopt and enforce all rules and regulations, 
not inconsistent with the laws of this state, which may be necessary for 
the management, control and conduct of the college and the business 
connected therewith. 
The above section applies to the junior college for Franklin, Marion and 
Winston counties. 
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ALASKA 
14.40.600. Regulations. A community college established by the 
university in cooperation with school districts or political subdivisions 
shall be established, maintained, and operated under rules and 
regulations adopted by the board. The selection and academic 
qualifications for personnel and the curriculum of a community college 
insofar as it pertains to academic degree programs and activities, is the 
responsibility of the board. The selection and qualifications of 
personnel for nondegree programs and activities of the community college 
are the responsibility of the governing body of the school district or 
political subdivision. 
ARIZONA 
15-679. Powers and duties. A. Except as otherwise provided, the 
district board shall: 
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5. Appoint and employ a president or presidents, vice presidents, 
deans, professors, instructors, lecturers, fellows, and other 
such officers and employees it deems necessary. 
7. Remove any officer or employee when in its judgement the 
interests of education in the state so require. 
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ARKANSAS 
80-4910. Local board established - composition - terms - elections -
powers and duties. 
b. The powers and duties of the local Board shall be as follows: 
(5) To appoint, upon nomination of the president, members of 
the administrative and teaching staffs and to fix their 
compensation and terms of employment. 
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CALIFORNIA 
66700. Community colleges as part of the public school system: Duties 
of state boards of Education. The public community colleges are 
secondary schools and shall continue to be a part of the public school 
system of this state. Ths Board of Governors of the California Community 
Colleges shall prescribe minimum standards for the formation and 
operation of public community colleges and exercise general supervision 
over public community colleges. 
77290. Employment of personnel: Salaries and Benefits. The district 
board shall employ and assign all personnel not inconsistent with the 
minimum standards adopted by the board of governors. The district 
governing board shall establish employment practices, salaries, and 
benefits for all employees not inconsistent with the laws of this state. 
72292. Student conduct: Faculty and student expression of opinions. 
The district governing board shall establish rules and regulations 
governing student conduct. The district governing board shall establish 
procedures not inconsistent with those established by the board of 
governors to insure faculty and students the opportunity to express their 
opinions at the campus level. 
87604. Employment. The governing board of community college district 
shall employ each certificated person as one of the following: contract 
employee, regular employee, or temporary employee. 
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87605. Employment contract. The governing board of a district shall 
employ persons to ·serve in positions requiring certification 
qualifications for the first academic year of his employment or portion 
thereof by contract. Any person who, at the time an employment contract 
is offerred to him by the district, is neither a regular employee of the 
district nor a contract employee then serving under a second contract 
entered into persuant to Section 87608 shall be deemed to be employed for 
"the first academic year of his employment or a portion thereof." 
87606. Contract contents. An employment contract shall contain in such 
terms and conditions as the governing board an the proposed employee 
shall agree upon and as are consistent with the provisions of the law. 
87607. Decisions re continued employment: Requirements. Before making 
a decision relating to the continued employment of a contract employee, 
the following requirements shall be satisfied: 
(a) The employee has been evaluated in accordance with the 
evaluation standards and procedures established in accordance 
with the provisions of Article 4 (commencing with 
Section 87660) of this chapter, a fact determined solely by the 
governing board. 
(b) The governing board has received statements of the most recent 
evaluations. 
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(c) The governing board has received recommendations of the 
superintendent of the district and, if the employee is employed 
at a community college, the recommendations of the president of 
that community college. 
(d) The governing board has considered the statement of evaluaton 
and the recommendations at a lawful meeting of the board. 
87608. Contract employee: First contract. If a contract employee is 
working under his first contract, the governing board shall at its 
discretion, and not subject to judicial review except as expressly 
provided herein, shall elect one of the following alternatives: 
(a) Not enter into a contract for a second year. 
(b) Enter into a contract for a second academic year. 
(c) Employ the contract employee as a regular employee for all 
subsequent academic years. 
87609. Contract employee: Second contract. If a contract employee is 
employed under his second consecutive contract entered into pursuant to 
Section 87608, the governing board, at its discretion and not subject to 
judicial review except as expressly provided herein, shall elect one of 
the following alternatives: 
(a) Employ the contract employee as a regular employee for all 
subsequent academic years. 
(b) No employ the contract employee as employee. 
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87610. Notice re decisions: Requirements. The governing board shall 
give written notice of its decision under Section 87608 and the reasons 
therefor to the employee on or before March 15 of the academic year 
covered by the existing contract. Failure to give the notice as required 
to a contract employee under his first contract shall be deemed an 
extension of the existing contract without change for the following 
academic year. The governing board shall give written notice of its 
decision under Section 87608 and the reasons therefor to the employee on 
or before March 15 of the academic year covered by the existing contract. 
Failure to give the notice as required to a contract employee under this 
second consecutive contract shall be deemed a decision to employ him as a 
regular employee for all subsequent academic years. 
87611. Hearing. If the contract employee objects to the decision of the 
governing board persuant to Section 87609, he may request a hearing. The 
hearing shall be requested and conducted and the proposed decision shall 
be prepared, in accordance with the provision of Section 87740. 
87667. Dismissal and penalties: Contract and regular employees. During 
the school year, all contract and regular employees are subjected to 
dismissal and the imposition of penalites on the grounds and pursuant to 
procedures set forth in the article. 
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87667. Grounds for dismissal or penalization. A contract or regular 
employee may be dismissed or penalized for one or more of the grounds set 
forth in Section 87732. 
87671. Satisfaction of grounds. A contract or regular employee may be 
dismissed or penalized if one or more of the grounds set forth in Section 
87732 are present and the following are satisfied: 
(a) The employee has been evaluated in accordance with standards 
and procedures estalbished in accordance with the provisions of 
this article. 
(b) The district governing board has received all statements of 
evaluation which considered the events for which dismissal 
of penalities may be imposed. 
(c) The district governing board has received recommendations 
of the superintendent of the district and, if the employee 
is working for a community college, the recommendation of 
the president of that community college. 
(d) The district governing board has considered the statements 
of evaluation and the recommendations in a lawful meeting 
of the board. 
87672. Statement of decision to dismiss or penalize: Postponement. If 
a governing board decides it intends to dismiss or penalize a contract or 
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regular employee, it shall deliver a written statement, duly signed and 
verified, to the employee setting forth the complete and precise decision 
of the governing board and the reasons therefor. 
The written statement shall be delivered by serving it personally on the 
employee or by mailing it by the Unisted States registered mail to the 
employee at his address last known to the district. 
A governing board may postpone the operative date of a decision to 
dismiss or impose penalities for a period not to exceed one year, subject 
to the employee's satisfying his legal responsibilities as determined by 
statute and rules and regulations of the district. At the end of his 
period of probation, the decision shall be made operative or permanently 
set aside by the governing board. 
87673. Employee's noticed of objection to decision. If the employee 
objects to the decision of the governing board or the reasons therefor on 
any ground, he shall notify in writing the governing board, the 
superintendent of the district which employs him, and the persident of 
the college at which he serves of his objection within 30 days of the 
date of the service of notice. 
87674. Agreement as to arbitrator: Written confirmation. Within 30 
days of the receipt by the district governing board of the employee's 
demand for a hearing, the employee and the governing board shall agree 
upon an arbitrator to hear the matter. Where there is agreement as to 
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the arbitrator, the employee and the governing board shall enter into the 
records of the governing board written confirmation of the agreement 
signed by the employee and an authorized representative of the governing 
board. Upon entry of such confirmation, the arbitrator shall assume 
complete and sole jurisdiction over the matter. 
87675. Arbitration proceedings: Arbitrator's decision. The arbitrator 
shall conduct preceedings in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 5 
(commencing with Section 11500) of Part 1, Division 3, Title 2, of the 
Government Code except that the right of discovery of the parties shall 
not be limited to those matters set forth in Section 11507.6 of the 
Government Code but shall include the rights and duties of any party in a 
civil action orought in a superior court. In all cases, discovery shall 
be completed prior to one week before the date set for hearing. He shall 
determine whether there is cause to dismiss or penalize the employee. If 
he finds cause, he shall determine whether the employee shall be 
dismissed and determine the precise penalty to be imposed, and he shall 
determine whether his decision shall be imposed immediately or postponed 
pursuant to Section 87672. No witness shall be permitted to testify at 
the hearing upon oath or affirmation. No testimony shall be given or 
evidence introduced relating to matters which occurred more than four 
years prior to the date of the filing of the notice. Evidence of records 
regularly kept by the governing board concerning the employee may be 
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introduced, but' no decision relating to the dismissal or suspension of 
any employee shall be made based on charges or evidence of any nature 
relating to matters occurring more than four years prior to the filing of 
the notice. 
87676. Postponement of operation of decision. In the case in which the 
arbitrator determines that the operationg of his decision should be 
postponed, any question of terminating the postponement shall be 
determined by the arbitrator. 
87677. Payment of costs. The district alone shall pay the fees of the 
arbitrator, his expenses, and such expenses as he shall determine are a 
cost of the proceedings. The "cost of the proceedings" does not include 
any expenses paid by the employee for his counsel, witnesses, or the 
preparation on presentation of evidence on his behalf. 
87678. Request for appointment of administrative hearing officer. If 
within 30 days of the receipt of the notification by the district 
governing board, no written confirmation of agreement of the employee and 
the governing board to an arbitrator has been submitted to the secretary 
of the governing board for entry into its records, the governing board 
shall certify the matter to the Office of Administrative Hearings and 
request the appointment of an administrative hearing officer. 
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87679. Administrative hearing officer's conduct of proceedings. The 
administrative hearing officer shall conduct proceedings in accordance 
with the provisions of Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 11500) of 
Part 1, Division 3, Title 2, of the Government Code except that the right 
of discovery of the parties shall not be limited to those matters set 
forth in Section 11507.6 of the Government Code but shall include the 
rights and duties of any party in a civil action brought in a superior 
court. In all cases, discovery shall be completed prior to one week 
before the date set for hearing. The written notice delivered to the 
employee pursuant to Section 87672 shall be deemed an accusation. The 
written objection of the employee delivered pursuant to Section 87673 
shall be deemed the notice of defense. 
87680. Hearing proceedings: Hearing officer's decision. The hearing 
officer shall determine whether there is cause to dismiss or penalize the 
employee. If he finds cause, he shall determine whether the employee 
shall be dismissed and determine the precise penalty to be imposed, and 
he shall determine whether his decision should be imposed immediately or 
postponed pursuant to Section 87672. No witness shall be permitted to 
testify at the hearing except under oath or affirmation. No testimony 
shall be given or evidence introduced relating to matters which occurred 
more than four years prior to the date of the filing of the notice. 
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Evidence of records regularly kept by the governing board concerning the 
employee may be introduced, but no decision relating to the dismissal or 
suspension of any employee shall be made based on charges or evidence of 
any nature relating to matters occurring more than four years prior to 
the filing of the notice. 
87681. Postponement of operation of decision. In the case in which the 
hearing officers determines that the operation of his decision should be 
postponed, any question of terminating the postponement shall be brought 
to the hearing officer. 
87682. Judicial review. The decision of the arbitrator or hearing 
officer, as the case may be, may, on petition of either the governing 
board of the employee, be reviewed by a court of competent jurisdiction 
in the same manner as a decision may be a hearing officer under Chapter 5 
(commencing with Section 11500) of Part 1 of Division 3 of Title 2 of the 
Government Code. The court, on review, shall exercise its independent 
judgement on the evidence. The proceeding shall be set for hearing at 
the earliest possible date and shall take precedence over all other 
cases, except older matters of the same character and matters to which 
special precedence is given by law. 
87683. Payment of costs. The charges levied by the Office of 
Administrative Hearing shall be paid by the district. 
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87684. Immoral conduct or conviction of crime involving moral turpitude: 
Satement of facts. If a contract or regular employee is dismissed or 
penalized for immoral conduct or conviction of a felony or crime 
involving moral turpitude, the governing board shall transmit to the 
Chancellor of the California Community Colleges, and to the county 
superintendent of schools which issued the certificate under which the 
employee was serving at the time of his dismissal or the imposition of 
his penalty, a statement setting forth the acts of the employee and a 
request that any certificate issued by the county board of education to 
the employee be revoked if the employee is not reinstated upon appeal. 
87732. Grounds for dismissal of regular employee. No regular employee 
shall be dismissed except for one or more of the following causes: 
(a) Immoral or unprofessional conduct. 
(b) Any violation of Article 4 (commencing with Section 11400) of 
Chapter 3 of Title 1 of Part 4 of the Penal Code. 
(c) Dishonesty. 
(d) Incompetency. 
(e) Evident unfitness for service. 
(f) Physical or mental condition which makes him or her unfit to 
instruct or associate with students. 
(g) Persistent violation of or refusal to obey the school laws or 
reasonable regulations prescribed for the government of the 
community colleges by the governing board of the community 
college district employing him or her. 
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(h) Conviction of a felony or of any crime involving moral 
turpitude. 
(i) Conduct specified in Section 1028 of the Government Code. 
(j) Knowing membership by the employee in the Communist Party. 
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87734. Unprofessional conduct or incompetency: Notice of charges. The 
governing board of any community college district shall not act upon 
charges of unprofessional conduct or incompetency unless during the 
preceeding term or half school year prior to the date of the filing of 
the charge, and at least 90 days prior to the date of the filing, the 
board of its authorized representative has given the employee against 
whom the charge is filed, written notice of the unprofessional conduct or 
incompetency, specifying the nature thereof with such specific instances 
of behavior and with such particularity asto furnish the employee an 
opportunity to correct his faults and overcome the grounds for such 
charge. The written notice shall include the evaluation made pursuant to 
Article 4 (commencing with Section 87660) of this chapter, if applicable 
to the employee. "Unprofessional conduct" and "incompetency" as used in 
this section means, and refers to, the unprofessional conduct and 
incompetency particularly specified as a cuase for dismissal in Section 
87732 and does not include any other cause for dismissal specified in 
Section 87732. 
198 
CALIFORNIA (continued) 
87735. Immediate suspension: Hearing upong certain charges. Upon the 
filing of written charges, duly signed and cerified by the person filing 
them with the governing board of a community college district, or upon a 
written statement of charges formulated by the governing board, charging 
a permanent employee of the district with immoral conduct, conviction of 
a felony or of any crime involving moral turpitude, with incompetency due 
to mental disability, with willful refusal to perform regular assignments 
without reasonable cause, as prescribed by reasonable rules and 
regulations of the employing district, or with knowning membership by the 
employee in the Communist Party, the governing board may, if it deems 
such action necessary, immediately suspend the employee from his or her 
'duties and give notice to him or her of his or her suspension, and that 
30 days after service of the notice, he or she will be dismissed, unless 
he or she demands a hearing. 
If a regular employee is suspended upon charges of knowing membership by 
the employee in the Communist Party, he or she may within 10 day after 
service upon him of notice of such suspension file with the governing 
board a verified denial, in writing, of the charges. In such event the 
regular employee who demands a hearing within the 30-day period shall 
continue to be paid his or her regular salary during the period of 
suspension and until the entry of the decision of the hearing officer, if 
and during such time as he or she furnishes to the district a suitable 
bond, or other security acceptable to the governing board, as a guarantee 
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that the employee will repay to the district the amount of salary so paid 
to him or her during the period of suspension in case the decision of the 
Commission on Professional Competence is that he or she shall be 
dismissed. If it is determined that the employee may not be dismissed, 
the district shall reimburse the employee for the cost of the bond. 
87736. Sex offenses and naroctics offenses; compulsory leave of absence. 
Whenever the certificated employee of a community college district is 
charged with the commission of any sex offense, as defined in Section 
87010, by complaint, information, or indictment filed in a court of 
competent jurisdiction, the governing board of the district shall 
immeidately place the employee upon compulsory leave of absence for a 
period of time extending for not more than 10 days after the date of the 
entry of judgement in the proceedings. The governing board of the 
district may extend the compulsory leave of absence of the employee 
beyond such period by giving notice to the employee withint 10 days after 
the entry of judgement in the proceedings that the employee will be 
dismissed at the expiration of 30 days from the date of service of the 
notice, unless the employee demands a hearing as provided in this 
article. 
Any employee placed upon compulsory leave of absence pursuant to this 
section shall continue to be paid his or her regular salary during the 
period of his or her compulsory leave of absence, if and during such time 
as the employee furnishes to the community college district a suitable 
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bond, or other security acceptable to the governing board, as a guarantee 
that the employee will repay to the district the amount of salary so paid 
to the employee during the period of compulsory leave of absence in case 
the employee is convicted of such charges, or fails or refuses to return 
to service following an acquittal of the offense or dismissal of the 
charges. If the employee is acquitted of the offense, or the charges 
against the employee are dismissed, the district shall reimburse the 
employee for the cost of the bond upon his or her return to service in 
the district. 
If the employee does not elect to furnish bond, or other security 
acceptable to the governing board of the district, and if the employee is 
acquitted of the offense, or the charges against the employee are 
dismissed, the district shall pay to the employee his or her full 
compensation for the period of the compulsory leave of absence upon his 
or her return to service in the district. 
Whenever any certificated employee of a community college district is 
charged with the commission of narcotics offense as defined in Section 
87011 of the Education Code, or a violation of Section 261.5 of the Penal 
Code, Sections 11357 to 11361, inclusive, 11363, 11364 or 11377 to 11382, 
inclusive, insofar as such sections relate to any controlled substances 
in paragraph (4) or (5) of subdivision (b) of Section 11056, or any 
controlled substances in subdivision (d) of Section 11054, except 
paragraphs (10), (11), (12), and (17), of such subdivision of the Health 
and Safety Code, by complaint, information, or indictment filed in a 
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court of competent jurisdiction, the governing board of the district may 
immediately place the employee upon compulsory leave in accordance with 
the procedure in this section. 
87737. Notice of suspension and intent to dismiss: Service. The notice 
of suspension and intention to dismiss, shall be in writing and be served 
upon the employee personally or by United States registered mail 
addressed to the employee at his last knmrn address. A copy of the 
charges filed, containing the information required by section 11503 of 
the Government Code, together with a copy of the provisions of this 
article, shall be attached to the notice. If the employee does not 
demand a hearing within the 30 day period, he may be dismissed upon the 
expiration of 30 days after service of the notice. 
87740. Cause, notice, and right to heari.ng required for dismissal of 
probationary employee. (a) No later than March 15 and before an employee 
is given notice by the governing board that his services will not be 
required for the ensuing year, the governing board and the employee shall 
be given written notice by the superintendent of the district or his 
designee, or in the case of a district which has no superintendent by the 
clerk or secretary of the governing board, that it has been recommended 
that such notice be given to the employee, and stating the reasons 
therefor. If a contract employee has been in the employ of the district 
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less than 45 days on March 15, the giving of such notice may be deferred 
until the 45th day of employment and all time periods and deadline dates 
herein prescribed shall be coextensively extended. 
Until the-employee has requested a hearing as provided in subdivision (b) 
or has waived his right to a hearing, the notice and reasons therefor 
shall be confidential and shall not be divulged by any person, except as 
may be necessary in the performance of duties; however, the violation of 
this requirement of confidentiality, in and of itself, shall not in any 
manner be construed as affecting the validity of any hearing conducted 
pursuant to this section. 
(b) The employee may request a hearing to determine if there is cause 
for not reemploying him for the ensuing year. A request for a hearing 
must be in writing and must be delivered to the person who sent the 
notice pursuant to subdivision (a), on or before a date specified 
therein, which shall not be less than seven days after the date on which 
the notice is served upon the employee. If an employee fails to request 
a hearing on or before the date specified, his failure to do so shall 
constitute his waiver of his right to a hearing. The notice provided for 
in subsection (a) shall advise the employee of the provisions of this 
subdivision. 
(c) In the event a hearing is requested by the employee, the preceeding 
shall be conducted and a decision made in accordance with Chapter 5 
(commencing with Section 11500) of Part 1 of Division 3 of Title 2 of the 
Government Code and the governing board shall have all power granted to 
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an agency therein, except that: (1) the respondent shall file his 
notice of defense,if any, within five days after service upon him of the 
accusation and he shall be notified of such five-day period for filing in 
the accusation; (2) the discovery authorized by Section 11507.6 of the 
Government Code shall be available only if request is made therefor 
within 15 days after service of the accusation, and the notice required 
by Section 11505 of the Government Code shall so indicate; and (3) the 
hearing shall be conducted by a hearing officer who shall prepare a 
proposed decision, containing findings of fact and a determination as to 
whether the charges sustained by the evidence are related to the welfare 
of the schools and the students thereof. The proposed decision shall be 
prepared for the governing board and shall contain a determination as to 
the sufficiency of the cause and a recommendation as to disposition. 
However, the governing board shall make the final determination as to the 
sufficiency of the cause and disposition. None of the findings, 
recommendations, or determinations contained in the preposed decision 
prepared by the hearing officer shall be binding on the governing board 
or on any court in future litigation. Copies of the proposed decision 
shall be submitted to the governing board and to the employee on or 
before May 7 of the year in which the preceeding is commenced. All 
expenses of the hearing, including the cost of the hearing officer, shall 
be paid by the governing board from the district funds. The board may 
adopt from time time such rules and procedures not inconsistent with 
provisions of this section, as may be necessary to effectuate this 
section. 
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(d) The governing board's determination not to reemploy a contract 
employee for the ensuing school year shall be for cause only. The 
determination of the governing board as to the sufficiency of the cause 
pursuant to this section shall be conclusive, but the cause shall relate 
solely to the welfare of the schools and the students thereof and 
provided that cause shall include termination of services for the reasons 
specified in Section 87743. The decision made after the hearing shall be 
effective on May 15 of the year the proceeding is commenced. 
(e) Notice to the contract employee by the governing board that his 
sevice will not be required for the ensuing year,shall be given no later 
than Nay 15. 
(f) If a governing board notifies a contract empoyee that his services 
will not be required for the ensuing year, the board shall, within 10 
days after delivery to it of the employee's written request, provide him 
with a statement of its reasons for not reemploying him for the ensuing 
year. 
(g) Any notice or request shall be deemed sufficient when it is 
delivered in person to the employee to whom it is directed, or when it is 
deposited in the United States' registered mail, postage prepaid and 
addressed to the last known address of the employee. 
(h) In the event that the governing board does not give notice provided 
for in subdivision (e) of this section on or before Hay 15, the employee 
shall be deemed reemployed for the ensuing school year. 
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(i) If after request for hearing pursuant to subdivision (b) any 
continuance is granted pursuant to Government Code Section 11524, the 
dates prescribed in subdivisions (c), (d), (e), and (h) which occur on or 
after the date of granting the continuance shall be extended for a period 
of time equal to such continuance. 
87743. Reduction in number of permanent employees. No regular employee 
shall be deprived of his position for causes other than those specified 
in Sections 87453, 87467 and 87484, and Sections 87732 to 87739, 
inclusive, and no contract employee shall be deprived of his position for 
cause other than as specified in Section 87740 except in accordance with 
the provisions of Section 87463 and Sections 87743 to 87762, inclusive. 
Whenever in any school year the average daily attendance in all of the 
schools of a district for the first six months in which school is in 
session shall have declined below the corresponding period of either of 
the preivous two school years, or whever a particular kind of service is 
to be reduced or discontinued not later than the beginning of the 
following school year, and when in the opinion of the governing board of 
said district it shall have become necessary by either of such conditions 
to decrease the number of regular employees in said district, the said 
governing board may terminate the services of not more than a 
corresponding percentage of the certificated employees of said district, 
regular as well as contract, at the close of the school year; provided, 
that the services of no regular employee may be terminated under the 
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provisions of this section while any contract employee, or any other 
employee with less seniority, is retained to render a service which said 
regular employee is certificated and competent to render. 
Notice of such termination of services for a reduction in attendance or 
reduction or discontinuance of a particular kin of service to take effect 
not later than the beginning of the following school year, shall be given 
before the 15th of Hay in the manner prescribed in Section 87740 and 
services of such employees shall be terminated in the inverse of the 
order in which they were employed, as dete~illined by the board in 
accordance l'lith the provision of Sections 87413 and 87414. In the event 
that a regular or contract employee is not given the notices and a right 
to the hearing as provided for in Section 87740, he shall be 'deemed 
reemployed for the ensuing school year. The board shall make assignments 
and reassignments in such a manner that employees shall be retained to 
render only services which their seniority and qualifications entitle 
them to render. 
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23-10-101. Legislative declaration. (1) It is the purpose of this 
article: 
(a) To provide a fair and orderly procedure for the terminatin of 
employment of faculty members at publicly controlled 
institutions of higher education in cases involving dismissal 
or nonrenewal of contract, whether by reason of reduction of 
force or other reasons; 
(b) To adequately protect academic freedom and intellectual 
inquiry; and 
(c) To minimize the need for judicial determination of such 
matters. 
23-10-201. Grounds for dismissal and nonrenewal. The grounds for 
dismissal or nonrenewal of a faculty member shall be mental disability, 
neglect of duty, conviction of a felony, insubordination, moral 
turpitude, incompetency, or other good and just cause as determined by 
the failure to meet resonable written and published standards. No 
faculty member may be dismissed or nonrenewed due to temporary illness as 
defined by board policy, leave of absence granted previously, or military 
leave of absence. 
23-10-202. Preliminary procedures - termination of employment by 
dismissal or nonrenewal of contract. (1) (a) Notice of dismissal may be 
given at any reasonable time. 
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(b) Notice of nonrenewal shall be given by the board no later than 
December 15 of the year prior to the year in which the nonrenewed 
contract is to expire; except that, in the case of a faculty member's 
first contract, the notice of nonrenewal shall be given no later than 
February 15 of the year in which the contract is to expire. 
(c) Any such notice pursuant to this section shall be in writing, shall 
be sent by registered mail to the faculty member, and shall state the 
reasons for dismissal or nonrenewal of contract. 
(2) (a) If the faculty member makes a request for a hearing in writing 
not more than ten calendar days after receipt of the notice of dismissal 
or nonrenewal, he shall be entitled to the following procedure: Within 
seven school days after the written request for a hearing, a campus 
hearing committee shall convene and attempt to reach an informal 
resolution of the dispute. The campus hearing committee shall consist of 
two persons selected by the faculty member, two persons selected by the 
chief administrative officer, and a fifth person mutually selected by the 
four appointees. The campus hearing committee and administration shall 
exchange all available pertinent data required for a complete 
investigation of the action, if requested by a member of the campus 
hearing committee. The campus hearing committee may propose disciplinary 
or corrective action different from that ordered by the administration. 
All five members of the campus hearing committee must be employees of 
that institution. If the campus hearing committee cannot reach a 
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resolution that is acceptable to both the faculty member and the chief 
administrative officer within seven calender days, unless extended by 
mutual consent, the faculty member shall be entitled to a full and fair 
hearing conducted in accordance with the provisions of section 24-4-105, 
C.R.S., before an impartial hearing officer. 
(b) The campus hearing committee shall have the power to adopt its own 
rules of procedure. The faculty member shall have the option of 
attending all meetings of the campus hearing committee. 
(c) The hearing officer shall be selected mutually by the faculty member 
and the chief administrative officer. If no agreement ·is reached withint 
ten days, the chief district judge of the judicial district in which the 
educational institution is located shall be notified, and the judge shall 
appoint a hearing officer within five days. Said just shall appoint a 
person totally disinterested in the proceeding. 
(d) The hearing officer shall hold a hearing within five days and shall 
render his decision within twenty days after his initial appointment. 
The hearing officer shall make findings of fact and conclusions and 
prepare and transmit his initial decision to the board, which shall 
review and take action on the initial decision in accordance with the 
provisions of section 24-4-105 (15), C.R.S. The action of the board 
shall be subject to judicial review in accordance with the provisions of 
section 24-4-106, C.R.S. 
(3) (a) A faculty member may be summarily suspended without prior 
implementation of the relevant procedures provided in this article, for 
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a period not to exceed fifteen days, upon a finding of the chief 
administrative officer that there is good cause to believe that: 
(I) The continued presence on the grounds of the education 
institution would endanger the safety or well-being of 
the faculty member or other member of the educational 
institution; or 
(II) The continued functioning of the faculty member in his 
position would substantially impair or substantially 
disrupt the normal functions of the educational institution. 
(b) Benefits and salary shall remain in force during term of any 
suspension. 
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(c) Any faculty member suspended may request and shall be granted 
a hearing officer as provided in this section. Any finding 
of the hearing shall be subject to judicial review in 
accordance with the provisions of section 24-4-106, C.R.S. 
(4) There need be no hearing granted on the nonrenewal of a faculty 
member's first three probationary annual contracts with an educational 
instituion. 
23-10-203. Reduction in forces - ~easons and priorties. (1) Reduction 
in forces resulting in the termination of a faculty member may take place 
for any one of the following reasons: 
(a) When the institution is faced with a justifiable lack of work; 
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(b) When the institution or program area has experienced declining 
enrollment in any two consecutive fall semesters or fall quarters or the 
equivalent thereof; 
(c) When the general assembly has failed to appropriate or a board has 
failed to allocate at or above the previous year's full-time equivalent 
faculty or full-time equivalent student, in which case the institution 
must provide the faculty member with a minimum of sixty days' written 
notice of termination; 
(d) Any justifiable change in program; 
(e) When the board declairs a fiscal emergency as defined in section 
23-10-102, in which case the institution must provide the faculty member 
with a minimum of sixty days' written notice of termination. 
(2) Any reduction in forces ahll be effected in accordance with section 
23-10-202 and subsections (3) and (4) of this section. Notice of 
termination due to reduction in force shall be presented in person to the 
faculty member or be sent by certified mail to the last known address of 
the faculty member before December 15 of the year in which any such 
reduction in force is necessary, except as provided in paragraphs (c) and 
(e) of subsection (1) of this section, and shall state the reasons for 
termination. 
(3) Normal attrition shall be considered prior to staff reduction, and 
part-time instructors in the program area affected shall be reduced prior 
to staff reduction of any other members. 
212 
COLORADO (continued) 
(4) In the event that additional reductions beyond those specified in 
subsection (3) of this section are necessary and competency of faculty 
member is relatively equal, seniority in the program area affected shall 
prevail in considering which faculty members shall be reduced. The most 
recently employed faculty member shall be the first to be reduced and 
additional reduction shall proceed in that order. 
23-10-205. Article provides minimum requirements. This article provides 
the minimum requirements for dismissal, nonrenewal, and reduction in 
force. Nothing in this article shall be construed as prohibiting an 
educational institution from adopting its own procedures which are 
consistent with the minimum requirements contained in this article. 
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lOa-6. Duties of the board of governors; establishment of statewide 
policy for higher education. 
(6) Within the limits of authorized expenditures, the policies of the 
state system of higher education shall be consistent with the following 
goals • 
(2) to protect academic freedom • • • 
lOa-72. Duties of board of trustees. 
(a) • • • The board of trustees may employ the faculty and other 
personnel needed to operate and maintain the institutions within its 
jurisdiction. Within the limitation of appropriations, the board of 
trustees shall fix compensation of such personnel, establish terms and 
conditions of employment and prescribe their duties and qualifications. 
Said board of trustees shall determine who constitutes its professional 
staff. Said board shall annually submit to the commissioner of the 
administrative services a list of the positions which it has included 
within the professional staff • 
• • • Subject to statewide policy and guidelines established by the board 
of governors, the board of trustees shall: 
(4) establish policies which protect academic freedom and the content of 
courses and degree programs; 
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14 9105. Powers and duties of Board. 
(d) For the effectuation of the purposes of this chapter the Board in 
addition to such other powers expressly granted to it by this chapter, 
shall have the following powers: 
(6) To appoint members of the administrative and teaching staffs of the 
institutions and to fix their compensation and terms of employment; 
(16) To employ such persons as deemed desirable, 
215 
FLORIDA 
240.335. Employment of community college personnel. Employment of all 
personnel in each community college shall be upon recommendation of the 
president subject to rejection for cause by the board of trustees and 
subject to the rules and regulations of the state board relative to 
certification, tenure, leaves of absence of all types, including 
sabbaticals, renumeration, and such other conditions of employment as the 
Division of Community Colleges deems necessary and proper; and to 
policies of the board of trustees not inconsistent with law. 
240.339. Contracts with administrative and instructional personnel. 
Each person employed in an administrative or instructional capacity in a 
community college shall be entitled to a contract as provided by 
regulations of the state board. 
240.132. Participation by students or employees in disruptive activities 
at state institutions of higher learning; penalties. 
(1) Any person who shall accept the privilege extended by the laws of 
this state of attendance or employment at any state college, state 
community college or state university shall, by so attending or working 
at such institutions, be deemed to have given his consent to the policies 
of that institution, the Board of Regents of the Divison of Universities 
of the Department of Education, and the laws of this state. Such 
policies shall include prohibition against disruptive activities at state 
institutions of higher learning. 
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(2) After it has been determined that a student or employee of a state 
institution of higher learning has participate in disruptive activities, 
the following penalties may be imposed against such person: 
(a) Immediate termination of contract of such employee of the state 
instutition of higher learning, and thereafter such person shall not be 
employed by any state public school or state college, state community 
college, or state university. 
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2-3-31. General powers. The board of regents shall have power: 
(1) To make such reasonable rules and regulations as are necessary for 
the performance of its duties; 
(2) To elect or appoint professors, educators, stewards, or any other 
officers necessary for all of the schools in the university system, as 
may be authorized by the General Assembly; to discontinue or remove them 
as the good of the system or any of its schools or institutions or 
stations may require; and to fix their compensations; 
20-3-134. Regents to fix policies and standards; inspections and 
supervision; withholding state funds from substandard junior colleges. 
The board of regents shall adopt rules and regulations fixing policies 
and standards entitling the local operating authority to receive state 
aid for the support of junior colleges and shall have authority to make 
such inspections and supervision as shall be necessary to insure that 
such policies and standards by them are met as prescribed by the board. 
If there has been a failure to comply with such policies and standards by 
any such junior college, the board shall have authority to withhold or 
terminate the payment of any state funds which would otherwise be due 
under the terms of this article. 
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305-2. Powers of board. The board of regents shall have authority to 
establish and govern community colleges. It shall have the same powers 
with respect to the community colleges that it has to the university in 
general. 
304-11. Faculty. The faculty of the university shall be under the 
direction of a president who shall be appointed by the board of regents. 
The board shall appoint such deans, directors, other members of the 
faculty, and employees as may be required to carry out the purposes of 
the institution, prescribe their salaries and terms of service, where 
such salaries and terms of service are not specifically fixed by 
legislative enactment, make and enforce rules governing sabbatical leaves 
with or without pay, consistent with the practice of similar institutions 
on the mainland, and not withstanding the laws of the state relating to 
vacations of the officers and employees of the state. 
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33-2107. General powers of the board of trustees. The board of trustees 
of each junior college district shall have the power: 
(1) To adopt rules and regulations for its own government and the 
government of the college; 
33-2108. President - Instructors and other employees - Requirements for 
admission and graduation - Certificates and diplomas - Textbooks and 
equipment. The board of trustees shall elect a president of the college 
and, upon his recommendation, appoint such officers, instructors, 
specialists, clerks, and other personnel as it may deem necessary; fix 
their salaries and prescribe their duties • • • 
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103B-2. Tenure. Any faculty member who has been employed in any 
district for a period of 3 consecutive school years shall enter upon 
tenure unless dismissed as hereinafter provided. However, a board may at 
its option extend such period for one additional school year by giving 
the faculty member notice not later than 60 days before the end of the 
school year or term during the school year or term immediately preceeding 
the school year or term in which tenure would otherwise be conferred. 
Such notice must state the corrective actions which the faculty member 
should take to satisfactorily complete service requirements for tenure. 
The specific reasons for the one-year extension shall be confidential but 
shall be issued to the teacher upon request. The foregoing provision is 
for a three-year period and optional one-year contracts which now or 
hereafter may provide for a lesser period of service before entering upon 
tenure. A tenured faculty member shall have a vested contract right in 
continued employment as a faculty member subject to termination only upon 
occurance of one or more of the following: 
(a) just cause for dismissal; or 
(b) a reduction in the number of faculty members employed by the 
board or a discontinuance of some particular type of teaching 
service or program. 
103B-3. Dismissal of non-tenure faculty member. Every Board shall 
provide by rule or contract for a procedure to evaluate the performance 
and qualifications of non-tenure faculty members. If the implementation 
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of such procedure results in a decision to dismiss a non-tenure faculty 
member for the ensuing school year or term, the Board shall give notice 
thereof to the faculty member not later than 60 days before the end of 
the school year or term. The specific reasons for the dismissal shall be 
confidential but shall be issued to the teacher upon request. If the 
Board fails to give such notice, within the time period, the faculty 
member shall be deemed reemployed for the ensuing school year. If the 
Board fails to give such notice within the time provided during the third 
year, or during the fourth year in the case of a one year extension, the 
faculty member shall enter upon tenure during the ensuing school year or 
term. 
103B-4. Dismissal of tenured faculty member for cause. If a dismissal 
of a tenured faculty member is sought for cause, the board must first 
approve a motion by a majority vote of all its members. The specific 
charges for dismissal shall be confidential but shall be issued to the 
tenured faculty member upon request. The Board decision shall be final 
unless the tenured faculty member within ten days requests in writing of 
the Board that a hearing should be scheduled. If the faculty member 
within 10 days requests in writing that a hearing be scheduled, the Board 
shall schedule such hearing on those charges before a disinterested 
hearing officer ona date no less than 45 days, nor more than 70 days 
after the adoption of the motion. The hearing officer shall be selected 
from a list of 5 qualified arbitrators provided by a nationally 
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recognized arbitration organization. Within 10 days after the teacher 
receives· the notice of the hearing, either the Board and the teacher 
mutually or the teacher alone shall request the list of qualified hearing 
officers from the arbitration organization. Within 5 days from receipt 
of the list, the Board and the teacher, or their legal representatives, 
shall alternately strike one name from the list until one name remains. 
The teacher shall make the first strike. Notice of such charges shall be 
served upon the tenured faculty member at least 21 days before the 
hearing date. Such notice shall contain a bill of particulars. The 
hearing shall be public at the request of either the tenured faculty 
member of the Board. The tenured faculty member has the privilege of 
being present at the hearing with counsel and of cross-examining 
witnesses and may offer evidence and witnesses and present defenses to 
charges. The hearing officer upon request by either party may issue 
subpoenas requiring the attendance of witnesses and production of 
documents. All testimony at the hearing shall be taken under oath 
administered by the hearing officer. The hearing officer shall cause a 
record of the proceedings to be kept and the Board shall employ a 
competent reporter to take stenographic or stenotype notes of all 
testimony. The costs of the reporter's attendance and services at the 
hearing and all other costs of the hearing shall be borne equally by the 
Board and the tenured faculty member. Either party desiring a transcript 
of the hearing shall pay the cost thereof. If in the opinion of the 
Board the interests of the district require it the Board after 20 days 
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notice, may suspend the tenured faculty member pending the hearing; but 
if acquitted, the tenured faculty member shall not suffer the loss of any 
salary by reason of the suspension. The hearing officer shall, within 
reasonable dispatch, make a decision as to whether or not the tenured 
faculty member shall be dismissed and shall give a copy of the decision 
to both the tenured faculty member and the Board. The decision of the 
hearing officer shall be final and binding. 
103B-5. Reduction in number of faculty members. If a dismissal of a 
faculty member for the ensuing school year results from the decision of 
the Board to decrease the number of faculty members employed by the board 
or to discontinue some particular type of teaching service or program, 
notice shall be given the affected faculty member not later than 60 days 
before the end of the preceding school year, together with a statement of 
honorable dismissal and the reason therefor, provided that the employment 
of nontenured faculty member may be tel~inated under the provisions of 
this Section while any probationary faculty member, or other employee 
with less seniortiy, is retained to render a service which the tenured 
employee is competent to render. In the event a tenured faculty member 
is not given notice within the time provided, he shall be deemed 
reemployed for the ensuing school year. For the period of 24 months from 
the beginning of the school year for which the faculty member was 
dismissed, any faculty member shall have the preferred right to 
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reappointment to a position entailing services he is competent to render 
prior to appointment of any few faculty member; provided that no 
non-tenured faculty member or other employee with less seniority shall be 
employed to render a service which a tenured faculty member is competent 
to render. 
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20-12-61-13 (28-26413). Powers and duties of boards of trustees. The 
board of trustees of the Indiana Vocational Technical College, and 
regional board of trustees of regional institutes within the framework of 
statewide coordination shall have the authority to: 
(4) Develop and adopt the appropriate programs to be offered, to employ 
the necessary personnel, determine their qualifications and fix their 
compensation, including therein provisions with regard to employee group 
insurance and benefits. 
226 
IOWA 
279.15. Notice of termination-request for hearing. 
1. The superintendent or the superintendent's designee shall notify the 
teacher not later than March 15 that the superintendent will recommend in 
writing to the board at a regular or special meeting of the board held 
not later than March 31 that the teacher's continuing contract be 
terminated effective at the end of the current school year. 
2. Notification of recommendation of termination of a teacher's contract 
shall be in writing and shall be personally delivered to the teacher, or 
mailed by certified mail. The notification shall be complete when 
received by the teacher. The notification and the recommendation to 
terminate shall contain a short and plain statement of the reasons, which 
shall be for just cause why the recommendation is being made. The 
notification shall be given at or before the time the recommendation is 
given to the board. As a part of the termination proceedings, the 
teacher's complete personnel file of employment by the board shall be 
available to the teacher, which file shall contain a record of all 
periodic evaluations between the teacher and appropriate supervisors. 
Within five days of the receipt of the written notice that the 
superintendent is recommending termination of the contract, the teacher 
may request, in writing to the secretary of the board, a private hearing 
with the board. The private hearing shall not be subject to chapter 28A 
and shall be held no sooner than ten days and no later than twenty days 
following the receipt of the request unless the parties otherwise agree. 
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The secretary of the board shall notify the teacher in writing of the 
date, time, and location of the private hearing, and at least five days 
before the hearing shall also furnish to the teacher any documentation 
which may be presented to the board at the private hearing and a list of 
persons who may address the board in support of the superintendent's 
recommendations at the private hearing. At least 3 days before the 
hearing, the teacher shall provide any documentation he or she expects to 
present at the private hearing, along with the names of any persons who 
may address the board on behalf of the teacher. This exchange of 
information shall be at the time specified unless otherwise agreed. 
279.16. Private hearing-decision-record. The participants at the 
private hearing shall be at least a majority of the members of the board, 
their legal representatives, if any, the teacher's immediate supervisor, 
the teacher, the teacher's representatives, if any, and the witnesses for 
the parties. The evidence at the private hearing shall be limited to the 
specific reasons stated in the superintendent's notice of recommendation 
of termination. No participant in the hearing shall be liable for any 
damages to any person if any statement at the hearing is determined to be 
erroneous as long as the statement l.;ras made in good faith. The 
superintendent shall present evidence and agrument on all issues involved 
and the teacher may cross-examine, respond and present evidence and 
argument in his or her behalf relevant to all issues involved. Evidence 
may be by stipulation of the parties and informal settlement may be made 
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by stipulation, consent, or default or by any other method agreed upon by 
the parties in writing. The board shall employ a certified shorthand 
reporter to keep a record of the private hearing. The proceedings or any 
part thereof shall be transcribed at the request of either party with the 
expense of transcription charged to the requesting party. 
The presiding officer of the board may administer oaths in the same 
manner and with like effect and under the same penalties as in the case 
of magistrates exercising criminal or civil jurisdiction. The board 
shall cause subpoenas to be issued for such witnesses and the production 
of such books and papers as either the board or the teacher may 
designate. The subpoenas shall be signed by the presiding officer of the 
board. 
In case a witness is duly subpoenaed and refuses to attend, or in 
case a witness appears and refuses to testify or to produce required 
books or papers, the board shall, in writing, report such refusal to the 
district court of the county in which the administrative office of the 
school district is located, and the court shall proceed with the person 
or witness as though the refusal had occurred in a proceeding legally 
pending before the court. 
The board shall not be bound by common law or statutory rules of 
evidence or by technical or fomal rules of procedure, but it shall hold 
the hearing in such manner as is best suited to ascertain and conserve 
the substantial rights of the parties. Process and procedure under 
sections 279.13 to 279.19 shall be as summary as resonably may be. 
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At the conclusion of the private hearing, the superintendent and the 
teacher may file written briefs and agruments with the board and within 
three days or such other time as may be agreed upon. 
If the teacher fails to timely request a private hearing or does not 
appear at the private hearing, the board may proceed and make a 
determination upon the superintendent's recommendation, which 
determination in that case shall be not later than April 10, or not later 
than five days after the scheduled date for the private hearing, 
whichever is applicable. The board shall convene in open session and by 
roll call vote determine the termination or continuance of the teacher's 
contract. 
Within five days after the private hearing, the board shall, in 
executive session, meet to make a final decision upon the recommendation 
and the evidence as herein provided. The board shall also consider any 
written brief and arguments submitted by the superintendent and the 
teacher. 
The record for a private hearing shall include: 
1. All pleadings, motions and intermediate rulings. 
2. All evidence received or considered and all other submissions. 
3. A statement of all matters officially noticed. 
4. All questions and offers of proof, ejections and rulings 
thereon. 
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5. All findings and exceptions. 
6. Any decision, opinion or conclusion by the board. 
7. Findings of fact shall be based soley on the evidence in the 
record and on matters officially noticed in the record. 
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The decision of the board shall be in writing and shall include 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, separately stated. Findings of 
fact, if set forth in statutory language, shall be accompained by a 
concise and explicit statement of the underlying facts and supporting the 
findings. Each conclusion of law shall be suported by cited authority or 
by reasoned opinion. 
When the board has reached a decision, opinion, or conclusion, it 
shall convene in open meeting and by roll call vote determine the 
continuance or discontinuing of the teacher's contract. The record of 
the private conference and findings of fact and exceptions shall be 
exempt from the provisions of chapter 68A. The secretary of the board 
shall immediately mail notice of the board's action to the teacher. 
279.17. Appeal by teacher to adjudicator. If the teacher is no longer a 
probationary teacher, the teacher may, within ten days, appeal the 
determination of the board to an adjudicator by filing a notice of appeal 
with the secretary of the board. The notice of appeal shall contain a 
concise statement of the action which is the subject of the appeal, the 
particular board action appealed from, the grounds on which relief is 
sought and the relief sought. 
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Within five days following receipt by the secretary of the notice of 
appeal, the board or the board's legal representative, if any, and the 
teacher or the teacher 1 s representative, if any, may select an 
adjudicator who resides within the boundaries of the merged area in which 
the school district is located. If an adjudicator cannot be mutually 
agreed upon witin the five-day period, the secretary shall notify the 
chairperson of the public employment relations board by transmitting the 
notice of appeal, and the chairperson of the public employment relations 
board shall within five days provide a list of five adjudicators to the 
parties. Within three days from the receipt of the list of adjudicators, 
the parties shall select an adjudicator by alternately removing a name 
from the list until only one name remains. The person whose name remains 
shall be the adjudicator. The parties shall determine by lot which part 
shall remove the fist name from the list submitted by the chairperson of 
the public employment relations board. The secretary of the board shall 
inform the chairperson of the public employee relations board of the name 
of the adjudicator selected. 
If the teacher does not timely request an appeal to an adjudicator 
the decision, opinion, or conclusion of the board shall become final and 
binding. 
Within thirty days after filing the notice of appeal, or within 
further time allowed by the adjudicator, the board shall transmit to the 
adjudicator the original or a certified copy of the entire record of the 
private hearing which may be the subject of the petition. By stipulation 
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of the parties to review the proceedings, the record of the cases may be 
shortened. The adjudicator may require or permit subsequent corrections 
or additions to the shortened record. 
The record ceritifed and filed by the board shall be the record upon 
which the appeal shall be heard and no additional evidence shall be heard 
by the adjudicator. In such appeal to the adjudicator, especially when 
considering the credibility of witnesses, the adjudicator shall give 
weight to the fact findings of the board; but shall not be bound by them. 
Before the date set for hearing a petition for review of board 
action, which shall be within ten days after receipt of the record unless 
otherwise agreed or unless the adjudicator orders additional evidence ot 
be taken before the board, application may be made to the adjudicator for 
leave to present evidence in addition to that found in the record of the 
case. If it is shown to the adjudicator that the additional evidence is 
material and that there were good reasons for failure to present it in 
the private hearing before the board, the adjudicator may order that the 
additional evidence be taken before the board upon conditions determined 
by the adjudicator. The board may modify its findings and decision in 
the case by reason of the additional evidence and shall file that 
evidence and any modifications, new findings, or decisions, with the 
adjudicator and mail copies of the new findings or decisions to the 
teacher. 
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The adjudicator may affirm board action or remend to the board for 
further proceedings. The adjudicator shall reverse, modify, or grant any 
appropriate relief from the board action if substantial rights of the 
teacher have been prejudiced because the board action is: 
1. In violation of a board rule or policy or contract; or 
2. Unsupported by a preponderance of the competent evidence in the 
record is viewed as a whole; or 
3. Unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious or characterized by an 
abuse of discretion or a clearly unwarranted exercise of 
discretion. 
The adjudicator shall, within fifteen days after the hearing, make a 
decision and shall give a copy of the decision to the teacher and the 
secretary of the board. The decision ofthe adjudicator shall become the 
final and binding decision of the board unless either party within ten 
days notifies the secretary of the board that the decision is rejected. 
The board may reject the decision by majority vote, by roll call, in open 
meeting and entered into the minutes of the meeting. The board sl1all 
immediately notify the teacher of its decision by certified mail. The 
teacher may reject the adjudicator's decision by notifying the board's 
secretary in writing within ten days of the filing of such decision. 
279.18. Appeal by either party to court. If either party rejects the 
adjudicator's decision, the rejecting party shall, within thirty days of 
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the initial filing of such decision, appeal to the district court of the 
county in which· the administrative office of the school district is 
located. The notice of appeal shall be immediately mailed by certified 
mail to the other party. The adjudicator shall transmit to the reviewing 
court the original or a certified copy of the entire record which may be 
the subject of the petition. By stipulation of all parties to the review 
proceedings, the record of such a case may be shortened. A party 
unreasonably refusing to stipulate to limit the record may be taxed by 
the court for the additional cost. The court may require or permit 
subsequent corrections or additions to the shortened record. 
In proceedings for judicial review of the adjudicator's decision, 
the court shall not hear any further evidence but shall hear the case 
upon the certified record. In such judicial review, especially when 
considering the credibility of witnesses, the court shall give weight to 
the fact findings of the board; but shall not be bound by them. The 
court may affirm the adjudicator's decision or remand to the adjudicator 
or the board for further proceedings upon conditions determined by the 
court. The court shall reverse, modify, or grant any other appropriate 
relief if substantial rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced 
because the action is: 
1. In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; or 
2. In excess of statutory authority of the board or the 
adjudicatory; or 
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3. In violation of a board rule or policy or contract; or 
4. Hade upon unlawful procedure; or 
5. Affected by other error of law; or 
6. Unsupported by a preponderance of the competent evidence in the 
record made before the board and the adjudicator when that 
record is viewed as a whole; or 
7. Unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious or characterized by an 
abuse of discretion or a clearly unwarranted exercise of 
discretion. 
An aggrieved or adversely affected party to the judicial review 
proceeding may obtain a review of any final judgement of the district 
court by appeal to the supreme court. The appeal shall be taken as in 
other civil cases, although the appeal may be taken regardless of the 
amount involved. 
279.19. Probationary period. The first tuo consecutive years of 
employment of a teacher in the same school district are a probationary 
period. However, a board of directors may waive the probationary period 
for any teacher who previously served a probationary period in another 
school district and the board may extend the probationary period for an 
additional year with the consent of the teacher. 
In the case of the termination of a probationary teacher's contract, 
the provisions of sections 279.15 and 279.16 shall apply. 
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The board's decision shall be final and binding unless the 
termination was based upon an alleged violation of a constitutionally 
guaranteed right of the teacher or an alleged violation of public 
employee rights of the teacher under section 20.10. 
279.27. Discharge of teacher. A teacher may be discharged at any time 
during the contract for just cause. The superintendent or the 
superintendent's designee, shall notify the teacher immediately that the 
superintendent will recommend in writing to the board at a regular 
meeting or special meeting of the board held not more than fifteen days 
after notification has been given to the teacher that the teacher's 
continuing contract be terminated effective immediately following a 
decision of the board. The procedure for dismissal shall be provided in 
sections 279.15(2) to 279.19. The superintendent may suspend a teacher 
under this section pending hearing and determination by the board. 
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72-5436. Definitions; exceptions. As used in this act: (a) "Teacher" 
shall mean any professional employee who is required to hold a teacher's 
certificate in any public school, any teacher or instructor in any area 
vocational-technical school or community junior college, except that 
"teacher" shall not include supervisors, principals, superintendents or 
any person employed under the authority of K.S.A. 72-8202b, or amendments 
thereto, or any person employed in an administrative capacity by any area 
vocational-technical school or community junior college. 
(b) "Board" shall mean the board of education of any school district, 
the board of control of any area vocational-technical school and the 
board of trustees of any community junior college. 
72-5437. Continuation of teacher's contracts; exceptions; notice of 
termination or nonrenewal; change of terms. All contracts of employment 
of teachers, as defined in K.S.A. 72-5436, and amendments thereto, except 
contracts entered into under the provisions of K.S.A 72-5412a, shall be 
deemed to continue for the next succeeding school year unless written 
notice of termination or nonrenewal is served by a board upon any teacher 
prior to the time the contract has been completed, and written notice of 
intention to nonrenew a contract shall be served by a board upon any 
teacher on or before fifteenth day of April • • • 
72-5433. Contents of notice; hearing; designation of hearing committee 
members; appointment by district judge, when. Whenever a teacher is 
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given written notice of intention not to renew the teacher's contract as 
provided in K.S.A 72-5437, or whenever such a teacher is terminated 
before the end of his or her contract term, the teacher shall be given a 
written notice of the proposed nonrenewal or termination including (1) a 
statement of the reasons for the proposed nonrenewal or termination, and 
(2) a statement that the teacher may have the matter heard by a hearing 
committee, upon written notice filed with the clerk of the board of 
education or the board of control, or the secretary of the board of 
trustees within fifteen (15) days from the date of such notice of 
nonrenewal or termination that he or she desires to be heard and 
designating therein one hearing committee member. Upon the filing of any 
such notice, the board shall, within fifteen (15) days thereafter, 
designate one hearing committee member. The two hearing committee 
members shall designate a third hearing committee member who shall be the 
chairman and who shall in all cases be a resident of the state of Kansas. 
In the event that the two hearing conmittee members are unable to agree 
upon a third hearing committee member l-Tithin five (5) days after the 
designation of the second committee member, a district judge of the home 
county of the school district, area vocational-technical school or 
community junior college shall appoint the third hearing committee member 
upon application of the teacher or either of the first two hearings 
committee members. 
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72-5439. Procedural due process requirements. The hearing provided for 
in K. S .A. 725438, shall afford procedural due process, including the 
following: 
(a) The right of each party to have counsel of such party's own choice 
present and to receive the advice of such counsel or other person whom 
such party may select, and 
(b) the right of each party or such party's counsel to cross-examine any 
person who provides information for the consideration of the hearing 
committee, except those persons whos testimony is presented by affidavit, 
and 
(c) the right of each party to present such parties own witnesses in 
person or their testimony by affidavit or deposition, except that 
testimony of a witness by affidavit may be presented only if such witness 
lives more than one hundred (100) miles from the location of the unified 
scholl district office, area vocational-technical school or community 
junior college, or is absent from the state or is unable to appear 
because of age, illness, infirmity or imprisonment. Hhen testimony is 
presented by affidavit the same shall be served upon the clerk of the 
board of education or the board of control, or the secretary of the board 
of trustees, or the agent of the board and upon the teacher in person or 
by first class mail to the address of the teacher which is on file with 
the board not less than ten (10) days prior to presentation to the 
hearing committee, and 
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(d) the right of the teacher to testify in his or her own behalf and 
give reasons for his or her conduct, and the right of the board to 
present is testimony through such persons as it may call to testify in 
its behalf and to give reasons for its actions, rulings or policies, and 
(e) the right of the parties ot have an orderly hearing, and 
(f) the right of the teacher to a fair and impartial decision based on 
substantial evidence. 
72-5440. Witnesses, fees and mileage; hearing committee members, 
expenses; testimony; recording and transcribing, when; costs. (a) For 
attending before the hearing committee at a hearing hereunder, witnesses 
who are subpoenaed shall receive five dollars ($5) per day and mileage at 
the rate prescribed under K.S.A. 1976 Supp. 75-3223a for miles actually 
traveled in going to and returning from the attendance at such hearing. 
The fees and mileage for the attendance of witnesses shall be borne by 
the party calling the witness, except that fees and mileage of witnesses 
subpoenaed by the hearing committee shall not receive fees or mileage for 
attendance at such hearing. 
(b) Each member of the hearing committee shall be paid subsistence 
allowances, mileage and other expenses as provided in K. S .A. 1976 
Supp. 75-3223, and amendments thereto. The cost for the services of 
members of the hearing committee shall be borne equally by the three 
parties. 
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(c) Testimony at the hearing hereunder may, and upon the request of 
either party shall, be taken by a certified shorthand reporter or 
electronically recorded, and shall be transcribed upon request by either 
party or upon direction by a court. The costs. for any such transcription 
shall be borne by the board. 
(d) All other costs of a hearing hereunder which are not specifically 
allocated in this section shall be borne equally by the parties. 
72-5441. Same; affidavits; depositions; interrogatories; time. When 
either party desires to present testimony by affidavit or by deposition, 
that party shall furnish to the hearing committee the date on which the 
testimony shall be taken. A copy of the affidavit or the deposition 
shall be furnished to the opposing party within ten (10) days following 
the taking of any such testimony, and no such testimony shall be 
presented at a hearing until the opposite party has had a least ten (10) 
days prior to the date upon which the testimony is to be presented to the 
hearing committee to rebut such testimony by affidavit or deposition or 
to submit interrogatories to the affiant or deponent to be answered 
under oath. Such ten (10) day period may, for good cause shown, be 
extended by the chairman of the hearing committee. 
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72-5442. Powers of hearing committee; rules of evidence not binding; 
burden of proof; admissibility of evidence. At any meeting of a hearing 
committee, when authorized by a majority of the committee, any member 
thereof may: 
(a) administer oaths; 
(b) issue subpoenas for the attendance and testimony of witnesses 
and the production of books, papers and documents relating to 
any matter under investigation; 
(c) authorize depositions to be taken; 
(d) receive evidence and limit lines of questioning and testimony 
which are repetitive, cumulative or irrelevant; 
(e) call and examine witnesses and introduce into the record 
documentary and other evidence; 
(f) regulate the course of the hearing and dispose of procedural 
requests, motions and similar matters; and 
(g) take any other action necessary to make the hearing and accord 
with administrative due process. 
Hearings hereunder shall not be bound by rules of evidence whether 
statutory, common law or adopted by the rules of court: Provided, 
however, that the burden of proof shall initially rest upon the board in 
all instances other than when the allegation is that the teacher's 
contract has been terminated or nonrenewed by reason of the teacher 
having exercised a constitutional right. All relevant evidence shall be 
admissible, except that the hearing committee may in its discretion 
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exclude any evidence if it believes that its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the fact that its admission will necessitate 
undue consumption of time. 
72-5443. Recommendation of hearing committee; findings of fact; 
determination of issues; decision by board; appeal to district court. 
Unless otherwise agreed by both board and the teacher, the hearing 
committee shall render a written recommendation not later than thirty 
(30) days after the close of the hearing, setting forth its findings of 
fact and recommendation as to the determination to the teacher and to the 
board which shall, after considering the hearing committee's 
recommendation and after hearing oral argument or receiving written 
briefs from a teacher and a representative of the board, decide whether 
the teacher's contract shall be renewed or terminated, which decision 
shall be final, subject to appeal to the district court as provided by 
K.S.A. 60-2101. The decision of the board shall be submitted to the 
teacher not later than thirty (30) days after the close of oral argument 
or submission of written briefs. 
72-5445. Application of act; two years of employment required; waiver, 
when. The provisions of K. S. A. 72-5438 to 72-5443 inclusive, and 
amendments thereto, shall apply to those teachers who have at any time 
completed two (2) consecutive years of employment in the school district, 
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area vocational-technical school, or community junior college then 
currently employing such teacher, except where the teacher alleges his or 
her termination or nonrenewal is the result of his or her having 
exercised a constitutional right. Any board may waive such two (2) year 
requirement for any such teachers employed by it who, prior to such 
employment, were teachers who had completed no less than two (2) 
consecutive years of employment in any school district, area 
vocational-technical school, or community junior college in this state. 
72-5446. Abridgement of constitutional right; procedure for 
determination. (a) In the event that any teacher, as defined in K.S.A. 
72-5436, and amendments thereto alleges that the teacher's contract has 
been nonrenewed by reason of the teacher having exercised a 
constitutional right, the following procedure shall be implemented; 
(1) the teacher allegeing an abridgement by the board of a 
constitutionally protected right shall specify the nature of the activity 
protected, and the times, dates, and placed of such activity; 
(2) the hearing committee provided by K. S .A. 72-5438 shall 
thereupon be constituted and shall decide if there is substantial 
evidence to support the teacher's claim that the teacher's exercise of a 
constitutionally protected right was the reason for the nonrenewal; 
(3) if the hearing committee shall determine that there is no 
substantial evidence to substantiate the teacher's claim of a violation 
of a constitutionally protected right, the hearing committee shall 
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dissolve, and the board's decision to not renew the contract shall stand; 
(4) if the hearing committee shall determine that there is 
substanital evidence to support the teacher's claim, the board shall be 
required to submit to the committee any reasons which may have been 
involved in the nonrenewal; 
(5) if the board has any substantial evidence to support its 
reason, the board's decision not to renew the contract shall be upheld. 
(b) The provisions of this section shall be supplemental to the 
provisions of K.S.A. 72-5436 to 72-5445, inclusive, and any amendments 
thereto. 
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164.575. Definition for KRS 164.575 to 164.600 - As used in KRS 164.575 
to 164.600, unless the context requires otherwise, "board" means the 
board of trustees of the University of Kentucky. 
164.595. Powers of board. (1) The board has the same powers with 
respect to the community colleges that it has as to the University of 
Kentucky in general. The board shall designate each community college 
with a name that includes the words "community college." 
The following section is in reference to University of Kentucky 
164.230. Removal of professors, officers and employees. The board of 
trustees has full power to suspend or remove any of the officers, 
teachers, professor or agents that it is authorized to appoint, but no 
president, professor or teacher shall be removed until ten (10) days' 
notice in writing, stating the nature of the charges preferred, and after 
an opportunity has been given to make defense before the board by counsel 
or otherwise and to introduce testimony which shall be heard and 
determined by the board. 
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17:1381. Junior colleges to be under supervision of board of education. 
All junior colleges established pursuant to R.S. 17:1380 shall be placed 
under the direction and supervision of the state department of education. 
Such colleges must be operated in connection with a state high school, 
and offer two years of standard college work, in keeping with accredited 
colleges, in advance of the courses of study prescribed for state high 
schools. The department of education shall prescribe the courses of 
study and the hours of credit allowed, and make the rules and necessary 
regulations for the proper government of the colleges. These rules and 
regulations shall be enforced by the parish superintendents and the 
several parish school boards of the districts created. 
17:411. Examination and certification of teachers. The State Board of 
Education shall prescribe the qualifications and provide for the 
certification of the teachers of elementary, secondary, trade, normal and 
collegiate schools ••• 
17:441. Definitions. As used in this Subpart, the word "teacher" means: 
(1) Any employee of any parish or city school board who holds a 
teacher's certificate. 
17:442. Probation and tenure of parish or city school teachers. Each 
teacher shall serve a probationary term of three years to be measured 
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from the date of his first appointment in the parish or city in which the 
teacher is serving his probation. During the probationary term the 
parish or city school board, as the case may be, may dismiss or discharge 
any probationary teacher upon the written recommendation of the parish or 
city superintendent of schools, as the case may be, accompanied by valid 
reasons therefor. 
Any teacher found unsatisfactory by the parish or city school board, 
as the case may be, at the expiration of said probationary term, shall be 
notified in writing by the board that he has been discharged or 
dismissed; in the absence of such notification, such probationary teacher 
shall automatically become a regular and permanent teacher in the employ 
of the school board of the parish or city, as the case may be, in which 
he has successfully served his three year probationary term; all teachers 
in the employ of any parish or city school board as of July 31, 1946 who 
hold proper certificates and who have served satisfactorily as teachers 
in that parish or city for more than three consecutive years, are 
declared to be regular and permanent teachers in the employ of the school 
board of that parish or city. 
17:443. Removal of teachers; procedure; right to appeal. 
A. A permanent teacher shall not be removed from office except upon 
writen and signed charges of willful neglect of duty, or incompetency, or 
dishonesty, or of being a member of or contributing to any group, 
organization, movement or corporation that is by law or injunction 
249 
LOUISANA (continued) 
prohibited from operating in the state of Louisiana, and then only if 
found guilty after a hearing by the school board of the parish or city, 
as the case may be, which hearing may be private or public, at the option 
of the teacher. At least twenty days in advance of the hearing, the 
superintendent ~o1ith approval of the school board shall furnish the 
teacher a copy of the written charges. Such statement of charges shall 
include a complete and detailed list of the specific reasons for such 
charges and shall include but not be limited to the following: date and 
place of alleged offense or offenses, names of individuals involved in or 
witnessing such offense or offenses names of witnesses called or to be 
called to testify against the teacher at said hearing, and whether or not 
any such charges previously have been brought against the teacher. The 
teacher shall have the right to appear before the board with witnesses in 
his behalf and with counsel of his selection, all of whom shall be heard 
by the board at said hearing. For the purpose of conducting hearings 
hereunder the board shall have the power to issue subpoenas to compel 
attendance of all witnesses on behalf of the teacher. Nothing herein 
contained shall impair the right of appeal to a court of competent 
jurisdiction. 
B. If a permanent teacher is found guilty by a school board, after 
due and legal hearing as provided herein, on charges of willful neglect 
of duty, or of incompetency, or dishonesty, or of being a member of or 
contributing to any group, organization, movement or corporation that is 
by law or injunction prohibited from operatiug in the state of Louisiana, 
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and ordered removed from office, or disciplined by the board, the 
superintendent with approval of the board shall furnish to the teacher a 
written statement of recommendation of removal or discipline, which shall 
include but not be limited to the exact reason(s), offense (s), or 
instance(s) upon which the recommendation is based. Such teacher may, 
not more than one year from the date of the said finding, petition a 
court of competent jurisdiction for a full hearing to review the action 
of the school board, and the court shall have jurisdiction to affirm or 
reverse the action of the school board in the matter. If the finding of 
the school board is reversed by the court and the teacher is ordered 
reinstated and restored to duty, the teacher shall be entitled to full 
pay for any loss of time or salary he or she may have sustained by reason 
of the action of the said school board. 
17:3101. Definitions. For the purposes of this chapter the following 
definitions shall apply: 
(1) "Institution of higher learning" means any state owned and 
operated college or university now or hereafter established, and includes 
all state owned and operated junior colleges and branches of such 
colleges and universities. 
17:3103. Distruptive acts defined; dismissal and notification thereof. 
Any student, member of the faculty, administrative official or other 
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employee of any institution of higher learning of this state who: 
(1) Organizes, and/or participates in, and/or holds himself out to 
be a part of any demonstration, protest, riot or other activity on or 
immediately adjacent to the grounds of any such institution, the effect 
of which is willfully to interfere with or disrupt the normal educational 
process or administration at such institution; or 
(2) Enters into any building or structure of such institution alone 
or as a member of a group, when the effect of such entry into or presence 
within the building or structure is willfully to interfere with or 
disrupt the normal educational process or administration at such 
institution; or 
(3) Willfully destroys, defaces, disfeatures, disfigures or in any 
other way damages public property on the grounds of said institution; or 
(4) Willfully fails to obey and lawful order of a peace officer or 
any person to whom is delegated the authority to act in such capacity at 
said institution; or 
(5) In any way willfully and directly aids, abets, or encourages 
any of the foregoing acts may be expelled or dismissed from such 
institution effective immediately upon written notification of explusion 
or dismissal signed by the president or his designated representative and 
delivered by registered mail at the last known address of the recipient. 
Any person so dismissed or expelled shall have the right to appeal the 
decision by which such action was taken. All appeals shall be heard by a 
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panel which shall be composed of the members of the governing authority 
of the institution of higher learning; provided however, that either or 
both of said authorities may adopt rules and regulations authorizing the 
president and the governing authority to appoint a special panel, 
composed of not less than three no more than five members of the 
governing authority, to hear any appeal presented to it, and in such case 
the decision of the special panel shall constitute the decision of the 
governing authority in the same manner and to the same extent as if the 
hearing had been before the whole membership of the governing authority. 
17:3104.· Content of notification of dismissal. The notice of expulsion 
or dismissal shall specifically set forth the ground or grounds upon 
which expulsion or dismissal is based, as well as contain a short and 
clear statement of the facts upon which the expulsion or dismissal is 
based. In addition, the noticed shall inform the recipient that he may, 
within thirty days after the date of expulsion or dismissal order, 
request a hearing before the governing authority of the particular 
institution of higher learning in which he is enrolled and/or employed. 
The hearing before the governing authority shall be held and its decision 
rendered not later than thirty days after the date of the request for 
such hearing by the individual concerned. 
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17:3105 Rules and regulation; tenure laws. The governing authority of 
the various institution may adopt rules and regulations for the conduct 
of hearings to be held under the provisions of this chapter. Nothing in 
this Sub-Part shall be construed as authorizing the dismissal of a 
teacher e"cept for the comission of any of the acts herein prohibited. 
In all other cases of dismissal of a teacher, the tenure laws of this 
state shall apply. All rules and regulations so adopted shall conform to 
the applicable provisions of Chapter 13 of Title 49 of the Louisiana 
Revised Statutes of 1950, as amended. 
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26 1021 Purpose. It is declared to be the public policy of this state 
and it is the purpose of this chapter to promote the improvement of the 
relationship between public employers and their employees by providing a 
uniform basis for recognizing the right of the University of Maine 
employees, Maine Haritime Academy employees, vocational-technical 
institute employees and state schools for practical nursing employees to 
join labor organizations of their own choosing and to be represented by 
such organizations in collective bargaining for terms and conditions of 
employment. 
26· 1030 Hearings. 
1. Conduct of hearings. Hearings conducted by the board shall be 
informal and the rules of evidence prevailing in judicial proceedings 
shall not be binding. Any and all documentary evidence and other 
evidence deemed relevant by the board may be received. 
2. Power of chairman. The chairman shall have the power to 
administer oaths and to require by supoena the attendance and testimony 
of witnesses, the presentation of books, records and other evidence 
relative or pertinent to the issues presented to the board for 
determination. Witnesses subpoenaed by the board shall be paid by the 
Treasurer of State on warrants drawn by the state controller. 
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26 1031. Scope of binding contract arbitration. A collective bargaining 
agreement between the university, the academy, the vocational-technical 
institutes or the state schools for practical nursing and a bargaining 
agent may provide for bi.nding arbitration as the final step of a 
grievance procedure but the only grievances which may be taken to such 
binding arbitration shall be disputes between the parties as to the 
meaning or application of the specific terms of collective bargaining 
agreement. 
26 1033. Review of arbitration awards. 
(1) Court review. Either party may seek a review by the Superior 
Court of a binding determination by an arbitration panel. Such review 
shall be sought in accordance with the Maine Rules of Civil Procedures, 
Rule 80B. 
(2) Determination final on questions of fact. In the absence of 
fraud, the binding determination of an arbitration panel shall be final 
upon all questions of fact. 
(3) Power of reviewing court. The court may, after consideration, 
affirm, reverse, or modify any such binding determination or decision 
based upon an erroneous ruling or finding of law. An appeal may be taken 
to the law court as in any civil action. 
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ED 16-203. Powers of board of trustees. (a) In general. In addition 
to the other powers granted and duties imposed by this title, and subject 
to the authority of the State Board for Higher Education and the State 
Board for Community Colleges, each board of community college trustees 
has the powers and duties set forth in this section. 
(d) Salaries and tenure. Each board of trustees may fix the salaires 
and tenure of the president, faculty and other employees of the community 
college. 
ED 16-504. Baltimore County collective bargaining. (a) In general. 
The board of community college trustees for Baltimore County shall: 
(1) Establish an orderly procedure for the classified employees of 
county community colleges and their representatives to participate in the 
formulation of labor relations and personnel policies; and 
(2) Recognize the right of classified employees to organize and 
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing. 
(b) Rules and regulations. The board of trustees shall adopt rules and 
regulations that specify with respect to classified employees: 
(6) The definition of a grievance and the procedure for resolving 
grievences; 
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15A 10. Powers and Duties of Boards of Trustees. Each board of trustees 
shall be responsible for establishing those policies necessary for the 
administrative management of personnel, staff services, and the general 
business of the institution under its authority, subject to the authority 
granted to the board of regents of higher education under the provision 
of this chapter. Each board shall ••• (c) appoint, transfer, dismiss, 
promote, and award tenure to all personnel of said institution, subject 
to policies promulgate or agreements entered into by the board of 
regents • . • 
lSOE 8. Grievance Procedure May Be Included in Written Agreement; 
Binding Arbitration. The parties may include in any written agreement a 
grievance procedure culminating in final and binding arbitration to be 
invoked in the event of any dispute concerning the interpretation or 
application of such written agreement. In the absence of such grievance 
procedure, binding arbitration may be ordered by the commission upon the 
request of either party; provided that any such grievance procedure 
shall, wherever applicable, be exclusive and shall supercede any 
otherwise applicable grievance procedure provided by law; and further 
provided that binding arbitration hereunder shall be enforcedable under 
the provisions of chapter one hundred and fifty C and shall, where such 
arbitration is elected by the employee as the method of grievance 
resolution be the exclusive procedure for resolving any such grievance 
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involving suspension, dismissal, removal or termination notwithstanding 
any contrary provisions of sections thirty-nine and forty-one to 
forty-five, inclusive, of chapter thirty-one, section sixteen of chapter 
thirty-two, or sections forty-two through forty-three A, inclusive, of 
chapter seventy-one. 
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15.615 (1124) Administrator or director; qualifications, term of office; 
business manager; other personnel. Sec. 124. The borad of trustees may: 
(b) Select and employ such administrative officers, teachers and 
employees and engage such services as shall be necessary to effectuate 
its purposes. 
The following is an Attorney General opinion regarding the section above: 
The board of trustees of a community college district is without 
authority to delegate to its president or other administrators the powers 
to hire and discharge Op. Atty. Gen. Jan. 20, 1981, No. 5843. 
260 
MINNESOTA 
The following s~ction refers to the state board of community colleges: 
136.62. Powers of board. 
Subd. 4. Subject to the other provisions of sections 136.62 and 136.63, 
the board shall appoint the heads of each community college, the 
necessary teachers and supervisors, and all other necessary employees. 
·All such appointed persons shall be subject to the provisions of chapter 
43A in the same manner as such state civil service act is applicable to 
similar persons in the employ of the state university board. 
43A.16. Probationary periods. 
Subdivision 1. General. All unlimited appointments to positions in the 
classified service except as provided in this subdivision shall be for a 
probationary period the duration of which shall be determined through 
collective bargaining agreements or palns established persuant to section 
43A.18 but which shall not be less than 30 days fo full-time equivalent 
service nor more than two years of full-time equivalent service. An 
appointing authority may require a probationary period for transfers, 
reemployments, reinstatements, voluntary demotions, and appointments from 
the layoff list of former employees of a different appointing authority. 
For employees in a bargaining unit as defined in section 179.741 the 
requirement of such a probationary period shall be subject to applicable 
provisions of collective bargaining agreements. 
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Subd. 2. Termination during probationary period. There is no 
presumption of continued employment during a probationary period. 
Terminations or demotions may be made at any time during the probationary 
period subject to the provisions of this section and collective 
bargaining agreements or plans established pursuant to section 43A.18. 
If during the probationary period an employee with permanent status is 
dimissed for inability to perform the duties of the new position or for 
other cause not related to misconduct or delinquency, the employee shall 
be restored to a position in the employee's former class and agency. 
43A.33. Grievances 
Subdivision 1. Discharge, suspension, demotion· for cause, salary 
decrease. Managers and employees shall attempt to resolve disputes 
through informal means prior to the initiation of disciplinary action. 
No permanent employee in the classified service shall be reprimanded, 
suspended without pay, or reduced in pay or position, except for just 
cause. 
Subd. 2. Just cause. For purposes of this section, just cause includes, 
but is not limited to, consistent failure to perform assigned duties, 
substandard performance, insubordination, and serious violation of 
written policies and procedures, provided the policies and procedures are 
applied in a uniform, nondiscriminatory manner. 
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Subd. 3. Procedures. Procedures for discipline and discharge of 
employees covered by collective bargaining agreements shall be governed 
by the agreements. Procedures for employees not covered by a collective 
bargaining agreement shall be governed by this subdivision and by the 
commissioner's and managerial plans. (a) For discharge, suspension 
without pay or reduction in pay or position, no later than the effective 
date of such action, a permanent classified employee not covered by a 
collective bargaining agreement shall be given written notice by the 
appointing authority. The written notice shall include a statement of 
the nature of the disciplinary action, the specific reasons for the 
action, the effective date of the action and a statement informing the 
employee of the employee's right to reply within five working days to the 
receipt of the notice in writing or, upon request, in person, to the 
appointing authority or the authority's designee. The notice shall also 
include a statement that the employee may appeal the action to the office 
of administrative hearings within 30 days of the effective date of the 
disciplinary action; provided, that an employee who elects to reply to 
the appointing authority may appeal to the office within ten working days 
of the receipt of the authority's response to the reply. If the 
appointing authority has not responded within 30 days of the authority's 
receipt of the employee's reply, the appointing authority shall be deemed 
to have replied unfavorably to the employee. A copy of the notice and 
the employee's reply, if any, shall be filed with the commissioner no 
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later than ten calendar days following the effective date of the 
disciplinary action. The commissioner shall have final authority to 
decide whether the appointing authority shall settle the dispute prior to 
the hearing provided under subdivision 4. 
(b) For discharge, suspension or reduction in pay or position of any 
employee serving an initial probationary period, and for noncertification 
in any subsequent probationary period, grievance procedures shall be 
provided in the plan established pursuant to section 43A.18. 
(c) Any permanent employee who is covered by a collective bargaining 
agreement may elect to appeal to the chief hearing examiner within 30 
days after the effective date of the discharge, suspension or reduction 
in pay or position if the collective bargaining agreement provides that 
option. In no event may an employee use both the procedure under this 
section and the grievance procedure available pursuant to sections 179.61 
to 179.76. 
Subd. 4. Appeals; public hearings, findings. Within ten days of receipt 
of the employee's written notice of appeal, the chief hearing examiner 
shall assign a hearing examiner to hear the appeal. 
The hearing shall be conducted pursuant to the contested case provisions 
of chapter 14 and the procedural rules adopted by the chief hearing 
examiner. If the hearing examiner finds, based on the hearing record, 
that the action appealed was not taken by the appointing authority for 
just cause, the employee shall be reinstated to his position, or an equal 
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position in another division within the same agency, without loss of pay. 
If the hearing examiner finds that there exists sufficient grounds for 
institution of the appointing authority's action but the hearing record 
extablishes extenuating circumstances, the examiner may reinstate the 
employee, with full, partial, or no pay, or may modify the appointing 
authority's action. The hearing examiner's order shall be the final 
decision, but it may be appealed according to the provisions of sections 
14.63 to 14.68. Settlement of the entire dispute by mutual agreement is 
encouraged at any state of the proceedings. Any settlement agreement 
shall be final and binding when signed by all parties and submitted to 
the chief hearing examiner of the office of administrative hearings. 
Except as provided in collective bargaining agreements the appointing 
authority shall bear the costs of the hearing examiner for hearings 
provided for in this section. 
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37-29-63. Powers of the president. The president of any junior college 
shall have the power to recommend to the board of trustees all teachers 
to be employed in the district. He may remove or suspend any member of 
the faculty subject to the approval of the trustees ••• 
37-29-211. Instructors, professors and other teachers shall file 
affidavit as to membership in organizations. No instructor, professor or 
other teacher shall be employed or elected in any junior college 
supported wholly or in part by public funds, by the trustees or governing 
authority thereof unit, as a condition precedent to such employment, such 
instructor, professor, or other teacher shall have filed with such board 
of trustees or governing authority an affidavit as to the names and 
addresses of all incorporated and/or unincorporated associations and 
organizations of which such instructor, professor, or other teacher is 
presently paying, or within the last five years has paid, regular dues or 
to which the same is making, or within the past five years, has made 
regular contributions. 
37-29-215. Contracts of employment are void for failure to file 
affidavit. Any contract entered into by any board of trustees of any 
junior college supported wholly or in part by public funds, or by any 
governing authority thereof with any instructor, professor, or other 
instructional personnel, who shall not have filed the affidavit required 
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in section 37-29-211 prior to the employment or election of such person 
and prior to the making of such contracts, shall be null and void and no 
funds shall be paid under said contract to such instructor, professor, or 
other instructional personnel • • • 
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178.860. Board to appoint employees - fix compensation - teachers to be 
members of public school retirement system. The board of trustees shall 
appoint the employees of the junior college, define and assign their 
powers and duties and fix their compensation. All certificated personnel 
shall be members of the state public school retirement system of Missouri 
under provisions of section 169.010, R S Mo. 
The following Attorney General opinion refers to the above section: 
Junior colleges organized pursuant to the provisions of 178.770 et. seg. 
are not subject to the provisions of the teacher tenure act, 168.102 et. 
seg. Op. Atty. Gen. No. 59, Ryen, 3-17-70. 
In spite of the above attorney general opinion the courts have held that 
the tenure act does apply. 
168.114. Board may terminate, grounds for. 1. An indefinite contract 
with a permanent teacher shall not be terminated by the board of 
education of a school district except for one or more of the following 
causes: 
(1) Physical or mental condition unfitting him to instruct or associate 
with children; 
(2) Immoral conduct; 
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(3) In competency, inefficiency of in subordination in the line of duty; 
(4) Willful or persistent violation of, or failure to obey, the school 
laws of the state or the published regulations of the board of education 
of the school district employing him; 
(5) Excessive or unreasonable absence from performance of duties; or 
(6) Conviction of a felony or a crime involving moral turpitude. 
2. In determining the professional competency or efficiency of a 
permanent teacher, consideration should be given to regular and 
special evaluation reports prepared in accordance with the policy 
of the employing school district and to any written standards of 
performance which may have been adopted by the school board. 
168.116. Termination by board-notice-charges. 1. The indefinite 
contract of a permanent teacher may not be terminated by the board of 
education until after service upon the teacher of written charges 
specifying with particularity the grounds alleged to exist for 
termination of such contract, notice of a hearing on charges and a 
hearing by the board of education on charges if requested by the teacher. 
2. At least thirty days before service of notice of charges of 
incompetency, inefficiency, or insubordination in the line of duty, the 
teacher shall be given by the school board or the superintendent of 
schools warning in writing, stating specifically the causes which, if not 
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removed, may result in charges. Thereafter, both the superintendent, or 
his designated representative, and the teacher shall meet and confer in 
an effort to resolve the matter. 
3. Notice of a hearing upon charges, together with a copy of charges, 
shall be served on the permanent teacher at least twenty days prior to 
the date of the hearing. The notice and copy of the charges may be 
served upon the teacher by certified mail with personal delivery 
addressed to him at his last known address. If the teacher or his agent 
does not within ten days after receipt of the notice request a hearing on 
the charges, the board of education may, by a majority vote, order the 
contract of the teacher terminated. If a hearing is requested by either 
the teacher or the board of education, it shall take place not less than 
twenty nor more than thirty days after notice of a hearing has been 
furnished the permanent teacher. 
4. On the filing of charges in accordance with this section, the board 
of education may suspend the teacher from active performance of duty 
until a decision is rendered by the board of education but the teacher's 
salary shall be continued during such suspension. If a decision to 
terminate a teacher's employment by the board of education is appealed, 
and the decision is reversed, the teacher shall be paid his salary lost 
during the pending of the appeal. 
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168.118. Termination hearing, procedure, costs. If a hearing is 
requested on the termination of an indefinite contract it shall be 
conducted by the board of education in accordance with the follm-ling 
provisions: 
(1) The hearing shall be public; 
(2) Both the teacher and the person filing charges may be represented by 
counsel who may cross-examine witnesses; 
(3) Testimony at hearings shall be on oath or affirmation administered 
by the president of the board of education, who for the purpose of 
hearings held under sections 168.102 to 168.130 shall have·the authority 
to administer oaths; 
(4) The school board shall have the power to subpoena witnesses and 
documentary evidence as provided in section 536.077 RSMo, and shall do so 
on its own motion or at the request of the teacher against whom charges 
have been made. The school board shall hear testimony of all witnesses 
names by the teacher; however, the school board may limit the numer of 
witnesses to be subpoenaed on behalf of the teacher to not more than ten; 
(5) The board of education shall employ a stenographer who shall make a 
full record of the proceedings of the hearings and who shall, within ten 
days after the conclusion thereof, furnish the board of education and the 
teacher, at no cost to the teacher, with a copy of the transcript of the 
record, which shall be certified by the stenographer to be complete and 
correct. The transcript shall not be open to public inspection, unless 
the hearing on the termination of the contract was an open hearing or if 
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an appeal from the decision of the board is taken by the teacher; 
(6) All costs of the hearing shall be paid by the school board except 
the cost of counsel for the teacher; 
(7) The decision of the board of education resulting in the demotion of 
a permanent teacher or the termination of an indefinite contract shall be 
by a majority vote of the members of the board of education and the 
decision shall be made within seven days after the transcript is 
furnished them. A written copy of the decision shall be furnished the 
teacher within three days thereafter. 
168.120. Appeal by teacher, procedure. 1. The teacher shall have the 
right to appeal from the decision of the board of education to the 
circuit court of the county where the employing school district is 
located. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen days after service of 
a copy of the decision of the board of education upon the teacher, and if 
an appeal is not taken within the time, then the decision of the board of 
education shall become final. 
2. The appeal may be taken by filing notice of appeal with the board of 
education where upon the board of education, under its certificate shall 
forward to the court all documents and papers on file in the matter, 
together with a transcript of the evidence, the findings and the decision 
of the board of education, which shall thereupon become the record of the 
cause. Such appeal shall be heard as provided in chapter 536, RSMo. 
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3. Appeals from the circuit court shall be allowed in the same manner as 
in civil actions, except that the original transcript prepared and filed 
in the circuit court by the board of education, together with a 
.transcript of the proceedings had in the circuit court, shall constitute 
the transcript on appeal in the appellate court. The board of education 
shasll make available, to the parties, copies of any transcript prepared 
and filed by it in the circuit court and upon final determination of the 
cause in the appellate court the originai record of the board of 
education filed as part of the transcript on appeal shall be certified 
back to the board of education by the appellate court. In all appeals 
from the board of education or circuit court the costs thereof shall be 
assessed against the losing party as provided by law in civil cases. All 
appeals to the circuit court and appellate courts shall have precedence 
over all cases except election contests. 
4. If the circuit court finds for the teacher, he shall be restored to 
permanent teacher status and shall receive compensation for the period 
during which he may have been suspended from work, and such other relief 
as may be granted by the court. 
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20-15-225. Powers and duties of trustees. (1) The trustees of a 
community college district shall, subject to supervision by the board of 
regents: (h) appoint and dismiss a president and faculty for the 
community college; appoint and dismiss any other necessary officers, 
agents and employees; fix their compensation; and set the terms and 
conditions of their employment; 
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79-1254.02. Teachers and school nurses; contract; renewed; exceptions; 
amend or terminate; notice; hearing; decision. The contracts of the 
teaching staff and school nurses employed by the governing board of any 
state technical community college, educational service unit, or any 
educational program administered by the State Department of Education, 
the Department of Public Institutions, or any political subdivision of 
the state, except a Class I, II, III, or IV school district, those 
colleges governed by the Board of Trustees of the Nebraska State 
Colleges, and any university governed by the Board of Regents of the 
University of Nebraska, shall require the sanction of a majority of the 
members of such governing board. Except as provided in section 
79-1254.09, each such contract shall be deemed renewed and in force and 
effect until a majority of the board votes, sixty days before the close 
of the contract period, to amend or terminate the contract for just 
cause. The secretary of the board shall notify each teacher or school 
nurse in writing at least ninety days before the close of the contract 
period of any conditions of unsatisfactory performance or a reduction in 
teaching staff that the board considers may be just cause to either amend 
or terminate the contract for the ensuing year. Any teacher or school 
nurse so notified shall have the right to file within five days of 
receipt of such notice a written request with the board for a hearing 
before the board. Upon receipt of such request, the board shall order 
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the hearing to be held within ten days and shall give written notice of 
the time and place of the hearing to the teacher or school nurse. At the 
hearing, evidence shall be presented in support of the reasons given for 
considering amendment or termination of the contract, and the teacher or 
school nurse shall be permitted to produce evidence related thereto. The 
board shall render the decision to amend or terminate a contract based on 
evidence produced at the hearing. 
79-1254-03. Teachers; contract; minimum standard. Sections 79-1254.02 
and 791254.03 shall be construed as providing a mininum standard and not 
as repealing any law of a governing authority that provides for 
additional contract rights pertaining to the same subject matter. 
79-1254.05. Board of education; reduction in force policy; adopt; 
requirements. Prior to January 1, 1979, every board of education or 
governing board of any educational institution in Nebraska covered by the 
provisions of sections 79-1254 to 79-1262, shall adopt a reduction in 
force policy covering employees subject to such statutory provisions to 
carry out the intent of sections 79-1254.05 to 79-1254.08. No such 
policy shall allow the reduction of a permanent or tenured employee while 
a probationary employee is retained to render a service which such 
permanent employee is qualified by reason of certification and 
endorsement to perform or where certification is not applicable, by 
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reason of college credits in the teacher area. If employee evaluation is 
to be included as a criterion to be used for reduction in force, specific 
criteria, such a frequency of evaluation, evaluation forms, and number 
and length of classroom observations shall be included as part of the 
reduction in force policy. 
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396.111. Community Colleges' Probation System for professional 
employees~ The board of regents shall adopt and promulgate regulations 
establishing a system of probation for the professional employees of the 
community colleges of the University of Nevada System. The regulations 
must provide for a probationary period of such length as the board deems 
appropriate. 
In the following sections "board of regents" refers to the state board. 
396.315. Community Colleges: Dismissal system for professional 
employees. The board of regents shall adopt and promulgate regulations 
establishing a fair dismissal system for the professional employees of 
the community colleges who have completed probation as required by the 
board pursuant to NRS 396.311. The regulations must provide that no 
professional employee ~1ho has successfully completed his probationary 
period is subject to termination or nonrenewal of his contract except for 
good cause shown. The regulations must specify what constitutes good 
cause for such termination or nonrenewal of contract, and must include 
provisions for: 
1. Adequate notice; 
2. A hearing to determine whether good cause exists, to be held 
before an impartial hearing officer or hearing committee 
selected in a manner provided by the board; and 
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3. Opportunity for review of the decision of the hearing officer or 
hearing committee, in any case involving termination or 
nonrenewal of the contract of a professional employee who has 
completed probation. 
396.320. Causes for dismissal, removal of certain personnel. 
1. The willful neglect or failure on the part of any teacher, 
instructor, professor, president or chancellor in the University of 
Nevada System to observe and carry out the requirements of this chapter 
shall be sufficient cause for the dismissal or removal of such person 
from his position. 
2. It shall be sufficient cause for the dismissal of any teacher, 
instructor, professor, president or chancellor in the University of 
Nevada System when such person advocates, overthrow of the Government of 
the United States or of any state by force, violence or other unlawful 
means. 
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The two year college organization of New Hampshire was established by 
statute in 1983. The following section deals with the formation of 
personnel policies for that organization: 
188-F:13. Instructional Personnel. The board of governers shall conduct 
an examination of existing state personnel policies, rules and laws and 
the manner in which they apply to instructional personnel of the 
department. The board shall, by January 1, 1985, submit a report to the 
general court detailing modifications in those policies needed to make 
them appropriate for instructional personnel. The report shall include 
recommendations for legislative or other action to make such 
modifications. In its review, the board shall seek the assistance of the 
department of personnel and representatives of the instructional 
personnel of the post secondary technical institutions. 
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18A:60-l. Tenure. The services of all professors, associate professors, 
assistant professors, instructors, supervisors, registrars, teachers, and 
other persons employed in a teaching capacity, who are or shall hereafter 
to be employed, by the commissioner, in the Marie H. Katzenbach school 
for the deaf or in any other educational institution, or employed in any 
state college, or in any count college, shall be under tenure during good 
behavior and efficiency: 
a. after the expiration of a period of employment of three 
consecutive calendar years in any such institution or 
institutions; or 
b. after employment for three consecutive years with employment 
at the beginning of the next succeeding academic year in any 
such institution or institutions; or 
c. after employment in any such institution or institutions, within 
a period of any four consecutive academic years, for the 
equivalent of more than three academic years. 
An academic year, for the purpose of this section, means the period 
between the time school opens in the institution after the general summer 
vacation until the next succeeding summer vacation. 
18A: 60-2. Dismissal and reduction in salary. No such professor, 
associate professor, assistant professor, instructor, supervisor, 
registrar, teacher, or other person employed in a teaching capacity, so 
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under tenure, shall be dismissed or subjected to a reduction in salary 
except for inefficiency, in capacity, conduct unbecoming a teacher, or 
other just cause, and only in the manner prescribed by sub article B or 
article 2 of chapter 6 in this title. 
18A:60-6. This act shall be known and may be cited as "The State and 
County College Tenure Act." 
18A:60-7. Definitions. As used in this act, the following words and 
phrases shall have the following meaning: 
a. "Academic rank" means instructor, assistant professor, associate 
professor and professor. 
b. "Faculty member" means any full time member of the teacher staff 
appointed with academic rank. Pursuant to rules promulgated by 
the State Board of Higher Education, other full time 
professional persons shall be considered faculty members if they 
concurrently hold academic rank. 
18A:60-8. Tenure in academic rank; conditions. Faculty members shall be 
under tenure in their academic rank, but not in any administrative 
position, during good behavior, efficiency and satisfactory professional 
performance, as evidenced by formal evaluation and shall not be dismissed 
or reduced in compensation except for inefficiency, unsatisfactory 
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professional performance, incapacity, or other just cause and then only 
in the manner prescribed by sub article B of article 2 of chapter 6 of 
title 18A of the New Jersey Statutes, after employment in such college or 
by such board of trustees for 
a. 5 consecutive calendar years; or 
b. 5 consecutive academic years, with employment at the beginning 
of the next academic year; or 
c. the equivalent of more than 5 academic years within a period of 
any 6 consecutive academic years. 
18A: 60-9. Tenure by exceptional action after 2 years service. 
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 3 of this act a board of 
trustees may, as an exceptional action and upon the recorded two-thirds 
majority roll call vote of all its members and upon the recommendation of 
the president, grant tenure to an individual faculty member after the 
employment in such college or by such board of trustees for 2 consecutive 
academic years. The provisions of this section shall not be negotiable 
as a term and condition of employment under the "New Jersey 
Employer-Employee Relations Act", P.L. 1968, c 303. 
18A:6-18. Dismissal, reduction and compensation of persons under tenure 
in schools and institutions of higher learning. No professor, associate 
professor, assistant professor, instructor, supervisor, registrar, 
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teacher or other persons employed in a teaching capacity, in any state 
college, county college, or industrial school who is under tenure during 
good behavior and efficiency shall be dismissed or subject to reduction 
of salary, except for inefficiency, incapacity, conduct unbecoming a 
techer, or other just cause written charge of the cause or causes 
preferred against an individual shall be signed by the person or persons 
making the same and filed with the board of trustees of said college or 
school. Upon determination that the matter is a contested case, the 
board shall assign the matter for hearing and initial decision either to 
a subcommittee of three of its members or to the Office Administrative 
Law. A final decision shall be rendered by the full board of trustees. 
The person charged may be represented by counsel at all times and have 
compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses to testify 
therein as provided by law. Appeals from a decision of the board of 
trustees shall be made on the record to the Chancellor of Higher 
Education. Contested case hearing shall be conducted under rules and 
regulations established pursuant to 11The Administrative Procedure Act11 , 
P.L. 1968, c. 410 (C. 52:14B-1 et seg.) and P.L. 1978, c. 67 (C.52:14F-1 
et eg.) 
18A:6-18.1. Charge against suspended person not determined within 180 
days; payment of salary. If any tenured professor, associate professor, 
assistant professor, instructor, supervisor, registrar, teacher or other 
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person employed in a teaching capacity or any other tenured officer or 
employee in any state college, county college, or industrial school or 
any other officer of employee of the college or school who is subject to 
dismissal only in the manner prescribed by sub article B of article 2 of 
chapter 6 of Title 18A of the New Jersey Statutes, is suspended pending 
the determination of any charge against him, other than for indictment 
under the laws of the United States or the State of New Jersey, and 
should the determination of the charge not be made within'l80 days after 
it is filed with the board of trustees of said college or school, 
excluding all delays which are granted at the result of such person, the 
full salary (except for said 180 days) of such person shall be paid 
beginning on the 18lst day until a determination by the board of trustees 
is made. If the charge is dismissed, the person shall be reinstated 
immediately with full pay from the first day of the suspension. If the 
charge is dismissed and the suspension is continued during an appeal 
therefrom, then the person's full pay or salary shall continue until the 
determination of the appeal. However, the board of trustees shall deduct 
from the full pay or salary any sums received by way of pay or salary 
from any substituted employment assumed during the period of suspension. 
If the charge is sustained on the original hearing or an appeal 
therefrom, and the determination is appealed, then the salary suspension 
may be continued, reinstituted or instituted unless and until the 
determination is reversed, in which event the suspended person shall be 
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reinstated immediately with full pay as of the time of suspension. If 
the charges are sustained, the employer may recover any salary which was 
paid to the employee during the period of suspension. 
18A:6-20. The right to testify; counsel; witnessess; compulsory process. 
Any party to any dispute or controversy or charged therein, may be 
represented by counsel at any hearing held in or concerning the satne and 
shall have the right to testify, and produce witnesses to testify on his 
behalf and cross-examine witnesses produced against him, and to have 
compulsory process by subpoena to compel the attendance of witnesses to 
testify and to produce books and documents in such hearing when issued by 
(a) the president of the board of education, if the hearing is to be held 
before such board, or (b) the commissioner, if the hearing is to be held 
before him or on his behalf, or (c) the president and secretary of the 
state board, if the hearing is to be held before such board or before one 
of its committees, or (d) the chairman of the board of trustees of the 
state or county college or industrial school, if the hearing is to be 
held before such board, or (e) the chairman and secretary of the higher 
education board, if the hearing is to be held before such board or before 
one of its committee or before the chancellor. 
The subpoena shall be served in the same manner as subpoenas issued 
out of the superior court are served. 
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18A:6-25. Decisions in controversies and disputes. The determination of 
any controversy or dispute shall be made within 60 days after the close 
of the hearing and shall be in the form of a written decision which shall 
contain findings of facts upon which the determination is based, which 
shall be filed in the office of the commissioner and a copy of the 
decision shall be served upon the parties to the dispute, pursuant to 
rules made by the state board, and any such decision shall be binding 
unless and until reversed upon appeal. 
18A:6-27. Appeals. Any party aggrieved by any determination of the 
commissioner may appeal from his determination to the state board. 
Any party aggrieved by any determination of a board of trustees of 
any state college, county college or industrial school may appeal such 
determination to the chancellor. 
Any party aggrieved by any determination of the chancellor may 
appeal from such determination to the board of higher education. 
18A: 6-28. Appeals; how taken. An appeal to the state board of higher 
education shall be taken in the manner prescribed by rules of the 
respective board, within 30 days after the decision appealed from is 
filed, and such board shall have power to hear and determine any such 
appeal. 
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18A:6-29. Conduct of hearing on appeal to the state board or the board 
of higher education. The state board or the board of higher education 
may refer to the hearing of any appeal, taken to it in the manner 
pursuant to law, to a committee of not less than three of its members, 
which committee shall hear the same and report thereon, recommending its 
conclusions, to the board and the board shall thereupon decide the appeal 
by resolution in open meeting. 
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21-14-2. Establishment authorized; board; determination of need; 
agreements. 
D. If need is established, the board, in accordance with the board of 
educational finance criteria for initiating a branch community college 
program, shall consult with the board of regents of the higher education 
institution selected to be the parent institution, and if the board and 
the board of regents agree to conduct a branch community college in the 
area, they shall transmit a proposal to establish a branch community 
college to the board of educational finance. The board of educational 
finance shall evaluate the need and shall notify the board and the board 
of regents of approval or disapproval of the proposal. 
E. If the proposal is approved, the board and the board of regents of 
the parent instituion shall enter into a written agreement which shall 
include provisions for: 
(1) the higher education institutions to have full authority and 
responsibility in relation to all academic matters; 
(4) the cooperative use of facilities and teaching staff; 
(5) consideration of applications of local qualified people before 
employing teachers of the local school system • • • 
21-1-7. [Removal of president or faculty members; trial; compensation of 
secretary-treasurer restricted.] No president or member of the faculty of 
any state educational institution shall be removed during the term for 
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which he is selected, or appointed, except for cause, after trial by the 
board of regents or his institution, and that no secretary or treasurer 
of any such institution shall receive any compensation as such secretary 
and treasurer, or either. 
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6306. Administration of community colleges - board of trustees. 
2. The board of trustees of each community college shall appoint a 
president for the college, subject to approval by the state univeristy 
trustees, and it shall appoint or delegate to the president the 
appointment of other members of the staff. The staff of a community 
college shall consist of the professional service and the 
non-professional service. The professional service shall include 
positions requiring the performance of educational functions in 
agriculture, home economics, liberal and applied medicine, dentistry, 
nursing, academic administration, library service, student activities, 
student personnel services, and other professions required to carry on 
the work of the community colleges • • • 
In a court decision related to the above section, the section was 
interpreted as giving the trustees the power to delegate employee 
dismissal to the president. (Charles v. Onondage Community College, 
1979, 69 A.D. 2d, 418 N.Y.S. 2d. 718, appeal dismissed 48 N.Y. 2d. 650, 
421 N.Y.S. 2d. 200, 396 N.E. 2d. 482. 
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llSD-20. Powers and duties of trustees. The trustees of each 
institution shall constitute the local administrative board of such 
institution, with such powers and duties as are provided in this Chapter 
and as are delegated to it by the State Board of Community Colleges. The 
powers and duties of the trustees shall include the following: 
(2) To elect or employ all other personnel of the institution upon 
nomination by the president or chief administrative officer, subject to 
standards established by the State Board of Community Colleges. Trustees 
may delegate the authority of employing such other personnel to its 
president or chief administrative officer. 
(7) To perform such other acts and do such other things as may be 
necessary or proper for the exercise of the foregoing specific powers, 
including the adoption of rules, regulations and bylaws for the 
government and operation of the institution under this chapter and for 
the discipline students • 
. The following attorney general opinion refers to the above section: 
Chapter 115D of the General Statutes does not give the board of trustees 
of a community college authority to enact a tenure policy ••• N.C.G.S. 
llSD-20 delegates specific powers and duties to the boards of trustees of 
community colleges. Those powers do not include the authority to adopt a 
tenure system. To be sure, the powers and duties of the trustees include 
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the power to elect or employ personnel for the institution upon 
nomination by the president or chief administrative officer. N.C.G.S. 
115D-20(2). Moreover, the trustees are empowered to perform such other 
acts and do such other things as may be necessary or proper for the 
exercise of their power of employment. N.C.G.S. 115D-20(7). But simple 
power to employ, in the opinion of this Office, does not include the 
power to establish a system of tenure. That power does not exist by 
implication. Op. Atty. Gen. Vol. 15, No. 2, R Edminston, 1982. 
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15-10-01.1. Board of higher education to assume jurisdiction over junior 
colleges and off-campus education centers. The state board of higher 
education shall assume jurisdiction over each junior college that was 
established under chapter 15-18 and in existence on January 1, 1983 
15-10-17. Specific powers and duties of the board of higher education. 
The state board of higher education shall have all the powers and perform 
all the duties necessary to the control and management of the institution 
described in this chapter, including the following: 
1. To appoint and remove the president or other faculty head, and the 
professors, instructors, teachers, officers and other employees of the 
several institutions under its control, and to fix their salaries within 
the limits of legislative appropriations therefor, and to fix the terms 
of office and to prescribe the duties thereof, provided that the 
consideration of this appointment or removal of any such personnel shall 
be in executive session if the board chooses unless the person or persons 
involved request that the meeting shall be open to other persons of the 
public. 
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3354.09. Powers of board. The board of trustees of a community college 
district may: 
(D) Appoint the administrative officers, faculty and staff necessary and 
proper for such community college, and fix their compensation in 
instances in which the board of trustees has delegated such powers to a 
college or university operating such community college pursuant to a 
contract entered into by the board of trustees of the district; 
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70 4405. Powers and duties of the board. The governing board of a 
community junior college shall ·have the supervision, management, and 
control of the community junior college, and shall have the following 
additional specific powers and duties; 
a. Adopt such rules and regulations as it deems necessary to govern the 
community college. 
b. Employ and fix the compensation and duties of such personnel as it 
deems necessary for the operation of the community junior college; and 
establish appropriate policies for retirement, group insurance, and other 
staff benefits as provided for employees of other public colleges in 
Oklahoma. 
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341-290. General powers. The board of education of a community college 
district shall be responsible for the general supervision and control of 
any and all community college operated by the district. Consistent with 
any applicable rules of the State Board of Education, the board may: 
(1) Subject to ORS Chapter 237, employ administrative officers, 
professional personnel and other employees, define their duties, terms 
and conditions of employment and prescribe compensation therefor, 
pursuant to ORS 243.650 to 243.782. 
PENNSYLVANIA 
No statutory provision for hiring, tenure or dismissal of community 
college faculty exists. 
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16-31-5. Capacity and general powers of board - Succession to other 
agencies - Said board shall be and is hereby constituted a public 
corporation, and is empowered to sue and be sued in its own name, to have 
a corporate seal, and to exercise all powers usually appeartaining to the 
public corporations entrusted with the control of state institutions of 
higher education. Said board is hereby invested with legal title in 
trust for the state to all property, real and personal, now publicly 
owned for the use of the University of Rhode Island and the system of 
Rhodes Island junior colleges, including all departments, division and 
branches thereof. Said board is empowered to hold and operate said 
property in trust for the state; to acquire, hold and dispose of said 
property and other property as deemed necessary for the best execution of 
its corporate purposes; to employ presidents, professors, instructors, 
and other employees, and to determine their salaries; to authorize 
establish, or otherwise provide for retirement plans or programs for such 
employees and the making of contributions to said plans or programs, --
to enact by-law for its own government and regulations for the government 
of the institutions under its control • • • 
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59-55-50, Powers of State Department of Education over junior colleges. 
The State Department of Education shall have the same supervision, 
control and powers over any such junior college, when established 
hereunder, as it now has over the other departments of the public school 
system of this state. 
59-55-40. Requirements for establishment and maintenance. 
(4) A junior college shall be a public school providing one or more 
two-year courses beyond the eleventh year of the public school course and 
it shall be located in a school district which maintains an accredited 
high school and employs a junior college dean and at least the equivalent 
of two junior college teachers who, together with the superintendent, 
shall constitute the faculty of the junior college; 
(7) The superintendent of the college shall examine the certification of 
all persons under consideration as teachers in the junior college and 
recommend for employment only such persons as are found to be fully 
qualified in accordance with the standards established by the State Board 
of Education and he shall also keep a record of such certification and, 
on or before October first of each year, shall transmit a copy of this 
record to the State Department of Education. 
59-1-130. "Teacher" means any person who is employed either full time or 
part time by any school district either to teach or to supervise 
teaching, 
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59-25-410. Notification of employment for ensuing yenr; notification of 
assignment. On or before April fifteenth of each year, the boards of 
trustees of the several school districts shall decide and notify, in 
writing, the teachers, as defined in 59-1-130 of the 1976 Code, in their 
employ concerning their employment for the ensuing year. If the board, 
or the person designated by it, fails to notify a teacher who has been 
employed by a school district for a majority of the current school year 
of his status for the ensuing year, the teacher shall be deemed to be 
reemployed for the ensuing year and the board shall issue a contract to 
such teacher as though the board had reemployed such teacher in the usual 
manner. Notices of intent not to renew an employment contract shall be 
given in writing no later than April fifteenth of each year. 
On or before August fifteenth the superintendent, principal where 
applicable, or supervisor shall notify the teacher of his tenative 
assignment for the ensuing school year. 
This section shall not apply to any teacher whose contract of 
employment is under appeal under 59-25-450. 
59-25-420. Teacher required to notify board of acceptance; opportunity 
for hearing if not reemployed. Any teacher who is reemployed by written 
notification pursuant to 59-25-410 shall by April twenty-fifth first 
notify the board of trustees in writing of his acceptance of the 
contract. Failure on the part of the teacher to notify the board of 
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acceptance within the specified time limit shall be conclusive evidence 
of the teacher's rejection of the contract. 
Any teacher receiving notice that he will not be reemployed for the 
ensuing year, shall have the same notice and opportunity for a hearing 
provided in subsequent sections for teachers dismissed for cause during 
the school year. 
59-25-430. Dismissal of teachers; grounds; opportunity for hearing; 
suspension pending resolution of charges. Any teacher may be dismissed 
at any time who shall fail, or who may be incompetent, to give 
instruction in accordance with the directions of the superintendent, or 
who shall otherwise manifest an evidence unfitness for teacher; provided 
however, that notice and an opportunity shall be afforded for a hearing 
prior to any dismissal. Evident unfitness for teaching is manifested by 
conduct such as, but not limited to, the following: persistent neglect of 
duty, willful violation of rules and regulations of district board of 
trustees, drunkenness, conviction of a violation of the law of this state 
or the United States, gross immorality dishonesty, illegal use, sale or 
possession of drugs or narcotics. 
Notwithstanding the provisions of 59-25-450, when any teacher is 
charged with a violation of the law of this state or the United States 
which upon conviction may lead to, or be cited as a reason for, 
dismissal, such teacher may be suspended pending resolution of the 
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charges and receive his usual compensation during the suspension period, 
such compensation not to exceed the term of his teaching contract. If 
the teacher is convicted, including pleading guilty or nolo contendere to 
the charges, he may then be subject to dismissal proceedings. If no 
conviction results, his suspension shall be terminated. 
59-25-440. Written notice to teacher of possible dismissal; school 
administrator required to make reasonable effort to assist teacher in 
corrective measures; reasonable time for improvement required. Whenever 
a superior, principal, where applicable, or supervisor charged with the 
supervision of a teacher finds it necessary to admonish a teacher for a 
reason that he believes may lead to, or be cited as a reason for, 
dismissal or cause the teacher not to be reemployed he shall: (1) bring 
the matter in writing to the attention of the teacher involved and make a 
reasonable effort to assist the teacher to correct whatever appears to be 
the cause of potential dismissal or failure to be reemployed and, 
(2) except as provided in 59-25-450, allow reasonable time for 
improvement. 
59-25-450. Suspension of teachers; reinstatement. Whenever a 
superintendent has reason to believe that cause exists for the dismissal 
of a teacher and when he is of the opinion that the immediate suspension 
of the teacher is necessary to protect the well-being of the children of 
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the district or is necessary to remove substantial and material 
disruptive influences in the educational process, in the best interest of 
the children in the district, the superintendent may suspend the teacher 
without a hearing. The superintendent shall notify the teacher in 
writing of the suspension. Such written notice shall include the cause 
for suspension and the fact that a hearing before the board is available 
to the teacher upon request provided such request is made in writing 
within fifteen days as prescribed by 59-25-470. 
The salary of a suspended teacher shall cease as of the date the 
board sustains the suspension. If sufficient grounds for suspension 
are not subsequently found, the teacher shall be reinstated without loss 
of compensation. 
59-25-460. Notice of dismissal; conduct of hearing. No teacher shall be 
dismissed unless written notice specifying the cause of dismissal is 
first given to the teacher by the District Board of Trustees and an 
opportunity for a hearing has been afforded the teacher. Such written 
notice shall include the fact that a hearing before the board is 
available to the teacher upon written request provided, such request is 
made in writing within fifteen days as prescribed by 59-25-470'. Any such 
hearing shall be public unless the teacher requested in writing that it 
be private. The District Board of Trustees may issue subpoenas requiring 
the attendance of witnesses at any hearing and, at the request of the 
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teacher against whom a charge is made, shall issue such subpoenas, but it 
may limit the number of witnesses to be subpoenaed in behalf of the 
teacher to not more than ten. All testimony at any hearing shall be 
taken under oath. Any member of the board may administer oaths to 
witnesses. The board shall cause a record of the proceedings to be kept 
and shall employ a competent reporter to take stenographic or stenotype 
notes of all of the testimony. If the board's decision is favorable to 
the teacher, the board shall pay the cost of the reporter's attendance 
and services at the hearing. If the decision is unfavorable to the 
teacher, one-half of the cost of the reporter's attendance and services 
shall be borne by the teacher. Either party desiring a transcript of the 
hearing shall pay for the costs thereof. 
59-25-470. Request for hearing; time and place of hearing; rights of 
teacher; determination by board. Within fifteen days after receipt of 
notice of suspension or dismissal, a teacher may serve upon the chairman 
of the board or the superintendent a written request for a hearing before 
the board. If a teacher fails to make such a request, or after a hearing 
as herein provided for, the District Board of Trustees shall take such 
action and shall enter such order as it deems lawful and appropriate. 
The hearing shall be held by the board not less than ten nor more than 
fifteen days after the request is served, and a notice of the time and 
place of the hearing shall be given the teacher not less than five days 
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prior to the date of the hearing. The teacher has the privilege of being 
present at the hearing with counsel and of cross-examining witnesses and 
may for offer evidence and witnesses and may present any and all defenses 
to the charges. The board shall order the appearance of any witness 
requested by the teacher. The complainants shall initiate the 
introduction of evidence in substantiation of the charges. Within ten 
days following the hearing, the board shall determine whether the 
evidence showed good and just cause for the notice of suspension or 
dismissal and shall render its decision accordingly, either affirming or 
withdrawing the notice of suspension or dismissal. 
59-25-480. Appeals; costs and damages. The decision of the district 
board of trustees shall be final, unless within thirty days thereafter an 
appeal is made to the court of common pleas of any county in which the 
major portion of such district lies. 
Notice of such appeal and the grounds thereof shall be filed with 
the district board of trustees. The district board shall, within thirty 
days thereafter, file a certified copy of the transcript record with the 
clerk of such court. Any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from the 
court of common pleas in the same manner as provided by law for appeals 
from the circuit court to the Supreme Court. If the decision of the 
board is reversed on appeal, on a motion of either party the trial court 
shall order reinstatement and shall determine the amount for which the 
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board shall be liable for actual damages and the court costs. In no 
event shall any liability extend beyond two years from the effective date 
of dismissal. Amounts earned or amounts earnable with reasonable 
diligence by the person wrongfully suspended shall be deducted from any 
back pay. 
59-25-490. Depositions. Any part to such preceedings may cause to be 
taken the depositions of witnesses within or without th£ state and either 
by commission or de bene esse. Such depositions shall be taken in 
accordance with the subject to the same provisions, conditions and 
restrictions as apply to the taking of like depositions in civil actions 
at law in the court of common pleas; and the same rules with respect to 
the giving of notice to the opposite party, the taking and transcribing 
of testimony, the transmission and certification thereof and matters of 
practice relating thereto shall apply. 
59-25-500. Service of subpoenas; witness fees. The county sheriffs and 
their respective deputies shall serve all subpoenas of the district board 
and shall receive the same fees as are now provided by law for like 
service. Each witness who appears in obedience to such subpoenas shall 
receive for attendance the fees and mileage of witnesses in civil cases 
in courts of the county in which the hearing is held. 
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59-25-530. Unprofessional conduct; breach of contract. Any teacher who 
fails to comply with the provisions of this contract without the written 
consent of the school board shall be deemed guilty of unprofessional 
conduct. A breach of contract resulting from the execution of an 
employment contract with another board within the State without the 
consent of the board first employing the teacher makes void any 
subsequent contract with any other school district in South Carolina for 
the same employment period. Upon formal complaint of the school board, 
substantiated by conclusive evidence, the State board shall suspend or 
revoke the teacher's certificate, for a period not to exceed one calendar 
year. State educatio~ agencies in other states with reciprocal 
certification agreements shall be notified of the revocation of the 
certificate. In addition to the junior colleges referred to above, 
South Carolina also maintains a system of technical institutions governed 
by a state board and offering vocational and technical diploma and 
associate degree programs. The follol-7ing section refers to those 
institutes: 
59-53-52. Powers and duties of area commissions, generally. The area 
commissioners shall: 
(9) Employ such other personnel as may be necessary; 
(10) Establish, promulgate and enforce reasonable rules and 
regulations for the operation of their facilities; 
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49-8-301. Authority of board. - (a) The [state] board of regents shall 
promulgate a tenure policy or policies for faculty at institutions within 
the state university and community college system of Tennessee, which 
policy or policies shall ensure academic freedom and provide sufficient 
professional security to attract the best qualified faculty available for 
the institutions. 
(b) Pursuant to this part, the board shall: 
(1) Define the nature of tenure at institutions, end the rights and 
responsibilities of faculty lV'ith tenure; 
(2) Determine the minimum qualifications and requirements for 
eligibility of faculty for tenure, and the conditions precedent to the 
award of tenure by the board; 
(3) Provide for the termination of faculty with tenure by institutions 
for adequate cause, for retirement or disability, and for financial 
reasons or curricular reasons in an institution in the discretion of the 
board or its designee; and 
(4) Provide for all other matters relating to tenure deemed necessary by 
the board. 
(c) (1) Tenure shall only be acquired by a faculty member in an 
institution upon positive approval by the board, and no other type of 
tenure or right similar thereto shall be acquired by a faculty member. 
(2) Faculty with tenure shall be subject to all reasonable changes in 
the tenure policy adopted by the board, provided that faculty who have 
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previously been awarded tenure shall retain their tenured status under 
any new policy, and provided further that present faculty in probationary 
employment shall be given credit for service in an institution toward 
completion of any new probationary period. 
49-8-302. Action against tenured employee - Grounds. - "Adequate cause" 
for termination of faculty with tenure shall include the following: 
(1) Incompetence or dishonesty in teaching and research; 
(2) Willful failure to perform the duties and responsibilities for which 
the faculty member ~vas employed, or refusal or continued failure to 
comply with the policies of the board, the institution or the department, 
or to carry out specific assignments, when such policies or assignments 
are reasonable and nondiscriminatory; 
(3) Conviction of a felony or crime involving moral turpitude and 
improper use of narcotics or intoxicants which substantially impairs the 
faculty member's fulfillment of his or her departmental and institutional 
duties and responsibilities; 
(4) Carpicious disregard of accepted standards of professional conduct; 
(5) Falsification of information on an employment application or other 
information concerning qualifications for a position; and 
(6) Failure to mantain the level of professional excellence and ability 
demonstrated by other members of the faculty in the department or 
division of the institution. 
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49-8-303. Procedures for action against tenured employee. -
(a) The board shall develop procedures for the termination of faculty 
with tenure for adequate cause by the institutions following a hearing 
which ensures due process, which procedure shall include the following 
minimum requirements: 
(1) The faculty member shall be notified of the specific charges in 
writing, and shall be notified of the time, place and nature of the 
hearing at least twenty (20) days prior to the hearing; 
(2) The faculty member shall have the right to be represented by counsel 
of his or her own choice; 
(3) A verbatum record of the hearing shall be made, and a type written 
copy made available to the faculty ·member for a reasonable fee at the 
faculty member's request; 
(4) The burden of proof that adequate cause for termination exists shall 
be upon the institution, and shall be satisfied only by clear and 
convincing evidence in the record considered as a whole; 
(5) The faculty member shall have the right to confront and 
cross-examine all witnesses; and 
(6) The findings of fact and the decision will be based solely on the 
hearing record. 
(b) The board shall adopt all additional procedures it deems necessary 
for such hearings, and may provide for review of the decision by the 
board or its designee based upon the record. 
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(c) A faculty member serving a probationary period shall be given an 
oral statement of the reason for his nonappointment to the institution's 
faculty. 
49-8-304. Judicial review. - (a) A faculty member who has been awarded 
tenure, and who has been dismissed or suspended for cause, may obtain de 
novo judicial review of the final decision by filing a petition in a 
chancery court having jurisdiction within thirty (30) days of the final 
decision, and copies of the petition shall be served upon the board and 
all parties of record. 
(b) Within forty-five (45) days after sevice of the petition, or within 
such further time allowed by the court, the board shall transmit to the 
court the original or a certified copy of the entire record of the 
proceeding. 
(c) The chancellor shall reduce his findings of fact and conclusions of 
law to writing and make them parts of the record. 
(d) The decree of the chancery court will be subject to review by appeal 
to the supreme court as provided in the Tennessee Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
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130-082. Governing Board of Junior College or Other Independent School 
District. 
(d) • • • Said board shall be authorized to appoint or employ such 
agents, employees and officials as deemed necessary or advisable to carry 
out any power, duty, or function of said board; and to employ a 
president, dean, or other administrative officer, and upon the 
president's recommendation to employ the faculty and other employees of 
the junior college • • • 
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53-48-15. [State] Board to appoint president for each institution -
Duties and responsibilities. The board after consulting with the 
institutional council shall appoint or hire a president for each state 
university, state college and state junior college 
Unless the board shall reserve to itself such action, the president 
of each institution with the approval of the institutional council: 
(4) May provide for the constitution and organization of the faculty and 
administration of each institution, and enact rules and regulations for 
the government of the faculty and employees of that institution, which 
shall includ~ the establishment of a prescribed system of tenure for each 
institution. 
VERMONT 
No statutory provision for hiring, tenure or dismissal of community 
college faculty exists. 
314 
315 
VIRGINIA 
~3-231. Enforcement of standards for personnel. - The Chancellor shall 
enforce the standards established by the [State] Board for personnel 
employed in the administration of this chapter and remove or cause to be 
removed each employee who does not meet with such standards. 
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28B.50.850. Faculty Tenure-Purpose. It shall be the purpose of 
RCW 28B.50.850 through 28B.50.869 to establish a system of faculty tenure 
which protects the concepts of faculty employment rights and faculty 
involvement in the protection of those rights in the state system of 
community colleges. RCW 28B.50.850 through 28B.60.869 shall define a 
reasonable and orderly process for appointment of faculty members to 
tenure status and the dismissal of the tenured faculty member. 
28B.S0.851. Faculty tenure- Definitions. As used in RCW 28B.50.850 
through 28B.50.869: 
(1) "Tenure" shall mean a faculty appointment for an indefinite period 
of time which may be revoked only for adequate cause and by due process; 
(2)(a) "Faculty appointment11 , except as otherwise provided in subsection 
(2)(b) below, shall mean full time employment as a teacher, counselor, 
librarian or other position for which the training, experience and 
responsibilities are comparable as determined by the appointing 
authority, except administrative appointments; 11faculty appointment 11 
shall also mean department head, division heads, and administrators to 
the extent that such department heads, division heads or administrators 
have had or do have status as a teacher, counselor or librarian; 
(b) 11Faculty appointment 11 shall not mean special faculty appointment as 
a teacher, counselor or librarian or other position as enumerated in 
subsection (2)(a) of this section, which employment results from special 
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funds provided to a community college district from federal monies or 
other special funds which other funds are designated as "special funds" 
by the state board for community college education: Provided, That such 
"special funds" so designated by the state board for purposes for this 
section shall apply only to teachers, counselors and librarians hired 
from grants and service agreements and teachers, counselors and 
librarians hired in nonformule positions. A special faculty appointment 
resulting from such special financing may be terminated upon a reduction 
or elimination of funding or a reduction or elimination of program: 
Provided further, That a "faculty appointee" holding a faculty 
appointment pursuant to subsection (1) or (2) (a) who has been 
subsequently transferred to a position financed from "special funds" 
pursuant to subsection (2)(b) and who thereafter loses his position upon 
reduction or elimination of such "special funding" shall be entitled to 
be returned to his previous status as a faculty appointee pursuant to 
subsection (1) or (2)(a) depending upon his status prior to the "special 
funding" transfer. Notwithstanding the fact that tenure shall not be 
granted to anyone holding a special faculty appointment, the termination 
of any such faculty appointment prior to the expiration of the term of 
such faculty member's individual contract for any cause which is not 
related to elimination or reduction of financing or the elimination or 
reduction of program shall be considered a termination for cause subject 
to the provisions of this chapter; 
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(3) "Probationary faculty appointment" shall mean a faculty appointment 
for a designated period of time which may be terminated without cause 
upon expiration of the probationer's terms of employment; 
(4) "Probationer" shall mean an individual holding a probationary 
faculty appointment; 
(5) "Administrative appointment" shall mean employment in a specific 
administrative position as determined by the appointing authority; 
(6) "Appointing authority" shall mean the board of trustees of a 
community college district; 
(7) "Review committee" shall mean a committee composed of the 
probationer's faculty peers, a student representative, and the 
administrative staff of the community college: Provided, That the 
majority of the committee shall consist of the probationer's faculty 
peers. 
28B.S0-852. Faculty tenure - Rules and regulations - Award of faculty 
tenure - Maximum probationary period. The appointing authority shall 
promulgate rules and regulations implementing RCW 28B. 50.850 through 
28B.50.869 and shall provide for the award of faculty tenure following a 
probationary period not to exceed three consecutive regular college 
years, excluding sumn1er quarter: Provided, That tenure may be awarded at 
any time as may be determined by the appointing authority after it has 
given reasonable consideration to the recommendations of the review 
committee. 
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28B.50.855. Faculty tenure - Written agreement embodying terms of 
employment furnished faculty. The appointing authority shall provide 
each faculty member, immediately upon employment, with a written 
agreement which delineates the terms of employment including all 
conditions and responsibilities attached thereto. 
28B.50.856. Faculty tenure - Evaluation of probationer by review 
committee - Progress report, acknowledgment of receipt - Recommendation 
as to tenure. The probationary faculty appointment period shall be one 
of continuing evaluation of a probationer by a review committee. The 
evaluation process shall place prim~ry importance upon the probationer's 
effectiveness in his appointment. The review committee shall 
periodically advise each probationer, in writing, of his progress during 
the probationary period and receive the probationer's written 
acknowledgment thereof. The review committee shall at appropriate times 
make recommendations to the appointing authority as to whether tenure 
should or should not be granted to individual probationers: Provided, 
That the final decision to award to withhold tenure shall rest with the 
appointing authority, after it has given reasonable consideration to the 
recommendations of the review committee. 
28B.50.857. Faculty tenure - Decision not to renew probationary 
appointment, notice by appointing authority, when. Upon the decision not 
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to renew a probationary faculty appointment, the appointing authority 
shall notify the probationer of such decision as soon as possible during 
the regular college to the last day of the winter quarter. 
28B.50.860. Faculty tenure - Tenure retained upon administrative 
appointment. A tenured faculty member, upon appointment to 
administrative appointment shall be allowed to retain his tenure. 
28B.50.861. Faculty tenure - Dismissal only for sufficient cause. The 
tentured faculty member shall not be dismissed except for sufficient 
cause, nor shall a faculty member who holds a probationary faculty 
appointment be dismissed prior to the written terms of the appointment 
except for sufficient cause. 
28B.50.862. Faculty tenure - Certain grounds constituting sufficient 
cause. Sufficient cause shall also include aiding and abetting or 
participating in: 
(1) Any unlawful act of violence; (2) Any unlawful act resulting in 
destruction of community college property; or (3) Any unlawful 
interference with the orderly conduct of the educational process. 
28B.50.863. Faculty tenure - Review prior to dismissal - Scope -
Recommendations of review committee. Prior to the dismissal of a tenured 
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faculty member, or a'faculty member holding an unexpired probationary 
faculty appointment, the case shall first be reviewed by a review 
committee. The review shall include testimony from all interested 
parties including, but not limited to, other faculty members and 
students. The faculty member whose case is being reviewed shall be 
afforded the right of cross-examination and the opportunity to defend 
himself. The review committee shall prepare recommendations on the 
action they propose be taken and submit such recommendations to the 
appointing authority prior to their final action. 
28B.50.864. Faculty tenure - Appeal from decision for dismissal -
Procedure. Any faculty member dismissed pursuant to RCW 28B.50.850 
through 28B.50.869 shall have a right to appeal the final decision of the 
appointing authority in accordance with RCW 28B.19 .150 as now or 
hereafter amended. 
28B.50.867. Faculty tenure- Tenure rights upon transfer of employment 
to another community college. Upon transfer of employment from one 
community college to another community college within a district, a 
tenured faculty member shall have the right to retain tenure and the 
rights accruing thereto which he had in his previous employment: 
Provided, That upon permanent transfer of employment to another community 
college district, a tenured faculty member shall not have the right to 
retain his tenure or any of the rights accruing thereto. 
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28B.50.869. Faculty tenure - Review committees, composition - Selection 
of teaching faculty representatives, student representative. The review 
committee required by RCW 28B.50.850 through 28B.S0.869 shall be composed 
of members of the administrative staff, a student representative, and the 
teaching faculty. The representatives of the teaching faculty shall 
represent a majority of the members of each review committee. The 
members representing the teaching faculty on each review committee shall 
be selected by a majority of the teaching faculty and faculty department 
heads acting on a body. The student representative, who shall be a full 
time student, shall be chosen by the student association of the 
particular community college in such manner as the members thereof shall 
determine. 
28B.l9.150. Contested cases - Appeal from final decision in formal 
proceeding. 
(1) Any party, including the involved, aggrieved by a final decision in 
a contested case where formal proceeding has been utilized, whether such 
decision is affirmative or negative in form, is entitled to judicial 
review thereof only under the provisions of this chapter, and such party 
may not use any other procedure to obtain judicial review of a final 
decision, even though another procedure is provided elsewhere by a 
special statute or a statute of general application. Where the 
institution's rules provide a procedure for rehearing or reconsideration, 
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and that procedure has not been invoked, the decision shall not be final 
until action has been taken thereon. 
(2) Proceedings for review under this chapter shall be instituted by 
filing a petition in the superior court in the county wherein the primary 
office of the institution involved is located. All petitions shall be 
filed, together with an appropriate cost bond securing payment of costs 
necessary to prepare the record, within thirty days after the service of 
the final decision by the institution. Copies of the petition shall be 
served upon the institution or related board and all other parties of 
record. 
(3) The filing of the petition shall not stay enforcement of the 
decision being appealed. Where other statutes provide for stay or 
supersedas of a decision, it may be stayed by the institution or the 
reviewing court only as provided therein; otherwise the institution may 
do so, or the reviewing court may order a stay upon such terms as it 
deems proper. 
(4) Within thirty days after service of the petition, or within such 
further time as the court may allow, the institution shall transmit to 
the reviewing court the original or a certified copy of the entire record 
of the proceeding under review; but, stipulation of all parties to the 
review proceedings, the record may be shortened. Any part unreasonably 
refusing to stipulate to limit the record may be taxed by the court for 
the additional costs. The court may require [or] permit subsequent 
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corrections or additions to the record when deemed desirable. 
(5) The review shall be conducted by the court without a jury and shall 
be confined to the record, except that in cases of alleged irregularities 
in procedure before the institution now [not] shown in the record, 
testimony thereon may be taken in the court. The court shall, upon 
request, hear oral argument and receive written briefs. 
(6) The court may affirm the decision appealed from, or remand the case 
for further proceedings; or it may reverse the decision if the 
substantial rights of the petitioners may have been prejudiced because 
the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: 
(a) In violation of any state or federal constitutional provisions; or 
(b) In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the 
institution; or 
(c) Made unlawful procedures; or 
(d) Affected by other error of law; or 
(e) Clearly erroneous in view of the entire record submitted and the 
public policy contained in the act of the legislature authorizing the 
decision or order; or 
(f) Arbitrary or capricious. 
34.04.130. Contested cases- Judicial review. (1) Any person aggrieved 
by a final decision in a contested case, whether such decision is 
affirmative or negative in form, is entitled to judicial review thereof 
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only under the provisions of this 1967 amendatory act, and such person 
may not use any other procedure to obtain judicial review of a final 
decision, even though another procedure is provided elsewhere by a 
special statute or a statute of general application. Where the agency's 
rules provide a procedure for rehearing or reconsideration, and that 
procedure has been invoked, the agency decision shall not be final until 
the agency shall have acted thereon. 
(2) Proceedings for review under this chapter shall be instituted by 
filing a petition in the superior court, at the petitioner's option, for 
(a) Thurston county, (b) the county of the petitioner's residence or 
principal place of business, or (c) in any county where the property 
owned by the petitioner and affected by the contested decision is 
located. The petition shall be served and filed within thirty days after 
the service of the final decision of the agency. Copies of the petition 
shall be served upon the agency and all parties of record. If a timely 
petition is filed any party of record not filing or joining in the first 
petition who wants relief from the decision must join in the petition or 
serve and file a cross-petition within twenty days after service of the 
first petition or thirty days after service of the final decision of the 
agency, whichever period of time is longer. The court, in its 
discretion, may permit other interested parties to intervene. 
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(3) The filing of the petition shall not stay enforcment of the agency 
decision. Where other statutes provide for stay or supersedeas of any 
agency decision, it may be stayed by the agency or the reviewing court 
may order a stay upon such terms as it deems proper. 
(4) Within thirty days after service of the petition, or within such 
further time as the court may allow, the agency shall transmit to the 
reviewing court the original or a certified copy of the entire record of 
the proceeding under review; but, by stipulation of all parties to the 
review proceeding, the record may be shortened. Any party unreasonably 
refusing to stipulate to limit the record may be taxed by the court for 
the additional costs. The court may require [or] permit subsequent 
corrections or additions to the record when deemed desirable. 
(5) The reivew shall be conducted by the court without a jury and shall 
be confined to the record, except in cases of alleged irregularities in 
procedure before the agency, now [not] shown in the record, testimony 
thereon may be taken in the court. The court shall, upon request, hear 
oral argument and receive written briefs. 
(6) The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case 
for further proceedings; or it may reverse the decision if the 
substantial rights of the petitioners may have been prejudiced because 
the administrative findings, inferences, or decisions are: 
(a) in violation of constitutional provisions; or 
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(b) in excess of the statutory authority' or jurisdiction of the 
agency; or 
(c) made upon unlawful procedure; or 
(d) affected by other error of law; or 
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(e) clearly erroneous in view of the entire record as submitted and the 
public policy contained in the act of the legislature authorizing the 
decision or order; or 
(f) arbitrary or capricious. 
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18-26-Sc. Notice to probationary faculty members of retention or 
nonretention; hearing. The president of each state college, university 
or community college shall give written notice to probationary faculty 
members concerning their retention or nonretention for the ensuing 
academic year, not later than the first day of March for those 
probationary faculty members who are in their first academic year of 
service; not later than the fifteenth day of December for those 
probationary faculty members who are in their second academic year of 
service; and at least one year before the expiration of an appointment 
for those probationary faculty members who will not be retained shall be 
by certified mail, return receipt requested. Upon request of the 
probationary faculty member not retained, the president of the state 
college, university, or community college shall within ten days, and by 
certified mail, inform the probationary faculty member of the reasons for 
nonretention. Any probationary member who desires to appeal the decision 
may request 3 hearing from the board of regents within ten days after 
re~eiving the statement of reasons. The board of regents shall publish 
appropriate rules to govern the conduct of the appeal herein allowed. 
The board of regents shall, by such rules, prescribe either an unbiased 
committee of the board or appoint a hearing examiner to hear such 
appeals. Such hearing shall be held at the employing institution and 
within thirty days of the request. The rules of evidence shall not 
strictly apply. The faculty member shall be accorded substantive due 
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process, including the right to produce evidence and witnesses and to 
cross-examine witnesses, and to be represented by counsel or other 
representative of his or her choice. If the commi~tee of the board or 
the hearing examiner shall conclude that the reasons for nonretention are 
arbitrary or capricious or without a factual basis, the faculty member 
shall be retained for the ensuing academic year. The decision shall be 
rendered within thirty days after conclusion of the hearing. The term 
"probationary faculty members", shall be defined according to regulations 
promulgated by the board of regents. 
The rights herein provided to probationary faculty members are in 
addition to, and not in lieu of, other rights afforded them by other 
rules and regulations of the board of regents. 
18-26-25. Effect of leave of absence on academic tenure, rank, etc. Any 
other provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding any tenured 
professional at any higher educational institution subject to the control 
and supervisions of the board of regents, who shall, with the consent of 
the governing authority of the higher educational institutions by which 
he is employed, absent himself from his duties at such institution to 
accept employment in any nonelected governmental capacity shall be 
afford~d such benefits of academic tenure, rank and position as if such 
person had remained continuously in the position retained and held at 
such higher education institutions immediately preceeding any such 
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absence: Provided, however, that tenure and rank may be retained during 
an absence of more than two years if the president of the institution 
from which such person is on leave of absence submits in writing during 
' each of such years a request for such retention to the board of regents, 
and the board of regents approves such request for each such year: 
Provided further, that any individual who remains in governmental 
employment with leave granted in accordance with this section shall 
forfeit all rights to academic tenure, rank and position formerly held by 
him at such institution after the eighth year of such employment. 
WISCONSIN 
38.12. District board duties. 
(3) District director and other employees. (a) 
board shall employ and fix the compensation of • 
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2. such 
supervisors, coordinators, teachers and technical advisors and experts as 
are necessary. 
118.22. Renewal of teacher contracts. (1) In this section: 
(a) "Board" means a school board, vocational, technical and adult 
education district board, board of control of a cooperative educational 
service agency or county handicapped children's education board, but does 
not include any board of school directors in a city of the 1st class. 
(b) "Teacher" means any person who holds a teacher's certificate or 
license issued by the state superintendent or a classification status 
under the board of vocational, technical and adult education and whose 
legal employment requires such a certificate, license or classification 
status, but does not include part-time teachers or teachers employed by 
any board of school directors in a city of the 1st class. 
(2) On or before March 15 of the school year during which a teacher 
holds a contract, the board by which the teacher is employed or an 
employee at the direction of the board shall give the teacher written 
notice of nonrenewal of refusal to renew his contract for the ensuing 
school year. If no such notice is given on or before March 15, the 
contract then in force shall continue for the ensuing school year. A 
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teacher who receives a notice of renewal of contract for the ensuing 
school year, or a teacher who does not receive a notice of renewal or 
refusal to renew his contract for the ensuing school year on or before 
March 15, shall accept or reject in writing such contract not later than 
the following April 15. No teacher may be employed or dismissed except 
by a majority vote of the full membership of the board. No such board 
may enter into a contract of employment with a teacher for any period of 
' 
time as to which the teacher is then under a contract of employment with 
another board. 
(3) At least 15 days prior to giving written notice of refusal to renew 
a teacher's contract for the ensuing school year, the employing board 
shall inform the teacher by preliminary notice in writing that the board 
is considering nonrenewal of the teacher's contract and that, if the 
teacher files a request therefor with the board within 5 days after 
receiving the preliminary notice, the teacher has the right to a private 
conference with the board prior to being given written notice of refusal 
to renew his contract. 
(4) A collective bargaining agreement may modify, waive or replace any 
of the provisions of this section as they apply to teachers in the 
collective bargaining unit, but neither the employer nor the bargaining 
agent for the employees is required to bargain such modification, waiver 
or replacement. 
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118.23. Populous counties; teacher tenure. (1) In this section 
"teacher" means any person who holds a teacher's certificate or license 
and whose legal employment requires such certificate or license, who is 
employed full time and meets the minimum requirements prescribed by the 
governing body employing such person and who is employed by a school 
board, board of trustees or governing body of any school operating under 
chs. 115 to 121 and lying entirely and exclusively in a county having a 
population of 500,000 or more. "Teacher" does not include any 
superintendent or assistant superintendent; any teacher having civil 
service status under ss. 63.01 to 63.17; any teacher in a public school 
in a 1st class city; or any person who is employed by a school board 
during time of war as a substitute for a teacher on leave while on 
full-time duty in the U.S. armed forces or any reserve or auxiliary 
thereof and who is notified in writing at the time of employment that the 
position is of a temporary nature. 
(2) All teaches shall be employed on probation, but after continuous and 
successful probation for three years and the gaining of the 4th contract 
in the same school system or school, their employment shall be permanent 
except as provided in sub. (3) ••• Upon accepting employment in another 
school system or school to which this section applies, a teacher who has 
acquired permanent employment under this section shall be on probation 
therein for 2 years. After continuous and successful probation for 2 
years and gaining the 3rd contract in such school system or school, 
employment therein shall be permanent except as provided in sub. (3). 
(3) No teacher who has become permanently employed under this section 
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may be refused employment, dismissed, removed or discharged, except for 
inefficiency or immorality, for willful and persisteet violation of 
reasonable regulations of the governing body of the school system or 
school or for other good cause, upon written charges based on fact 
preferred by the governing body or other proper officer of the school 
system or school in which the teacher is employed. Upon the teacher's 
written request and no less than 10 nor more than 30 days after receipt 
of notice by the teacher, the charges shall be heard and determined by 
the governing body of the school system or school by which the teacher is 
employed. Hearings shall be public when requested by the teacher and all 
proceedings there at shall be taken by a court reporter. All parties 
shall be entitled to be represented by counsel at the hearing. The 
action of the governing body is final. 
(4) If necessary to decrease the number of permanently employed teachers 
by reason of a substantial decrease in pupil population within the school 
district, the governing body of the school system or school may lay off 
the necessary number of teachers, but only in the inverse order of the 
appointment of such teachers. No permanently employed teacher may be 
prevented from securing other employment during the period he is laid off 
under this subsection. Such teachers shall be reinstated in inverse 
order of their being laid off, if qualified to fill the vacanacies. Such 
reinstatement shall not result in a loss of credit for previous years of 
service. No new permanent or substitute appointments may be made while 
there are laid off permanent teachers available who are qualified to fill 
the vacancies. 
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(5) A collective bargaining agreement may modify, waive or replace any 
of the provisions of this section as they apply to teachers in the 
collective bargaining unit, but neither the employer nor the bargaining 
agent for the employees is required to bargain such modification, waiver 
or replacement. 
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21-18-206. Same; duties. The community college district board shall: 
(i) Prescribe and enforce rules and regulations for its own government 
and for government of the community college under its jurisdiction. 
Rules and regulations shall not be inconsistent with the rules and 
regulations of the community college commission; 
21-18-211. Same; powers and duties. 
commission shall: 
(a) The [community college] 
(vi) Act as a board of final appeal for the arbitration of disputes and 
differences between community colleges or which may arise on the staff or 
board of trustees of any of the community colleges whenever so requested 
to act by the local college district. 
